Selected quad for the lemma: authority_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
authority_n	absolute_a	law_n	power_n	2,756	5	5.3176	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A85293	The anarchy of a limited or mixed monarchy. Or, A succinct examination of the fundamentals of monarchy, both in this and other kingdoms, as well about the right of power in kings, as of the originall or naturall liberty of the people. A question never yet disputed, though most necessary in these times.	Filmer, Robert, Sir, d. 1653.	1648 (1648)	Wing F910; Thomason E436_4; ESTC R202028	34,573	45

how far the Parliament is able to create new formes and precedents and has a jurisdiction over it self All these doubts would be solemnly solved But in the first place the true priviledges of Parliament belonging not only to the being and efficacy of it but to the honor and complement of it would be clearly declared for the very naming of priviledges of Parliament as if they were chimeras to the ignorant sort and utterly unknown unto the learned hath been entertained with scorne since the beginning of this Parliament In this large passage taken out of the Observator which concernes the originall of all Government two notable Propositions may be principally observed First our Observator confesseth arbitrary or absolute government to be the first and the safest government for the world Secondly he acknowledgeth that the jurisdiction is uncertaine and the priviledges not cleerely declared of limited Monarchy These two evident truths delivered by him he labours mainely to disguise He seemes to insinuate that arbitrary Government was but in the infancy of the World for so he termes it but if we enquire of him how long he will have this infancy of the world to last he grants it continued above three thousand years which is an unreasonable time for the world to continue under age for the first opposers he doth find of arbitrary power were the ephori tribuni curatores c. The ephori were above three thousand years after the Creation and the tribuni were later as for his curatores I know not whom he meanes except the Master of the Court of Wards I cannot English the word curator better I doe not believe that he can shew that any curatores or et caeteras which he mentions were so ancient as the ephori As for the tribuni he mistakes much if he thinkes they were erected to limit and bound Monarchy for the state of Rome was at the least Aristocraticall as they call it if not popular when tribunes of the people were first hatched And for the Ephori their power did not limit or regulate Monarchy but quite take it away for a Lacedemonian King in the judgement of Aristotle was no King indeed but in name onely as Generalissimo of an Army and the best polititians reckon the Spartan Common-wealth to have been Aristocraticall and not Monarchicall and if a limited Monarchy cannot be found in Lacedemon I doubt our Observator will hardly find it any where else in the whole World and in substance he confesseth as much when he saith Now most Countries have found out an art and peaceable order for publique Assemblies as if it were a thing but new done and not before for so the word Now doth import The observator in confessing the Jurisdiction to be incertaine and the priviledges undetermined of that Court that should bound and limit Monarchy doth in effect acknowledge there is no such Court at all for every Court consists of Jurisdictions and Priviledges it is these two that create a Court and are the essentials of it If the admirably composed Court of Parliament have some defects which may receive amendment as he saith and if those defects be such as cause divisions both between the Houses and between the King and both Houses and these divisions be about so maine a matter as Jurisdictions and Priviledges and power to create new Priviledges all which are the fundamentals of every Court for untill they be agreed upon the act of every Court may not onely be uncertaine but invalid and cause of tumults and sedition And if all these doubts divisions have need to be solemnly solved as our Observator confesseth Then he hath no reason at all to say that Now the conditions of Supream Lords are wisely determined and quietly conserved or that Now most Countries have found out an art and peaceable order for publick affaires whereby the people may resume its own power to do it self right without injurie unto Princes for how can the underived Majesty of the people by assuming its own power tell how to do her selfe right or how to avoid doing injury to the Prince if her jurisdiction be uncertain and Priviledges undetermined He tels us Now most Countries have found an art and peaceable order for publick Assemblies and to the intent that Princes may not be Now beyond all limits and Laws the whole community in t is underived Majesty shall convene to do Justice But he doth not name so much as one Country or Kingdome that hath found out this art where the whole Community in its underived Majesty did ever convene to do Justice I challenge him or any other for him to name but one Kingdome that hath either Now or heretofore found out this art or peaceable order We do hear a great rumor in this age of moderated and limited Kings Poland Sweden and Denmark are talked of for such and in these Kingdomes or no where is such a moderated Government as our Observator meanes to be found A little enquiry would be made into the manner of the Government of these Kingdomes for these Northern people as Bodin observeth breathe after liberty First for Poland Boterus saith that the Government of it is elective altogether and representeth rather an Aristocracie then a Kingdome the Nobility who have great authority in the Diets chusing the King and limiting His Authority making His Soveraignty but a slavish Royalty these diminutions of regality began first by default of King Lewis and Jagello who to gaine the succession in the Kingdome contrary to the Laws one for his daughter and the other for his son departed with many of his Royalties and prerogatives to buy the voices of the Nobility The French Author of the book called the Estates of the world doth informe us that the Princes Authority was more free not being subject to any Laws and having Absolute Power not onely of their estates but also of life and death Since Christian Religion was received it began to be moderated first by holy admonitions of the Bishops and Clergy and then by services of the Nobility in war Religious Princes gave many Honours and many liberties to the Clergy and Nobility and quit much of their Rights the which their successors have continued The superiour dignity is reduced to two degrees that is the Palatinate and the Chastelleine for that Kings in former times did by little and little call these men to publike consultations notwithstanding that they had absolute power to do all things of themselves to command dispose recompence and punish of their own motions since they have ordained that these dignities should make the body of a Senate The King doth not challenge much right and power over His Nobility nor over their estates neither hath he any over the Clergy And though the Kings Authority depends on the Nobility for His election yet in many things it is absolute after he He is chosen He appoints the Diets at what time and place He pleaseth He

chooseth Lay Councelors and nominates the Bishops and whom He will have to be His Privy Counsell He is absolute disposer of the Revenews of the Crown He is absolute establisher of the decrees of the Diets it is in His power to advance and reward whom He pleaseth He is Lord immediate of His Subjects but not of His Nobility He is Soveraigne Judge of His Nobility in criminall causes The power of the Nobility daily encreaseth for that in respect of the Kings election they neither have law rule nor forme to do it neither by writing nor tradition As the King governs His Subjects which are immediately His with absolute Authority so the Nobility dispose immediately of their vassals over whom every one hath more then a regall power so as they entreat them like slaves There be certaine men in Poland who are called EARTHLY MESSENGERS or Nuntios they are as it were Agents of Jurisdictions or circles of the Nobility these have a certaine Authority and as Boterus saith in the time of their Diets these men assemble in a place neer to the Senate House where they choose two Marshals by whom but with a tribune-like authority they signifie unto the Counsell what their requests are Not long since their authority and reputation grew so mightily that they now carry themselves as heads and governours rather then officers and ministers of the publike decrees of the State One of the Counsell refused his Senators place to become one of these officers Every Palatine the King requiring it cals together all the Nobility of His Palatinate where having propounded unto them the matters whereon they are to treate and their will being known they choose four or six out of the company of the EARTHLY MESSENGERS these deputies meet and make one body which they call the order of Knights This being of late years the manner and order of the government of Poland it is not possible for the Observator to find among them that the whole community in its underived Majesty doth ever convene to do Justice nor any election or representation of the Community or that the people assume its owne power to do it self right The EARTHLY MESSENGERS though they may be thought to represent the Commons and of late take much upon them yet they are elected and chosen by the Nobility as their agents and officers The Community are either vassals to the King or to the Nobility and enjoy as little freedome or liberty as any Nation But it may be said perhaps that though the Community do not limit the King yet the Nobility do and so he is a limited Monarchy The Answer is that in truth though the Nobility at the choosing of their King do limit his power and do give him an oath yet afterwards they have alwayes a desire to please him and to second his will and this they are forced to do to avoid discord for by reason of their great power they are subject to great dissentions not only among themselves but between them and the order of Knights which are the earthly messengers yea the Provinces are at discord one with another and as for Religion the diversity of Sects in Poland bred perpetuall jars and hatred among the people there being as many Sects as in Amsterdam it self or any popular government can desire The danger of sedition is the cause that though the Crown depends on the election of the Nobility yet they have never rejected the Kings successour or transferred the Realme to any other family but once when deposing Ladislaus for his idlenesse whom yet afterward they restored they elected Wencelaus King of Bohemia But if the Nobility do agree to hold their King to his conditions which is not to conclude any thing but by the advise of his Counsell of Nobles nor to choose any wife without their leaves then it must be said to be a Common-weal not a Royalty and the King but only the mouth of the Kingdome or as Queen Christina complained that Her Husband was but the shadow of a Soveraigne Next if it be considered how the Nobility of Poland came to this great power it was not by any originall contract or popular convention for it is said they have neither Law rule nor forme written or unwritten for the election of their King they may thanke the Bishops and Clergy for by their holy admonitions and advise good and Religious Princes to shew their piety were first brought to give much of their Rights and Priviledges to their Subjects devout Kings were meerely cheated of some of their Royalties What power soever generall Assemblies of the Estates claime or exercise over and above the bare naked act of Counselling they were first beholding to the Popish Clergy for it it is they first brought Parliaments into request and power I cannot find in any Kingdome but onely where Popery hath been that Parliaments have been of reputation and in the greatest times of Superstition they are first mentioned As for the Kingdome of Denmarke I read that the Senators who are all chosen out of the Nobility and seldome exceed the number of 28 with the cheif of the Realme do choose their King They have alwaies in a manner set the Kings eldest Son upon the Royall Throne The Nobility of Denmarke withstood the Coronation of Frederick 1559 till he sware not to put any Noble man to death untill he were judged of the Senat that all Noble men should have power of life and death over their Subjects without appeal and the King to give no office without consent of the Councell There is a Chancelour of the Realme before whom they do appeal from all the Provinces and Islands and from him to the King himselfe I hear of nothing in this Kingdome that tends to popularity no Assembly of the Commons no elections or representation of them Sweden is governed by a King heretofore elective but now made hereditary in Gustavus time it is divided into Provinces an appeale lieth from the Vicount of every teritory to a Soveraigne Judge called a Lamen from the Lamens to the Kings Councell and from this Councell to the King himself Now let the Observator bethinke himself whether all or any of these three Countries have found out any art at all whereby the people ●r community may assume its owne power if neither of these Kingdomes have most Countries have not nay none have The people or Community in these three Realms are as absolute vassals as any in the world the regulating power if any be is in the Nobility Nor is it such in the Nobility as it makes shew for The election of Kings is rather a formality then any real power for they dare hardly choose any but the Heire or one of the blood Royall if they should choose one among the Nobility it would prove very factious if a stranger odious neither safe For the Government though the Kings be sworne to raigne according to the Laws and are not to do any thing without the consent of their Councell in publick affaires yet in regard they have power both to advance and reward whom they please the Nobility and Senators do comply with their Kings and Boterus concludes of the Kings of Poland who seem to be most moderated that such as is their valour dexterity wisdome such is their Power Authority and Government Also Bodin saith that these three Kingdomes are States changeable and uncertaine as the Nobility is stronger then the Prince or the Prince then the Nobility and the people are so far from liberty that he saith Divers particular Lords exact not only customes but tributes also which are confirmed and grow stronger both by long prescription of time and use of Judgements The End

mixed Monarchy Machivell is the first in Christendome that I can find that writ of a Mixed Government but not one syllable of a Mixed Monarchy he in his discourses or disputations upon the Decades of Livy falls so enamored with the Roman Common-wealth that he thought he could never sufficiently grace that popular government unlesse he said there was something of Monarchy in it yet he was never so impudent as to say it was a mixed Monarchy And what Machivell hath said for Rome the like hath Contarene for Venice But Bodin hath layed open the errors of both these as also of Polibius and some few others that held the like opinions As for the Kingdome of England if it have found out a form of Government as the Treatise layeth it down of such perfection as never any other people could It is both a glory to the Nation and also to this Author who hath first decipher'd it I now make my approach to the Book it self The title is A Treatise of Monarchy The first part of it is of Monarchy in Generall Where first I charge the Author that he hath not given us any definition or description of Monarchy in Generall for by the rules of method he should have first defined and then divided for if there be severall sorts of Monarchy then in something they must agree which makes them to be Monarchies and in something they must disagree and differ which makes them to be severall sorts of Monarchies in the first place he should have shewed us in what they all agreed which must have been a definition of Monarchy in Generall which is the foundation of the Treatise and except that be agreed upon we shal argue upon we know not what I presse not this maine omission of our Author out of any humor of wrangling but because I am confident that had he pitched upon any definition of Monarchy in Generall his own definition would have confuted his whole Treatise Besides I find him pleased to give us a handsome definition of Absolute Monarchy from whence I may infer that he knew no other definition that would have fitted all his other sorts of Monarchy it concerned him to have produced it lest it might be thought there could be no Monarchy but Absolute What our Author hath omitted I shall attempt to supply and leave to the scanning And it shall be a reall as well as nominall definition of Monarchy A Monarchy is the government of one alone For the better credit of this definition though it be able to maintain it self yet I shall deduce it from the principles of our Author of the Treatise of Monarchy We all know that this word Monarch is compounded of two Greek words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is imperare to govern and rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies one alone The understanding of these two words may be picked out of our Author First for government he teacheth us it is Potestatis exercitium the exercise of a morall p. 1. power next he grants us that every Monarch even his limited p. 12. Monarch must have the Supream power of the State in him so that his power must no way be limited by any power above his for then he were not a Monarch but a subordinate Magistrate Here we have a fair confession of a supreame unlimited power in his limited Monarch if you will know what he meanes by these words supream power turn to his 26 page there you will find Supream power is either Legislative or Gubernative and that the legislative power is the chief of the two he makes both supream and yet one chief the like distinction he hath before where he saith The power of Magistracy in respect of its degrees is Nomotheticall or p. 5. Architectonicall and Gubernative or Executive by these words of Legislative Nomotheticall and Architectonicall power in plain English he understands a power of making Laws and by Gubernative and Executive a power of putting those Laws in execution by judging and punishing offenders The result we have from hence is that by the Authors acknowledgment every Monarch must have the Supream power and that supream power is a power to make laws and howsoever the Author makes the Gubernative and Executive power a part of the Supream power yet he confesseth the Legislative to be chief or the highest degree of power for he doth acknowledge degrees of Supream power nay he afterwards teacheth us that the Legislative power is the height of power to which the other parts p. 4● are subsequent and subservient if Gubernative be subservient to Legislative how can Gubernative power be supream Now let us examine the Authors Limited Monarch by these his own rules he tells us that in a moderated limited stinted conditionate ● 12. legall or allayed Monarchy for all these tearms he hath for it the Supream power must be restrained by some Law according to which this power was given and by direction of which this power must act when in a line before he said that the Monarchs power must not be limited by any power above his yet here he will have his Supream power restrained not limited and yet restrained is not a restraint a limitation and if restrained how is it supream and if restrained by some law is not the power of that law and of them that made that law above his supream power and if by the direction of such law only he must govern where is the Legislative power which is the chief of Supream power when the Law must rule and govern the Monarch and not the Monarch the Law he hath at the most but a Gubernative or Executive power if his authority transcends its bounds if it command p. 14. beyond the Law and the Subject is not bound legally to subjection in such cases and if the utmost extent of the Law of the land be the measure of the Limited Monarchs power and Subjects duty where shall we find the Supream power that Culmen or apex potestatis p. 16. that prime 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which our Author saith must be in every Monarch The word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies principality and power doth also signifie principium beginning which doth teach us that by the word Prince or principality the principium or beginning of Government is meant this if it be given to the Law it robs the Monarch and makes the Law the primum mobile and so that which is but the instrument or servant to the Monarch becomes the master Thus much of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The other word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 solus one alone the Monarch must not only have the Supream power unlimited but he must have it alone without any companions Our Author teacheth us He is no p. 15. Monarch if the Supream power be not in one And again he saith if you put the apex potestatis or supream power

in each mans cause who will but question the legality of the Monarchs Government Certainly the sentence cannot but be unjust where but one mans tale is heard For all this the conclusion is Every man must oppose or not oppose the Monarch according to his owne conscience Thus at the last every man is brought by this Doctrine of our Authors to be his owne judge And I also appeal to the consciences of all mankinde whether the end of this be not utter confusion and Anarchy Yet after all this the Author saith this power of every mans judging p. 18. the illegall acts of the Monarch argues not a superiority of those who judge over him who is judged and he gives us a profound reason for it his words are it is not authorative and civill but morall residing in reasonable creatures and lawfull for them to execute What our Author meanes by these words not authorative and civill but morall perhaps I understand not though I think I doe yet it serves my turne that he saith that resistance ought to be made and every man must oppose or not oppose according as in conscience he can acquit or condemn the acts of his governour for if it inable a man to resist and oppose his Governour without question t is authorative and civill whereas he addes that morall judgement is residing in reasonable creatures and lawfull for them to execute he seemes to imply that authorative and civill judgement doth not reside in reasonable creatures nor can be lawfully executed Such a conclusion fits well with Anarchy for he that takes away all Government and leaves every man to his owne conscience and so makes him an Independent in State may well teach that authority resides not in reasonable creatures nor can be lawfully executed I passe from his absolute and limited Monarchy to his division or partition for he allowes no division of Monarchy into simple and mixed viz. of a Monarch the Nobility and Community Where first observe a doubt of our Authors whether a firme p. 25. union can be in a mixture of equality he rather thinks there must be a priority of order in one of the three or else there can be no unity He must know that priority of order doth not hinder but that there may be an equality of mixture if the shares be equall for he that hath the first share may have no more then the others so that if he will have an inequality of mixture a primity of share will not serve the turne the first share must be greater or better then the others or else they will be equall and then he cannot call it a mixed Monarchy where only a primity of share in the Supream power is in one but by his own confession he may better call it a mixed Aristocracy or mixed Democracy then a mixed Monarchy since he tells us the Houses of Parliament sure have two parts p. 56. of the greatest legislative authority and if the King have but a third part sure their shares are equall The first step our Author makes is this The soveraigne power must be originally in all three next he finds that if there be an equality of shares in three Estates there can be no ground to denominate a Monarch and then his mixed Monarch might be thought but an empty title Therefore in the third place he resolves us that to salve all A power must be sought out wherewith the Monarch p. 25. must be invested which is not so great as to destroy the mixture nor so titular as to destroy the Monarchy and therefore he conceives it may be in these particulars First a Monarch in a mixed Monarchy may be said to be a Monarch as he conceives if he be the head fountain of the power which governs p. 26. executes the established Laws that is a man may be a Monarch though he doe but give power to others to govern and execute the established Laws thus he brings his Monarch one step or peg lower still then he was before at first he made us believe his Monarch should have the Supream power which is the legislative then he falls from that and tells us A limited Monarch must govern according to law onely thus he is brought from the legislative to the gubernative or executive power only nor doth he stay here but is taken a hole lower for now he must not govern but he must constitute Officers to govern by laws if chusing Officers to govern be governing then our Author will allow his Monarch to be a Governour not else and therefore he that divided Supream power into legislative and gubernative doth now divide it into legislative and power of constituting Officers for governing by Laws and this he saith is left to the Monarch Indeed you have left him a faire portion of power but are we sure he may enjoy this it seems our Author is not confident in this neither and some others doe deny it him our Author speaking of the government of this Kingdome saith The choice of the Officers p. 38. is intrusted to the judgement of the Monarch for ought I know he is not resolute in the point but for ought he knows and for ought I know his Monarch is but titular an empty title certaine of no power at all The power of chusing Officers only is the basest of all powers Aristotle as I remember saith The common people are fit for nothing but to chuse Officers and to take accompts and indeed in all popular governments the multitude perform this work and this work in a King puts him below all his Subjects and makes him the onely Subject in a Kingdome or the onely man that cannot Govern there is not the poorest man of the multitude but is capable of some Office or other and by that means may sometime or other perhaps govern according to the laws onely the King can be no Officer but to chuse Officers his Subjects may all Governe but he may not Next I cannot see how in true sense our Author can say his Monarch is the head and fountain of power since his doctrine is that in a limited Monarchy the publick society by originall constitution confer on one man power is not then the publick society the head and fountain of power and not the King Again when he tels us of his Monarch that both the other States as well conjunctim as divisim be his sworn subjects and owe obedience to his commands he doth but flout his poor Monarch for why are they called his Subjects and his Commons he without any complement is their Subject for they as Officers may governe and command according to Law but he may not for he must judge by his judges in Courts of Justice onely that is he may not judge or governe at all 2. As for the second particular the sole or chiefe power in capacitating persons for the Surpeame power And 3. As to this third

particular the power of convocating such persons they are both so far from making a Monarch that they are the only way to make him none by choosing and calling others to share in the Supreame power 4. Lastly concerning his Authority being the last and greatest in the establishing every Act It makes him no Monarch except he be sole that hath that Authority neither his primity of share in the Supreame power nor his Authority being last no nor his having the greatest Authority doth make him a Monarch unlesse he have that Authority alone Besides how can he shew that in his mixed Monarchy the Monarchs power is the greatest The greatest share that our Author allowes him in the legislative power is a negative voice and the like is allowed to the Nobility and Commons And truly a negative voice is but a base tearme to expresse a Legislative power a Negative voice is but a privative power or indeed no power at all to do any thing onely a power to hinder an Act from being done Wherefore I conclude not any of his four nor all of them put p. 26. into one person makes the state Monarchicall This mixed Monarchy just like the limited ends in confusion destruction of all Government you shall hear the Authors confession That one inconvenience must necessarily be in all mixed Governments p. 28. which I shewed to be in limited Governmēts there can be no constituted legall Authorative Judge of the fundamentall controversies arising between the three Estates If such do rise it is the fatall disease of those Governments for which no salve can be applied It is a case beyond the possible provision of such a Government of this question there is no legall judge The accusing side must make it evident to every mans conscience the appeale must be to the community as if there were no Government and as by evidence consciences are convinced they are bound to give their assistance The wit of man cannot say more for Anarchy Thus have I picked out the flowers out of his Doctrine about limited Monarchy and presented them with some brief Annotations it were a tedious worke to collect all the learned contradictions and ambiguous expressions that accur in every page of his platonique Monarcy the booke hath so much of fancy that it is a better piece of Poetry then Policy Because many may thinke that the maine doctrine of limited and mixed Monarchy may in it self be most authenticall and grounded upon strong and evident reason although our Author perhaps have failed in some of his expressions and be liable to exceptions Therefore I will be bold to enquire whether Aristotle could find either reason or example of a limited or mixed Monarchy and the rather because I find our Author altogether insists upon a rationall way of justifying his opinion No man I thinke will deny but that Aristotle was sufficiently curious in searching out the severall formes of Common-wealths and Kingdomes yet I do not find that he ever so much as dreamed of either a limited or mixed Monarchy Severall other sorts of Monarchies he reckons up In the third booke of his Politiques he spends three whole Chapters together upon the severall kindes of Monarchy First in his fourteenth Chapter he mentions four kindes of Monarchy The Laconique or Lacedemonian The Barbarique The Aesymneticall The Heroique The Laconique or Lacedemonian King saith he had only Supreame power when he was out of the bounds of the Lacedemonian territories then he had absolute power his Kingdome was like to a perpetuall Lord Generall of an Army The Barbarique King saith Aristotle had a power very neere to tyranny yet they were lawfull and paternall because the Barbarians are of a more servile nature then the Grecians and the Asiatiques then the Europeans they do willingly without repining live under a masterly Government yet their government is stable and safe because they are paternall and lawfull Kingdomes and their guardes are Royall and not tyrannicall for Kings are guarded by their owne Subjects and Tyrants are guarded by strangers The Aesymneticall King saith Arist in old time in Greece was an elective Tyrant and differed only from the Barbarian Kings in that he was elective and not paternall these sorts of Kings because they were tyrannicall were Masterly but because they were over such as voluntarily elected them they were Regall The Heroique were those saith Aristotle which flourished in the heroicall times to whom the people did willingly obey and they were paternall and lawfull because these Kings did deserve well of the multitude either by teaching them arts or by warring for them or by gathering them together when they were dispersed or by dividing lands amongst them These Kings had Supreame power in war in sacrifices in Judicature These four sorts of Monarchy hath Aristotle thus distinguished and after summes them up together and concludes his Chapter as if he had forgot himself and reckons up a fift kind of Monarchy which is saith he when one alone hath Supreame power of all the rest for as there is a domesticall Kingdome of one house so the Kingdome of a City or of one or many Nations is a family These are all the sorts of Monarchy that Aristotle hath found out and he hath strained hard to make them so many First for his Lacedemonian King himselfe confesseth that he was but a kind of military Commander in war and so in effect no more a King then all Generals of Armies And yet this No-King of his was not limited by any Law nor mixed with any companions of his Government when he was in the wars out of the confines of Lacedemon he was as Aristotle stiles him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of full and absolute command no Law no companion to govern his Army but his owne will Next for Aristotles Aesymneticall King it appears he was out of date in Aristotles time for he saith he was amongst the ancient Greekes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aristotle might well have spared the naming him if he had not wanted other sorts for the honour of his owne Nation for he that but now told us the Barbarians were of a more servile nature then the Graecians comes here and tels us that these old Greeke Kings were elective tyrants The Barbarians did but suffer tyrants in shew but the old Graecians choose tyrants indeed which then must we thinke were the greater slaves the Greeks or the Barbarians Now if these sorts of Kings were tyrants we cannot suppose they were limited either by Law or joyned with companions Indeed Arist saith some of these tyrants were limited to certaine times and actions for they had not all their power for terme of life nor could meddle but in certaine businesses yet during the time they were tyrants and in the actions whereto they were limited they had absolute power to do what they list according to their owne will or else they could not have been said to be tyrants As for Aristotles Heroicke