sincere Religion of the Church is continued and established by the King And do recognize as we are bound by the law of God and man the Realm of England and the Imperiall Crown thereof doth belong to him by inherent birthright and lawfull and undoubted succession and submit our selves and our posterities for ever untill the last drop of bloud be spent to his rule and beseech the King to accept the same as the first fruits of our Loyalty and Faith to his Majesty and his posterity for ever and for that this Act is not compleat nor perfect without his Majesties assent the same is humbly desired This proves saith Judge Ienkins 1. That the Houses are not above the King 2. That Kings have not their titles to the Crown by the two Houses but 3. by inherent birth-right and 4. That there can be no Statute without his express assent and so 5. It destroyes the Chimaera of the Kings virtuall being in the Houses 18. The Kings Proclamations heretofore to severall purposes were of no less force then Acts of Parliament And the ground of it was that the supremitie of the Regal power is given by God And however that Act was indeed repealed by the meek concession of King Edward the sixth yet the Reason of the Repeal is recorded to have been this A willingness in the King to gratifie his people upâ—n trust that they would not abuse the same but rather be encouraged with more faithfulness and diligence to serve his Highness So when Charles the First passed a Bill for the continuance of the long Parliament indefinitely it was upon their promise that the gracious favour of his Majesty expressed in that Bill should not encourage them to do any thing which otherwise had not been sit to be done And so good is the Rule in the Civil Law Cessante causa cessat Lex That the Lords and Commons even of that very Parliament did dâ—clare it to hold good in Acts of Parliament 19. When 't was declared by all the Iudges and Sergeants of Law that it cannot be said the King doth wrong it was by a Periphrasis A Declaration of his Supâ—emacy For the meaning of it must be say the greatest Lawyers That what the King doth in point of Jurisdiction he doth by his Iudges who are sworn to deal legally between the King and his people So as the Judges may be questioned for violation of Law but the King is unaccountable and on his person or power no Reflection is to be made § 78. Thus I have given such an account of the proper subject of Supremacy as my Notes of Observation suggest unto me at this time I gather'd my Notes more especially for my private use and information that I might know what Party I ought to own in these times of Triall and Temptation partly out of the Papers which passed betwixt the King and both Houses of Parliament partly from the writings of Mr. Prin Mr. Diggs Iudge Ienkins and Dr. Langbane partly out of the Book of Statutes though I have not time to consult them much Many more Arguments I could urge out of the works of Iudge Ienkins but that I find them too many to be transcribed in this Appendix and withall I consider that book is cheap and little and I hope easily to be had which makes me choose to referr my Readers to his whole Lex Terrae from page 8. to page 63. I have been so convinced by all put together which hath been said as I cannot but conclude with the most Learned and moderate Doctor Sanderson That at least amongst us here in England there can be nothing more certain or conspicuous unless we will not use our eyes but rather choose to be blind at noon by stoutly winking against the Sun then that the power of these Three Kingdoms doth onely belong to his Serene and Supreme Royall Majesty This is said by that great and judicious Casuist in his stating the obligation and efficient cause of humane Lawes After which if Mr. Hickman shall yet contend that the Oxford Visitors were commissioned by the Supreme Authority of the Nation though by the two Houses onely not onely without but against the pleasure of the King I will onely referr him to certain Notes on the Oathes of Supremacy and Allegiance in a late-Printed Book which is thus â—ntitled The Resurrection of Loyalty and Obedience out of the Grave of Rebellion § 80. But I printed saith Mr. Hickman as if I had right to two Fellowships and asks how else he is but one of my receivers p 46. To which I answer 1. That for any thing I know Mr. Hickman succeeded him that succeeded me And my words of him were these that for ought I know he may be in possession of mine own fellowship c. Or 2. If he did not succeed my successor but that his Robbery is immediate not once removed I will give him an Answer to chew upon out of the Digests When a number of men do joâ—â— their strength to steal a piece of Timber or any thing else which is anothers which none of them singly could have carried away Vlpian saith that each of them severally as well as all of them joyntly is lyable to an action for the double value of the thing And so when the right of a Society is invaded by a Society which was our case in Magd. Colledge when almost all were at once bereaved by men of violence all may require their right of all and every man from every man For every man by partnership is an Accessary to all that have done the wrong as well as principall in part and indefinitely and so responsible to all who receive the wrong or do require a reparation I could prove to Mr. Hickman that he is guilty of the Visitor's sin by accepting the spoils of their injustice But I am ready to pardon though not to dissemble my being injur'd § 81. I had but said by such a figure as is allowable in Scripture It seems the Visitors made him one of my Receivers and Vsu-fructuaries when taking my words by the wrong handle he pretends that His is the usus-fructus p. 46. But 1. he knows I there added That my legitimate Successor they could not make him which is a proof that what I spake was of what they did not ought to do And a Facto ad Ius no good Argument is to be drawn The Visitors made him my Receiver as they made their strength the law of justice Or as Lambert made Cromwell the Kings Receiver 'T is easie for one man to be mâ—de an other man's Receiver and yet by a Proverb to be as bad as the thief that made him The sons of violence and rapine made one another what they pleased as opportunity and power was in their hands So it was said by Doctor Heylin that Mr. Hickman had made a Book But he presently added As
Kings Prerogative as well as Magna Charta is proved by Iudge Ienkins to be a principall part of the common Law and Royal Government a Law fundamental Nay 9. It is proved by the same most learned and pious Iudge That the Supreme power even in time of Parliament was declared by both Houses to belong unto the King 10. The Kings Supremacy hath been proved by so many Arguments out of Bracton as may be seen in Dudley Diggs The Reasons of the Vniversity of Oxford Iudge Ienkins and the like that I shall onely translate some few short passages into English The King saith he hath power and Iurisdiction over all who are within his Kingdome and none but He. Every one is under the King and he under God onely He hath no Peer or equal with his Kingdome mâ—ch less is inferiour unto his subjects God alone is his superiour and to God alone is he accomptable In a word The things that concern Iurisdiction and Peace or are annexed to peace and Iustice do belong to none but to the Crown and the Kingly Dignity nor can they be separated from the Crown for as much as the Crown consisteth in them 11. The Kings supremacy is evinced from the Nature of all his subjects Tenures they holding their Lands of him in Fee Whiâ—h though it gives a perpeâ—ual Estate yet is it not absolute but conditionall as depending on the acknowledgement of superiority and as being forfeitable upon the non-performance of some duties on which supposition it still returns unto the King For the breach of Fidelity is loss of Fee In short it is agreed among the most learned in the Law â— That the King alone hath such a property in all his Lands as Lawyers are wont to call Alaâ—dium because he doth hold in his own full Right without any service or payment of Rent because from God onely 2. That subjects of all Degrees do hold their Lands ut Feuda in the nature of Fee which implyes Fealty to a Superiour 12. The Oath of Allegeance hath the force of another Oath of Supremacy For Legiancy is defined to be an obligation upon all subjects to take part with their Liege Lord against all men living to aid and assist him with their bodies and minds with their advise and power not to lift up their arms against him nor to support in any way those that oppose him Now as no Liege Lord can acknowledge any Superiour and though bound to some duties is not bound under pain of Forfeiture so subjects on the other side are Homines Ligii all Liege-men owing him Faith and Allegiance as their Superiour Which Faith if they violate He is enabled by the Law as being the Fountain of Iurisdiction saith Master Diggs to seiz upon their Goods and Lands and to destroy their persons too Whereas if He fail in the discharge of his duty he is not subject to any Forfeiture by any Law of the Land I could ever hear of and Mr. Diggs hath challenged all the world to name any Doctor Sanderson also affirmeth That if a King who is Supreme should do the things that are proposed 1 Sam. 8. and Rule as a Tyrant by no other Law then his own hearts lust he would yet be unaccountable on this side Heaven however liable to the wrath of the Soveraign Iudge of all the World For however such a Tyrant may abuse his power yet the power is His which he abuseth and who shall say unto the King what dost thou Eccles. 8.4 a Text produced by the late King of most blessed Memorie against his own most unnatural and Blood Triers 13. There is an antient Monument saith Mr. Diggs p. 83. which shews the manner of holding a Parliament before the conquest The King is the head the beginning and the end of the Parliament and so he hath not any equal in his Degree This I cite to anticipate Mr. Hiâ—kman's possible objection 14. The King by Law hath just power to pass acts of Parliament by his great Seal to grant out Commissions of Oyer and Terminer for the holding of Assisses to adjourn the Term to whatsoever place he pleaseth To make Iustices of Peace which wholly depends on his will and pleasure To pardon Delinquents and Malefactors a priviledge by law estated solely in the King To choose his Officers to protect all persons to coin money to make leagues with forrein Princes to dispose the Militia to call and dissolve Parliaments And to be in one word Le dernier Resort de la Iustice. 15. In the thirty seventh Article of the Church of England The King or Queen is declared to have the chief Power in this Realm of England c. to whom the chief Government of all Estates of this Realm whether they be Ecclesiastical or Civil in all Causes doth appertain And this called the Prerogative which hath alwayes been given to all godly Princes in holy Scripture by God himself that they shall rule all Estates and all Degrees Ecclesiastical or Temporal and restrain with the Civil sword the stubborn and evil Doers 16. And accordingly in the Canons by law established in the Church A Supreme Power is declared to be given by God in Scripture to the sacred order of Kings which is there also declared to be of Divine Right And that for any person or persons to set up maintain or avow in any their said Realms respectively under any pretence whatsoever any Independent co-active power either Papal or popular whether directly or indirectly is to undermine their great Royal office and cunningly to overthrow that most sacred ordinance which God himself hath established and so is treasonable against God as well as against the King This I earnestly recommend to Mr. Hickman his consideration and that which follows in the Canon viz. That for subjects to bear Arms against their Kings offensive or defensive upon any pretence whatsoever is at the least to resist the powers which are ordained of God And though they do not invade but onely resist 17. Saint Paul tells them plainly They shall receive to themselves damnation The most excellent Recognition which was made by both Houses in the first year of King Iames is so worthy to be written in Letters of Gold and so needfull to be rivetted in the hearts and memories of the people who desire to have a conscience void of offence towards God and men that I think I shall deserve many an honest man's thanks who hath either never known or hath forgot what once he knew by inserting some part upon this occasion The King is our onely rightfull and lawfull Leige Lord and Soveraign we do upon the knees of our heart adnize constant Faith Loyalty and Obedience to the King and his Royall Progeny in this high Court of Parliament where all the body of the Realm is either in Person or by representation we do acknowledge that the true and
as a secret not according to the vote of his guilty Brethren who never charged me with ought no not so much as a suspicion Much less did they dare to let me know my Accuser for fear I should prove him a false Accuser and spoil the trade they then were driving Much less yet would they indure that I should have the least tryall fair or foul because they were conscious of the nothing that they were ablâ— to say against me Their dealing with me in that affair puts me in mind of what I read in an English book There was nothing so common in those Times as a charge without aâ— Accuser a sentence without a Iudge and a condemnation without a hearing But I was condemned without a charge too And it seems by no Judge that will own the Judgâ—ment For § 85. Mr. Hickman is fain to say that I was turned out of my Fellowship not by the Visitors but by the Committee of Lords and Commons for non-submission to the Authority of Parliament in visiting the Vniversity p. 47. To which I answer 1. That my Answer to the Visitors was judged rational and modest by Doctor Reynolds who therefore told me it was impossible I should be banished onely for that but rather for being at least suspected to have written some Books but what books they were or why I was suspected the Author of them he either could not or woulâ— not tell me 2. Mr. Hickman layes the whole fault on the Lords and Commons which I ascribe unto the Visitors transgressing the Commission by which they sate For would the Lords and Commons undo an Orphan for being modest and conscientiously desirous to gain some time to the end he might not answer but upon due consideration This would justifie Philanglus in the book above mention'd when he said That many were outed their Free-holds Liberty and Livelyhoods before any examination much less conviction and that the order of a Committee was commonly made to controlle the fundamentall Lawes of the Land I rather think that the Visitors did return a false answer and so abused the Lords and Commons then that persons of so much honour would be the authors of such a fact as Doctor Reynolds although a Visitor so much abhorred and never would give his consent unto But Mr. Hickman doth acknowledge that the two Houses may do amiss for he dares not undertake in all things to acquit them p. 48. § 86. But why doth he call it the Authority of Parliament which he confesseth at other Times to be no more then two Houses A Parliament without a King much more against him is a contradiction in adjecto Well said Judge Ienkins The leggs Arms and Trunck of the body cannot be above the Head nor have life without it So that supposing the King to be but one of the 3. States of which a Parliament doth consist He is a part and that the highest But in truth saith the learned Judge The King is none of the three estates but above them all The three estates are the Lords Spiritual the Lords Temporal and the Commons And so Mr. Hickman is unexcusable in beheading the Parliament by exclâ—ding the King from his Royal Birthright § 87. Again Mr. Hickman proceeds to ask Is it not Impudence to say that the Visitors authorized by the two Houses under the broad Seal of England could not make me his legitimate successor p. 47. To which I answer 1. that the Visitors were never authorized by the two Houses to condemn me without some little hearing or to huddle up their sentence and Execution without Accuser or witness or accusation face to face 2. The two Houses could onely make an Ordinance not an Act of Parliament which is a Law as the Houses themselves have oft confessed And Laws are the things which bind the people Nay 3. If any statute shall be made against Magna Charta and so against Bishops provided for by Magna Charta and confirmed by thirty two Acts of Parliament or against any man's right without a triall according to Law It is by Law declared null 42. Ed. 3. ch 1. But it seems Mr. Hickman is like Oliver Cromwell whose foul-mouth'd by-word was wont to be Magna Charta Magna Farta Nay 4. It is resolved in Law Books that if an Act of Parliament referr to or confirm a thing which is not as for a man to be a Iudge or witness in his own case or a thing that is misrecited or repugnant or impossible to be performed there the common Law shall controll and adjudge such an Act to be meerly void Now we who were of the Dispersion through the Avarice and Revenge of the cruel Visitors did find those Visitors in very great part at once our Iudges our Iuries our Executioners and our Heirs Had they dealt sincerely with us and bid us plainly leave our Fellowships because they had Sons and Nephews or other good friends to be cared for as the Fox was syncere when he bid the Cock come down from the Tree alledging this reason that he was hungry I should not have used them as now I do though I use them better then they did me But their pretending to Reformation and Iustice too did make their sin exceeding sinfull 5. The Broad Seal which he speaks of is called by Judge Ienkins a Counterfeit Seal And the Counterfeiting of that he proves High Treason Last of all I will add that we were taught in our Catechism by our common mother the Church of England that we are bound by God in the fifth Commandment to honour and obey not the two Houses but the King not the two Houses and the King but the King and his ministers Saint Peter accordingly commanding us to Submit our selves to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake instructs us to do it to the King as Supreme and unto Governours as sent by him Now were the Visitors really sent by him Or were they not flatly sent against Him Whether so or so Let it be judged by the Case of the University the most materiall part of which shall now become my next Section § 88. The onely question which is by these men propos'd to every single person in the University is Whether we will submit to their Visitation or to the power of Parliament as they call it in this Visitation That without the Personall Consent of the King to this Commission as far as it respects the University in General and us as members thereof we cannot now submit to any Visitation without incurring the guilt of manifold perjuries In reference to our Vniversity oathes we have long since given an Account by way of Plea to these men That our particular Locall or Collegiate Statutes which define us particular Visitors in our particular Colledges bind us under the same most evident perjury to submit to no other Visitation but that which the
extremity and nonsense in the worst degree because it implyes a contradiction to say the sin is the mere repugnance of the act to the law without the act which is repugnant Or that the sin of hating God is a deflection from the Precept without that hating which is the sin XIII 'T is so far from being false to call it a sin to blaspheme which is a positive entity that it is blasphemy to deny it This is a proof from plain experience XIV A part of nothing can be the thing of which it is but a part for then the part would be the whole which does imply a contradiction And so the formal part of sin cannot possibly be the sin but the sin must include the material also This doth prompt me Gentle Reader to prepare thee also for those evasions with which the Adversaries of Truth will pretend to answer what thou shalt urge 1. If therefore when thou provest a sin is positive they shall onely answer concerning sin quatenus sin Remember to tell them of their Fallacie à Thesi ad Hypothesin or à dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid 2. If again when thou sayst some sins are actions such as those which God forbids us to put in being they shall answer that sins of omission are not put them in mind of that other fallacie A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter 3. If when thou arguest by an Induction of such particulars as in the Instance of hating God they shall answer that hating is not evil in it self and good as fasten'd upon sin Tell them straight of their Fallacies A rectè conjunctis ad malè divisa and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the Argument is of hating as having God for its object And so to answer of hating without an object is an Intolerable impeâ—tinence dividing the Act from the Object which were onely considered in conjunction much more is it impertinent to talk of hating as 't is objected upon sin for that iâ— a traâ—sition à genere ad genus God is not sin nor is it a sin to hate sin but the sin of hating God is that to which they must speak in a compound sense Hold them punctually to this and they are undone 4 If they take upon them to prove acting the part of the opponent that the formal part of sin is a mere privation therefore the sin is a mere privation tell them first of their fallacie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the Antecedent might be true and yet the sequel extremely false Tell them next there is a Fallacie of Ignoratio Elenchì For the question is of sin not of a portion or part of sin They are past all Remedy who when the Question is whether it râ—ines do onely answer that the staff does not stand in the corner Tell them over and above that the formal part of some sins as of the Divels hating God is a positive Repugnance to the Law of God and so again there is the Fallacie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 barely to say and not to prove the universality of the thing can amount to no more then onely the begging of the question Mr. Hickman must confess he is the worst of Blasphemers if there is but one sin that is a positive entity because he saith that All such must be either God's creatures or God himself This also prompts me to reflect upon the Mischievous effects of his sad Dilemma For if God is said to be the cause of that positive entity or action Adam's eating forbidden fruit And the cause of that Law Thou shalt not eat it he is said to be the Author or cause of that sin which was his very eating forbidden fruit I have therefore taken the greater pains in my following Treatise both in vindicating God from being the Author of such effects and in charging them wholly upon the Free-will of man shewing how the sinful agent is alone the cause of the sinful act to the end I might convince and convert my Adversary even in spight of his own perversness and disabuse his followers or abeâ—tors notwithstanding their partiality and praepossession That when they exert any such reall and positive actions as the hating of God the ravishing of virgins the killing of Kings the committing of sacriledge the coveting and seizing their neighbour's goods they may be forced to declare with Coppinger and Hacket in the Star-Chamber the works are evil and from themselves unless they will take in the Divel too not good and from God as Mr. Hickman no less irrationally than blasphemously saith That there are haters of God who is Love it self God hath told us by Moses and by Saint Paul And according to the importance of the original word they are hated by God who are haters of him How we ought to be affected towards them that hate God the Psalmist tells us by his example Do not I hate them O Lord that hate thee yea I hate them with a perfect hatred Who they are that hate God by way of eminence our Learned Doctor Stearn hath taken the Liberty to say I shall content my self at present to shew the place in my Margin and to observe Mr. Hickman is therein intimately concern'd I do not hate Mr. Hickman but do love him so well as to wish him better Yet of the Doctrine which he delivers and pleadeth for with so much vehemence That every positive thing is good and either God or his creature I have industriously discovered my perfect hatred For the Hellish murder of Gods Anointed of ever Blessed and glorious Memory was as positive a something as any action to be produced And all the plea of those Deicides who sought to justifie the Fact was the use they made of this Fatal Doctrine They ever imputed unto God irresistibly willing or unconditionally decreeing and effectually over-acting his peoples spirits whatsoever unclean thing they were suffer'd in What was really but the patience they call'd the pleasure of the Almighty His passive permission they stil'd appointment What he had every where forbidden they gave him out to have predetermin'd What was a sin not to be expiated They calld an expiatory sacrifice They gave out God to be the Author of all that he sufferd them to commit the favourable approver of whatsoever he condemned them to prosper in In a word they told the people that God was delighted in those impieties which with much long suffering he but endur'd And then I think I was excusable for being impatient of such a Doctrine as to the Ruin of three Kingdomes I saw reduced into practice for diverse years How impartial I have been in the maintaining of the Truth I shall evince in the following papers by my Reply to Mr. BARLOW the Reverend Provost of Queens Colledge in Oxford my very learned and loving Friend To certain Reasonings of his in his second Metaphysical
the sin of sin or the sinfulness of sinfulness supposing both to be synonymous and sin so perfectly an abstract as hath been said Nay without any regard to his blessed self when he saith that sin doth not siginfie abstractly p. 100. § 3. But though sin is an Abstract in respect of the sinner viz. Abstractum physicum yet in respect of sinfulness which is abstractum metaphysicum all will confess it to be a concrete M. H. alone being excepted in his intemperate Fits who yet in Times of sobriety will confess what I would have him and such I proved it to be by proving an Identity betwixt the sin and the sinfull Act. For the transgression of the Law is confessedly an Act and sin by definition is the Transgression of the Law Nor will the Adversary deny that the Act of sinning is a sinfull Act. For being a Transgression it must needs be an Act and being such an act it must needs be sinfull The act of consenting to a Temptation which is sin in its birâ—h is punctum indivisibile and hath not any Dimensions to make it capable of a Division and so it must needs be the sin of consenting to the Temptation as well as it is the sinfull act § 4. Farther yet when in pursuit of the Controversie it lay upon me to shew how the determination of a mans will to the forbidden object was equally a sin and a positive being and what an Impiety it would be to intitle God to so foul a thing I made a challenge to M. Hickman as well as others to give an instance in some particular how the act and the obliquiâ—y might so be severed or distinguish'd as he might say which is Goâ—'s part and which is Satan's When a man doth curse God Lev. 24.15 which is the Act of that sin and which is the sin that is not the Act or which is the obliquity of the act o that sin M. Hickman did not attempt an Answer and sure I am he was not able For if the cursing of God is a whole sin it is an act of sin or an obliquity of an Act or both together and that either separably or inseparably 1. if onely an Act where then is the obliquity 2. if onely an obliquity of an Act where is the Act for all the whole sin is the cursing of God neither more nor less 3. if both together and separably let him make that seperation 4. if both are inseparably together he must confess that sin hath a positive being and that himself hath made God to be the Author of sin § 5. In a word I made appear what I meant by the word sin by the instances which I brought whereby to prove it the same with the sinfull act There being no difference no not so much as in imagination between David's lying with Bathsheba and his Adultery or between his Adultery and his sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 82. His lying with Bathsheba was his action which action was his sin p. 84. And again I discern no difference between the same evil action and it self as between Davids lying with Bathsheba and his Adultery ibid. Nor indeed was it possible that I should have spoken any otherwise when the Thing spoken of was not half of sin but the whole not the formal part as they phrase it but the very complexum as M. H. himself calls it p. 95. For actual sin of commission cannot otherwise be sin than as it is an act of sinning nor an act of sinning any otherwise then as it is a sinfull Act. § 6. That this was meant in our Dispute I have largely proved And that we ought to mean this I prove by the judgement of D. Twisse who saith that Fornication denoteth sin not onely according to its Formality as it is sin but also according to its materiality as it is an Act. His words in Latin are justly these Fornicatio notat peccatum non tantùm secundum Formale ejus quà peccatum est sed secundum materiale ejus quà actus est Now because M. Hickman doth boast so much of D. Twisse as one whom none durst undertake in the Arminian Controversies p. 106. I will farther insist upon his Authoritie whereby to prove the true Importance and together with that the positive entity of sin which that Doctor doth assert by unavoidable Implication whilst he saith that All sin being definitely considered and according to its certain species doth include two things the natural act and the turpitude of the Act or its repugnance with the Law of God He gives his instance in the sin of theft which he affirms to signifie as well the Aâ—t of taking away what is anothers as the deformity of the Act in as much as God hath said thâ—u shalt not steal The like instances he gives in the sins of Murther and Adultery which as it slatly contradicts what is said by M. Hick of sins being a meer abstract and the same with sinfulness pag. 53 54. so it proves â—e whole sin to have a positive entity by ascribing no less to a part of sin It being impossible for a part to have more of entity then the whole And if M. Hickman shall dare to say that a Repugnance to the Law may be theft without stealing or that stealing may be the sin of theft without a repugnance to the law so as one part of sin may be concluded to be a sin I forbear to say what will follow that he may not accuse me of bitter Language § 7. Noe 't is so absolutely impâ—ssible as implying a contradiction that a man shouâ—d be guilty of a Repugnance to any Law without the doing of that thing which the law forbids And by consequence so impossible that that alone should be the sin which is affirmed by D. Twisse to be but the formal part of it That as M. Whitfield and M. Barlee do acknowledge a materiall and â—ormâ—ll part making up one and the same sin so M. Hickman doth say as much when the necessity of his affairs compels him to it p. 94 95. how contradictory soever to what he had said a little before p. 53 54. when brought to a distress of another Nature And accordingly in his Title-page he held us in hand that he would prove there cannot be any positivity of sin not of the formall part of sin Again at the end of his long Preface when he pretends at least to come to the Thing in Question he sets down his Thesis in these express words ☞ That sin hath not a Positive Being pag. 1. No mention hitherto of any reduplication sin as sin or sin abstractly considered from act or habit And indeed he knew it to be impossible to consider the sin of hateing God abstractly from the act or habit since the Act of hateing God is the sin as well as the Act and the habituall hatred of God is as well the sin as
the habit He confesseth it an action to hate God and an action so intrinsecally and essentially evil because evil antecedently to any positive Law and evil ex genere objecto that no circumstance can make it lawful p. 94. And as impossible as it is to consider the same thing abstractly from it self so impossible it must be to consider the sin of hateing God abstractly from the Act of hateing God Thus M. Hickman hath written against his own light But which will grieve him most of all § 8. He hath also written against his Interest For first he confesseth by the means of his prevarication what he so stomachfully deny'd and vainly pretended to refute too to wit That sin hath a positive being I say he confesseth it in equivalence and that much more to his disadvantage then if he had said it in down-right Terms For why should he shamefully fall away from his first Engagement which was to prove that sin hath no positive being p. 1. but that he was inwardly convinced he had undertaken a thing impossible If he did not sin for sins sake nor think it a credit to be caught in the Act of Falshood why should he publish so grosse a Forgery as he knew would be detected by every Reader who should but thorowly peruse either his book or mine but that he thought it would pain him less to lye in the frying pan then the Fire If sin in his opinion hath no positive Being in any sense or respect whether as a Quality or as an Action or as complexum quid made up of a materiall and formall part why at last will he needs consider it as meerly abstracted from Act or habit and not without such abstraction when yet it is impossible that the hating of God should be so considered Let him shew how that sin can be abstracted from that act which is that sin or how it can be consider'd as so abstracted or else let him confess he dares not dispute of the thing in Question unless he may consider it as it is impossible to be consider'd which is not to dispute of the thing in Question but by an unmanlike Tergiversation to acknowledge the prevalence of the Truth at the very same time that he reviles it § 9. Again he hath open'd a wide Gate to the greatest absurdities in the world in proving that sin hath no positive Being because it hath none as abstractly considered from act or habit For according to this Logick one may prove that nothing hath a positive Being No vertue we may be sure as well as no vice For to clear it by an example as the act or habit of hating God hath no positive being abstracted from the act or habit so the act or habit of loving God hath no posiâ—ive being abstracted from the act or habit He confesseth it is an action to hate God and that the hatred of God is a quality he will not deny Nor can â—e possibly say more for the positive being of loving God or of the love which we have of God which can have no being at all neither positive nor privative if abstracted from all either act or habit that is from it self § 10. If M. Hickman's method were allowable he would strengthen the hands as of all evil doers so of the Atheist in particular who may prove to M. Hickman though not to any man else That God himself hath no positive entity which is as much as to say there is no God as abstractly considered from his Existence or from all manner of substance corporeall and incorporeall For the sin of hating God without the act of hating God which is the sin is simply nothing in the world And sure it cannot be a Question whether simply-nothing hath a positive being Yet this is the best that can be made of M. Hickman's skill in stâ—ting Questions § 11. Or admit a sin can be something abstracted from all manner of 〈◊〉 or habit yet the Question still would be whether such sin hath a positive being yea or nay in any respect whatsoever Not whether it hath it reduplicativè as sin that is so wretched a Transition à Thesi ad Hypothesin as by which I will prove that Master Hickman is a Brute For sure the Animal M. Hickman cannot possibly be a man reduplicativè as an Animal for then every Animal would be a man as well as he I say he cannot be a man as abstractly consider'd from the principle of reason And being not a man but yet an Animal he must needs be a Brute by all confessions But M. Hickman will say The Question is whether he is a man or no. Not whether he is such with the restrictive particle as joyned to Animal And I say the very same touching the business we have in hand The Question is Whether sin hath a positive being witness his own mouth p. 1. not with any restrictive as in conjunction with an abstraction from act or habit If M. Hickman be granted to be a man it will be a new Question how he comes by his manhood whether from his material or formal part which yet by the way are both essentials of his Being And sin being granted to have a positive being it matters not how or from whence it hath it whether from its material or formal part to use the words of D. Twisse which are both essentials of its Being what it is and no more can it exist without the one then the other But if the word as must needs be used then sin as synonymous with sinful act hath been ever the subject of my Discourse as by all my Instances and proofs may very sufficiently appear And whether sin hath a positive being as sin or as an action or as a quality for 't is confessed that to hate God is a sin and an action as that the hatred of God is a sin and a quality is a thing so easie to be determined that 't is not worthy of a Dispute But if M. H. will needs dispute it let him fairly confess 't is a second Question in the doing of which he must yield the first § 12. From all this it follows That when it is said by M. Hickman p. 49. my not distinguishing betwixt the sinful act and the sin of the act is the stone at which I have all along stumbled he does but dissemble the sense he hath of his unhappyness and by playing the Brave make the best of so bad a matter For he knew very exactly that I had proved an Identity betwixt the sin of killing Abel which was the act of murder and the act of killing him which was the sin of murder That the act of hating God is the sin of hating him and â— converso And so I must thank M. Hickman for whipping himself thus upon another mans back For this apparently is the stone at which he hath stumbled and faln headlong and bruised
himself as shall be shew'd his making a distinction without a difference As betwixt the act of hating God which is granted to be the sin and the sin of that act which is granted to be that very act of hating God For to hate God is 1 a sin 2 a whole sin and 3 nothing but a sin to which three clauses I challenge M. Hickman to make some Answer That if he thinks there is something in hating God which is not sin but very good as being one of God's Creatures which he sufficiently intimates by distinguishing the sin of the act from the sinful act as if the very act of hating God were not a sin the world may know him to be a Libertine without the protection of his disguise Had he forâ—seen that challenge to which I call'd for his Answer in my Letter to Doctor Heylin pag. 266. I had not met with an occasion for this last Section § 13. But because he seems in this place to use the word sin for sinfulness I will first intreat him to remember how sin is taken in holy Scripture by D. Twisse by M. Whitf by M. Barlee and by himself as I have shewd in this chapter § 1.6.7 Next I will help him to understand what is the sinfulness of sin and wherein it lyes It is granted I think by all that sin is that whole or complexum which doth consist of two parts material and formal so as neither part singly can either be or be conceived to be a sin And it is granted I think by all that the materiall Part of sin is positive it being an action or quality and when a quality an act or habit as hath been shew'd The onely privative Part of sin mark the emphasis which lyes on Part is the defection from the Rule which yet is founded in a positive act of which the other is onely a superadded relation unavoidably resulting by the positive acts application to the Rule Thus I think we are to speak if we may rightfully distinguish the two parts of sin which D. Field will not allow nor indeed is it possible so to distinguish the one from the other as to intitle God to the one without the other and that I suppose is the Doctors meaning But now for the abstract of this concretum it is that which resulteth from both united For after the manner that inequality doth arise from the Relation of a Bicubitum to a cubit so the sinfulness of a sin to wit of the action of hating God or of Cain's killing Abel doth arise by resultance from these two things God 's forbidding it to be done and its being done when thus forbidden so then The positive action of hating God as the materiall part which carries with it a defection from the rule of God's Law as the formal part is that complexum or whole sin which I have proved and shall prove to have a positive being The meer defection from the rule or repugnance to it without the action of hating God is not the sin but the formal part onely The meer action of hating God without its defection from the rule which for once I will suppose docendi gratiâ would not be the very sin but the material part onely But the sin as I said is both united viz. The action of hating God in a repugnance to or defection from the rule of God's law whereas the sinfulness of this sin that is the abstract of this concrete is not both parts united for then it would be concrete and so Identical with sin but that which resulteth from both united As the humanity is not the man made up of a body and a rational soul any more then the man is either of the two without the other but that which onely resulteth from both united whereas the man is both united § 14. But now for a while let us admit that the Question were of moral evil as such It would then be comprehensive of all moral evil For à quaâ—enus ad omne valet consequentia by his own confession p. 85. what then mean's he by a privation when he saith that sin or moral evil as such is a privation unless he means a meer privation and nothing else he speaks not against the posiâ—ivity of sin which even they who do assert do also hold there is a want of such a rectitude as is due but they say there is something besides that want As in walking to kill a neighbour there is something positive besides the want of a good end to which the walking should be directed And if any thing could be due to the hating of God to make it good as nothing can be there would be an action besides the want of that due as M. Hickman confesseth p 94. Nay in saying that that action is essentially evil ibid. he confesseth the very action to be the sin And taking sin in the right sense for complexum quid as he confesseth p. 95. we may allow him his own way of stating the Question to his undoing § 15. Again he is ruin'd by his preservative as may appear by this Dilemma Does he think that privation is a thing real or onely nominal something or nothing If nothing then for M. Hickman to filtâ—h and plunder is but a sin and therefore nothing in his opinion and so is a Carneadist If something then he thinks it Gods Creature or not his creature If his creature then he thinks that God is the Authour of sin and so he must think that sin is good or not good if he thinks it to be good he will scruple to commit it If not good he thinks that God can create what is peculiar to the Devil as Master Calvin inferreth against the Libertines If he thinks it not Gods Creature though something real then he must eate up his former saying viz. That it belongs to the universality of the first cause to produce every Real Being pag. 95. § 16. I shall conclude this Chapter with the Concession of Bonaventure that the sin of Concupiscence imports two things to wit an appetite and an excesse of that appetite In which excesse he confesseth there seemes to be a Position though he endeavours by a simile which doe's not run upon all its feet to make it seem a privation rather Which however it may infer yet it cannot wholy be without implying a contradiction And if either of the two is something positive the act of the appetite it self or the excesse in the act sure that which consisteth of both together I mean concupiscence cannot be lesse then either of them CHAP. III. § 1. HAving hitherto cleared and in the doing of that accidentally proved the thing in question I might immediately proceed to shew the littleness of the Tricks in which our Gamster is wont to deal but that I think it incumbent on me to effect that first which is most material and of which most Readers
do stand in the greatest expectation to wit the proving by such convincing and cogent Arguments that sin which is properly so called hath a positive Being as to put a conclusion to the whole Controversy and that by enabling the weakest Reader to stop the mouth of the strongest that shall oppose him And because I cannot but have observed what hath also been observed by many others that whatsoever is thought strong in Mr. H.'s Rhapsody by such as are partial to his Adventure he hath taken after his manner that is dishonestly without the citing his Author so much as once to whom he was beholding extreamly often from an Exercitation de naturâ mali which had been pen'd and printed more then 20. years agoe by my very good Friend Mr. THOMAS BARLOW who I conceive at that time could be but n wly Master of Arts though now the learned and Reverend Provost of Queens College I shall begin with that instance of which â— verily believed I had been the first urger ' â—â—ll since I found it in Dr. Field and in other writers of great Repute whom I have now consulted on this occaâ—â—on I mâ—an that which is drawn from the Sin of hating God and by consequence from all other sins of commission whereof this one is the fittest Instance to which Mr. Hickman pretends an answer though without the will and consent yet by the assistance of Mr. BARLOW The insufficiency of the Answer I intend to shew by my Reply Which being done I shall submit it to the consideration of Mr. Barlow That if he approves of my Reply he may may make me glad with the knowledge of it and that if he doth not he may shew me the reason of his dislike I suppose his judgement may now be altered from what it was in his younger years If not I shall desire to discuss the matter rather with Him who is able to tye me the hardest knoâ—s and to shew me my Error in case I erre then to contend with â—uch a Trifler as Mr. Hickman appears to be who is fitter to betray then maintain his Cause § 2. That the sin of hating God is nothing more then a sin and that it hath a posâ—â—ive being I have so often proved mine own way in my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 besides what I have done in my Letter to Dr. Heylin and in the sections of the foregoing Chapter that I suppose it high time to shew how others have proved it as well as I. Both that the greatness of their Authority may help prevail with some men to accept of reason and that I may take an opportunity to speak mine own sense in their Vindication I will the rather begin with Dr. Field because He if any other saith Mr. BARLOW himself who doth oppose him was a learned Writer of our own Church which he hath studiously defended against the Papisâ—s First t is his peremptory assertion That the sin of Commission which is the doing of that the creature is bound not to do is merely positive HIs first Reason for it is this As the affirmative part of Gods Law is broken by the not putting that in being which it requireth so the negative is violated prâ—cisely by putting that in being which it would not have to be Again he saith a little after That sin of commission is an evil act and that there are some evil Acts which are not evil ex fine Circumstantiis but ex genere objecto which are therefore denominated evill not by passive denomination as if they wanted some Circumstances that should make them good but by active denomination because no Circumstances can make them good and because by way of contrariety they deprive the sinner of that orderly disposition that should be found in him and some other of that good which pertaineth to him As it appeareth in the acts of injustice spoiling men of that which is their own which Mr. Hickman cannot endure to hear of and iâ— the acts of blasphemy against God or the hate of God in which the sinner as much as in him lieth by attributing to God what is contrary to his Nature or denying that which agreeth unto the same maketh him not to be that which he is and hating him wisheth he were not and endeavoureth to hinder what he would have done NOw saith the Doctor a little after That that sin of Commission which is an evil ex genere objecto is not denominated evil passively from the want of rectitude due unto it it is evident in that no rectitude is due to such an Act. For what rectitude is due to the specifical Act of hating God or what rectitude is it capable of This he urgeth against Those who affirm the act it self in the hating God to be very good and the deformity of the Act to be onely evil which deformity they fancie to be the want of a rectitude which was due to that act not at all considering that there cannot be possibly any such thing as a right hating of God or a rectified injustice these things implying a contradiction in adjecto Yet such absurdities they will swallow rather then confess what yet they find saith D. Field that some sins are positive Acts. pag. 119. Nay the Doctor advanceth farther and certainly farther then he needed if not farther then he ought I am sure much farther then I have done That in the siâ— of commission specifically considered there is nothing but meerly positive and the deformity that is found in it is precisely a positive Repugnance to the Law of God which he doth not say upon his own account onely but farther backeth it with the Authority and concurrent Judgements of many eminent Schoolmen and great Divines many more then M. Hickman so much as attempted to produce whose names and words shall be seen anon § 3. To the first Reason of the two which the most learned D. Field as the learned M. Barlow does once more call him p. 74. was pleas'd to give for his asserting the positive entity of sin M. Barlow doth not make any answer nor doth he take the least notice that there was any such thing though as it is his first reason so I conceive to be his best too which I shall probably shew when occasion serves especially if I chance to be put in mind To the second Reason his answer is That no rectitude is due to the hatred of God in as much as it is limited to such an object to wit God But as he saith a little before to which he here referrs his Reader The hatred of God being taken by it self may be good and so by consequence the being of the act shall not be evil per se. Iust as walking is good of it self though walking to kill or commit adultery cannot be made good by any Circumstance § 4. To this Answer I reply in the behalf of D. Field first That it
inevitably import the whole complexum viz. that very act in conjunction with that very object that it cannot so much as be conceived to be the sin of hating God when the act is supposd to be divided from the object To shew him the fruit of his Distinction I will put the case into other colours Let him prove he is a man by the best medium that he can use and I will prove ad hominem he can be none For man is complexum quid and must not be spoken of as One there is something in him material and something formal The Animal is one thing the Anima rationalis is quite another And M. Hickman being either without the other may be a Brute or an Angel but not a man And being for certain not an Angel of light he must if an Angel be one of darkness This is every way as pertinent and as tolerably applyed as what is spoken by M. Hickman against the positive being of hating God If this Coin is not currant let him not pay it to other men And if it is let him accept it when it is paid Secondly He so shamefully flyes from the thing in Question to that which he knew neither was nor can be as to discover the mean opinion which he really hath of his own Tenet and to prove his Book written against nothing so much as his own conscience 1. He knew it was not the Question whether hatred without relation to God as its object is a sin or whether any thing without hatred is the sin of hating God But he knew by what I had said in my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the thing in Question was the hating of God in sensu composito For I had said in the plainest terms That to hate God is a sin or a sinful act two expressions for one thing That the sinfulness consisteth neither in God without hating for he is purity it self nor in hating without God for hatred in it self is a thing indifferent and apt to be good as well as evil God himself hating sin with a perfect hatred but in the union and application of that act to that object As the nature of man consists not in a body onely nor onely in a soul but in the union of the one with the other p. 13. 2. He knew it could not be a Question whether hatred is a sin when taken per se without an object or whether the pravity of hating God can be any thing at all without the act of hating God or whether there can be possibly any act when there is none And yet his answer is as impertinent as if one of these had been the Question Thirdy In saying such works as the hating God are from God which the Scripture calleth the works of the Devil he speaketh Blasphemy And in saying the sin of hating God is complexum quid which must not be considered of as One he contradicts his other sayings that sin and sinfulness are the same that is a meer abstract and which cannot else be considered as sin So that here I must ask him a second time and challenge him to give me a Categorical Answer can the hating of God be conceived to be a sin or can it not when he answers I will reply But for his Blasphemies and self-contradictions let him read my letter to Dr Heylin p. 265. to p. 270. § 7. Having insisted thus largely on my Reply to those Answers which appear to shew us the very utmost that can be pleaded in the defence of so gross an Error and having detected the obvious Fallacies in which the whole force of the answers lyeth I shall study to be the briefer in all that follows without the least fear of being thought to be obscure by my plainest Reader To Dr. Field his 2. Reasons above recited A Third Reason may be added from HUGO GROTIUS who saith that some things are evil without the Law and that the Law being continuing to oblige it is naturally evil to procure any man's acting against the Law or to make a Law to the contrary and therefore repugnant to the Nature of God From whence there follow 2. things 1. that some whole acts are immutably evil and 2. That they cannot have any being from the Almighty IACOBVS ALMAIN giveth an instance in the hating of God and in Adultery and saith they could not but be forbid To whom 't is answered by Mr. Barlow that if God did not forbid theft it would not be a sin and that he may dispense with his Law as when he said to Abraham go kill thy son But I reply 1. That he speaks not to the Instances brought by Iacobus Almain It had been ill to hate God had it been possible that God had not forbid it 2. Theft is not of those things which are onely evil because forbidden as the eating swines flesh among the Jews but of those other things which are onâ—ly forbidden for being evil And therefore 3. It was not possible that God should never have forbidden all manner of injustice of which theft is one species 4. God did not say to Abâ—aham Go kill thy son but go and offer him up which he also did without killing 5. Had he done it he had not dispensed with his Law which onely forbiddeth such a killing as ipso facto becomes a Murder not such as ipso facto becomes a sacrifice else a thief could not be hanged for the fulfilling of one Law without the breach or dispensation of another The prohibition of murder comprehends not killing by commission from God who may as lawfully take away Isaacks life by Abrahams hand as by a Feaver 6. If the act of stealing or hating God be affirmed to be good and so a positive entity abstractly considered from Gods forbidding it must be granted to be such when it is forbidden I mean a positive entity although not good and so the Answer destroyes its end Mr. Barlow's words are si illud mandatum abfuisset idem numero actus horrendum fuisset homicidium p. 66. Had it been murder it had been sin for murder cannot but â—e sin and so we have his confession that sin may be a positive act But 7. It does imply a contradiction to say the same numerical act can be forbidden and not forbidden which I therefore leave to consideration § 8. What Mr Barlow calleth a concession in his behalf I call an argument against him viz. That if God could produce that act of hating God in respect of the substance of the Act then it would not be evil but say I that act is proved by me and others yea and confessed by Mr. H. to be wholy because intrinsecally and essentially evil evil ex genere objecto and antecedently to the Law therefore it cannot be Gods production for all its having a positive Entiâ—y This I retort to Mr. B. his p. 66 67. and it pincheth Mr. H. more
wayes then one § 9. Whereas it is said p. 67. that if the man that hates God whilest yet in 's wits shall continue to hate him being mad the act remaines but not the obliquity because the act to be sinful must be rational and free I deny that any man can hate God or love him without the use of reason but I further return six things 1. That for a man to hate God is the greatest madness in the world 2. That if he is not so altered but that he continues to hate God he is not altered so far but that he continues to be a sinner in hating God 3. Whilst he continues to be a man he continues to have freedom and rationality enough to sin by 4. This Argument would prove if it had real force in it that not only all infants but some adultâ— are in a state of Impeccability 5. It would follow from hence that the goodness of a vertuous act doth not consist in the substance of it because it would then become impossible that the substance of the act should continue without the goodness Whereas it is said in this Evasion that the Act of hating God may remain in substance without the presence of its obliquity But 6. to answer yet more expresly to his reason taken from Rational and free I say the sinfulness of the act is one thing and the sinfulness of the agent is quite another The obliquity alone or the sole contrariety of the act to the Law in conjunction with the act from which it cannot be disjoyned is enough to constitute the sinfulness of the act But the Liberty of will and use of Reason are required onely to the sinfulness of the agent Which yet again is no otherwise then in respect unto God imputing or punishing according to the Equity or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the second Covenant For though otherwise considered without the Equity of the Gospel sins of ignorance are sins and Original sin which is born with us is our sin still § 10. And whereas it is added a little after that if with the very same act wherewith he now doth hate God a man should afterwards hate sin the same act for substanâ—e would be morally good p. 67 I reply that this supposeth an impossibility and confutes it self with the contradiction which it implyes To hate God one day and to hate sin the next are so far from being the same act numerically that Dr. Field doth rightly make them to be specifically distinct And the supposing them to be One was to me at first such an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that I admired how Mr. Barlow could so impose upon him-self untill I duely considered his want of years when he engaged himself for so great an Error § 11. The two arguments which follow to prove that sin hath a real being whereof the one is urged by FERRARIENSIS the other by GREGORIE ARIMINENSIS I forbear to prosecute as I might because they do not prove the positive but onely the real being of sin which Mr. Hickman grants though t is denyed by M. Barlow p. 69. or rather it was denyed by him when he was newly Master of Arts. For that he should still be so much mistaken is more then can enter into my thoughts And therefore unless he shall friendly invite me to it I will not meddle with the Infirmities of the two next pages But onely observe how the belief that sin hath no positive is apt to pass into a Belief that it hath not so much as a Real being And indeed by the same figure that sin is called a meer privation it is also called a meere nothing The reason of which I shall shew anon § 12. ANd so I pass to a fourth Reason why the sin of hating God hath a positive being Because this sin is intrinsecally evil as Mr. B. objects against himself out of IOANNES de RADA and therefore not onely evil through some privation because saith he it is impossible that any privation should be intrinsecal to a positive act And Gulielmus de Rubione doth press it thus A positive act which is so evil that no kind of circumstance can make it not evil is not evil for any defect or privation but preâ—isely for the substance of the act p. 71. To the Argument of RADA Mr. Barlow thus answers That such an act is called intrinsecally evil not because its obliquity is of its nature and essence but because by the law of nature it is evil of it self without the addition of a positive Law or because it is evil ex genere objecto and not onely for the want of some circumstance p. 73. But I reply 1. It implyes a contradiction to affirm its being intrinsecally evil and at once to deny it essentially evil for ratio formalis and ratio intrinseca are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with Philosophers and M. Hickman hath dropped a good Confession that the action of hating God is essentially evil p. 94. 2. That it is evil of it self antecedently to any positive Law evil ex genere objecto is a concession whereby to prove it essentially evil 3. No part of this answer pretends to prove that it is not indeed intrinsecally evil but onely quarrell 's about the reason why the act is so called 4. It doth not speak to the chief thing of all that no privation can be intrinsecall to a positive act and so it seemeth by silence to give consent § 13 MOral evil is proved to be a positive thing because vice is set against vertue by an opposition of contrariety as Aristotle saith L. Cat. c. 10. § 1. for each term of such opposites must needs be positive because they are both predicamental species which things are so true that they are granted by M. Barlow p. 80. who therefore endeavours to elude the Argument by saying the same thing which I have often replyed unto to wit that in respect of their mâ—terial signification virtue and vice are opposita contrariè but not in respect of their formal signification To which I reply first as before that this is the old fallacie à rectè conjunctis ad malè divisa and so a flat transition à thesi ad hypothesin And if it be put into Syllogism there will be found to be unavoidably an Ignoratio Elenchi The Question being of sin or vice in sensâ—s composito and the Answer onely considering it in sensâ—s diviso Secondly Vice cannot be vice nor be imagined so to be without its material as well as formal significatum for without the act of hating God the sin or vice of hating God which is the act cannot be so much as supposed to be much less to be repugnant to any law wherein its formality is said to consist for that would imply a contradiction And thus the Answer or rather evasion doth so far forsake as indeed to nul the thing in Question Thirdly
supposing the vice to be taken from the Act or habit of hating or hatred by its having sin for its object it must be granted to be a virtue and therefore not opposed to virtue by any kind of opposition which M. B. observes to be replyed by Ferrariensis To which although it is rejoyned by the same Ferrariensis yet the rejoynder is nothing else but a gross return to the old fallacie just now discovered in the Answer and so is equally refelled by every part of my Reply By the way I note one good confession and from the words of Aquinas that vice as well as virtue may be taken for a concrete whereas M. Hickman was fain to say that sin or vice is so perfectly an abstract that he cannot conceive it to be sin unless he conceive it as an Abstract and that he is to seek what vox abstracta is if sin be not such p. 54. It may very well be that he is to seek for he elsewhere confesseth that sin is complexum quid And if he thinks that abstractum doth signifie complexum he is a small Latinist indeed if he doth not he is a self-contradictor § 14. A Sin of commission is proved to have a positive being because it necessarily requireth some positive act whereby to become a perfect sin of commission which as it is granted by M. Barlow so it seemeth to be also confirmed by him p. 84. where he approveth that of Suarez Metaph. tom 1. disp 11. Malum simpliciter est illud quod est in se malum hoc est caret aliquo bono sibi ipsi debito ad modum perfectionis propriè quale est omne peccatum praesertim commissionis For if every sin of commissi on is not simply evil only but wholly too as that must needs be which doth carere omni bono sibi debito and though I deny the supposition that any good thing can be due to sin then the positive act without which it cannot be must needs be morally and simply evil It being the Sin of commission which is spoken of in both places not any action or quality which is no sin at all so as the ordinary shift of flying from the Act of hating God which is the sin of commission and so the subject of the Discourse to the act of hating without relation to any object which is no sin at all or with relation onely to sin which makes it a high moral good is foreseen and prevented by what I now say What is said by M. Barlow of the threefold difference beâ—wixt a sin of omission and commission p. 86. concerneth nothing that I know excepting those words which he frames to himself in his objection p. 82. In hoc SOLVM distinguitur peccatum omissionis commissionis quia omissio dicit nudam carentiam actus at commissio necessario requirit actum The word solùm is very strange And if he found it in GULIELMUS DE RUBIONE as it is more then I know so I am not concerned to make inquiry It is sufficient for me that my Argument being unanswer'd needs not the help of a Reply I hasten therefore to another way of eviction § 15. THat is properly a sin which is forbidden by the Law But the positive act of Adultery theft or hating God is forbidden by the Law And therefore the Act so forbidden is very properly a sin we commonly say it is a sin to do this or that as to hate God and to love the world because God hath forbid us to do the one and the other To this it is answered by Mr. Barlow who not producing any Author for the objection and putting in the word Formaliter p. 82. may seem to have adapted the Argument for an Answer That the Act precisely taken is not forbidden as a positive Act as in Murder meerly to kill is not forbidden quoad esse physicum for then it should not be lawfull to kill a malefactor who is justly condemned to be put to death but as it recedeth from the Rule of right reason and is subjected to the privation of that rectitude which is due pag. 86. But I reply 1. That this is the old fallacie so often mentioned for an act without reference to a negative precept of the law is not an act which is forbiddâ—n nor pretended by any to be a sin much less of comm ssion which alone was the act spoken of in the Argument and so instead of an answer we have onely an escape from the thing in Question 2. It is affirmed by Aquinas 1.2 q. 71. Art 6. and q. 72. art 6. That Austin put two things in the definition of sin to wit a material and formal part that is a positive act and its repugnance to the Law witness his citation p. 85. And what is this but to say that sin is totum essentiale which it cannot be without one of its two essentials so that the Answer doth offend against the Answerer himself by considering the one without relation to the other notwithstanding his Acquiescence in St. Austin's Definition 3. The Answer doth not deny that the positive act is forbidden and so a sin but onely speaks of that thing in respect of which it is forbidden And to this it may easily be replyed that as an act is not morally evil without relation to the Law which doth forbid it so an act hath nothing of moral goodness without Relation to the law which doth command it or to the Councel which doth commend it And again as no act can be a sin without repugnance to the Rule of right Reason so can there be no such repugnance without an act 4. It is not all killing but killing properly called Murder which is forbidden by the Law which commands the killing of the Murderer and thereby makes it an act of Iustice. And therefore that should have been the instance for all such killing is forbidden by the Law and such alone doth belong to the adaequate subject of our Discourse 5. To hate God is a sin and a positive act to which it hath beâ—n proved that no kinde of rectitude can be due And it had naturally been evil though it had never been forbidden which yet it could not but have been because the not forbidding of it had been repugnant to Gods nature For though the act of hating God could not be from Eternity yet this proposition is aeternae veritatis and might truly have been spoken from all eternity that it is evil to hate God Therefore this and the like acts were forbidden by the Law even because they were evil and are not onely evil by being forbidden by the Law which yet those men do presuppose who will have every thing good that hath a positive being and nothing simply evil but an abstracted repugnance unto the Law not considering the difference betwixt the breach of a positive and moral Law betwixt a Iews hating God and
his eating swines flesh The latter which was evil because forbidden was after the Law for that very reason But the former which was forbidden because t was evil was such in order of Nature before the Law The want of heed to which thing I have the rather desired to remove by insisting on it a second time because I think it is the parent of many errours § 16 HAving thus done with my Reply to the several Answers of M. Barlow I now proceed to another Argument which I lately gathered out of FRANCISCUS DIOTALLEVIUS and which is the fitter to succeed the immediate Argument going before because it will make for its Confirmation Evil works saith this Author who for strength and accuteness gives place to none are synonymous with works which are forbidden by God Almighty who hath left it in our power to make our wayes evil which yet could not be if he did not onely permit but efficaciously make us to do the thing that he forbiddeth Now the thing that he forbiddeth will be confessed not to be this That when we act what he forbids us we do not suffer to come to pass that formal obliquity annexed to all such acts by the repugnance which they have to the Law forbidden them But the thing forbidden to us is this That we do not produce the positive being of that act with which the moral obliquity is inseparably annexed The former cannot be the thing because the law being given Thou shalt love the Lord thy God we cannot possibly hate him without a repugnance unto the law which by commanding our love forbids our hatred The latter therefore must be the thing which we are forbid to put in being And which is properly our work though a positive entity because it is absolutely impossible that God who forbids us the act of hating him should make that act which he thus forbids the making of or that by acting us with his power which is irresistible he should make us to do what he forbids us the doing of But to return to Diotallevius when it is said Thou shalt not covet thy neighbours wife the meaning of it cannot be this Beware that whilst thou proâ—ucest the free act of concupiscence the moral obliquity do not follow it for alas it cannot but follow The meaning therefore must needs be this see that thou abstain from that free act of concupiscence because of that obliquity which is inseparably annext Or determine not thy will to that object which makes the act become contrary to the rule of right Reason And so he concludes it to be the Judgement of the whole Council at Trent which in matters of this Nature must needs be of great consideration That God's concurrence is onely permissive to the free determination of the created will in producing the very being of the evil act And God's permission is so distinguished both by Fathers and Schoolmen from his effection or operation as to signifie no more then the negation of an impediment or cohibition Scotus calls it the negation of the divine positive act which by consequence is not a positive act And it is not an action saith Diotallevius but the negation of an impediment in respect of that operation which doth depend upon our free determination From whence it follows that he who hates God be he man or divel is the sole cause of that act which for that reason also is wholly sin § 17. THis is farther confirmed by an Argument leading ad absurdum For if God does concurr to the positive act of hating God not onely permissively by not hindering it but physically too by praedetermining the will of the Sinner to it then he absolutely wâ—â—leth the actuall hating of himself which of all absurdities is the greatest And again when man is forbid by God to hate him and when God does grievously complain and threaten to punish with Hell fire the man that doth not obey his prohibition It cannot choose but follow that if he absolutely willeth the positive act which he forbiddeth to wit the sinners hating of him he willeth and nilleth the same thing and after the very same manner which is a blasphemous contradiction And thus it is proved to Mr. Hickman to whom alone I am henceforth speaking that the sin of hating God hath a positive being because that quality or action which hath a positive being is clearly proved to be a sin And it is proved to be a sin by being proved to be a Thing which is not made or produced but onely suffered or permitted by God Almighty to come to pass And only made or produced by them that hate him § 18. CAIETAN proves the positive Entity of sin because saith he it consisteth as well of a conversion to an object contrary to the object of virtue as of an aversion from the law And hence saith the Cardinal there is in sin a double nature of evil the one arising from the object the other from the not observing of the law the first is positive the second privative The first inferreth the second for it cannot be that a man should hate God but that in so doing he must break the law because it is simply and intrinsecally evil so that to do it is a sin And as this is observed by D. Field in confirmation of his Doctrine l. 3. c. 23. p. 120. so I find the same Cardinal elsewhere saying that in moralibus pars subjectiva mali est malum and est in moralibus malum dupliciter Implying the whole sin to be a concrete not a repugnance to the law without an act which doth imply a contradiction § 19. THe most acute EPISCOPIVS doth implicitly thus argue although by way of paralipsis As an act commanded by the law is the virtue it self or ordination of the will unto the law so the act forbidden by the law is the vice it self or inordination of the will against the law And as the act of virtue doth not contain or connote any reall thing positive superadded to the act which may be called ordination so the act of vice doth connote nothing privative superadded to the act which may be called inordination § 20. DOctor STERN a very late but Learned Writer doth briefly urge six Arguments to prove that sin may have a positive being four of which I praetermit because I have already shewd them as long since urged by other men though otherwise urged by him than others and perhaps in some places to more advantage The other two I shall mention as not yet touched First saith he a Non-entity may be morally good and therefore an entity may be morally evill The Consequence is evident both by the Rule of opposites and because there is not more repugnance betwixt Obliquity and Entity as obliquity is taken or mistaken by the adverse party then betwixt goodness and Non-entity The Antecedent is proved because a mere omission of a forbidden
act although a Non-entity is morally good Again the Schoolmen do hold a twofold punishment the one of sense the other of loss whereof the latter is the wages of an aversion from God as is also the former of a conversion to the Creature so that if sin were nothing but mere privation the poena sensus would be inflicted without all justice under the notion of Revenge for a conversion to the creature § 21. AGain it may be thus argued and out of BARONIVS his Metaphysica Generalis That which hath not a positive entity cannot be the cause of any thing But sin many wayes is the cause of something For 1. it is the cause of punishment and 2 one sin is the cause of another A vitious act is the cause of a vitious habit A vitious habit is the cause of vitious actions And a natural propension to evil which Baronius calls original sin is said by him to be the cause of all the vitious actions oâ— our will T is true he answers this argument but his answer may be refuted by my Replyes to Mr. Barlow and by what Baronius grants of which anon as the Reader will finde if he makes a triall § 22. Now besides these Arguments thus largely urged and that from many more Authors then Mr. Hickman hath named for his opinion I shall exhibit a larger Catalogue but with a lesser expense of time and paper of such eminently learned and knowing men as have justified my judgement with the authority of their own and of whom unawares I have undertaken a justification I will begin with those Writers with the concurrence of whose opinions Dr. Field thought fit to credit his § 23. ALVAREZ saith the sin of commission is a Breach of a negative Law which is not broken but by a positive Act. Aquinas also saith that though in a sin of omission there is nothing but a privation yet in the sin of commission there is some positive thing Nay he saith more plainly what Dr. Field doth not observe that the ratio formalis of sin is two fold whereof the one is according to the intention of the sinner And that it consisteth essentially in the Act of the free-will He also infers it to be an accident whilst he saith that every sin is in the will as in its subject And very often that in every sin there are two things whereof the one is a quality or action and so the whole sin must have a positive being Farther yet it is consequent to the opinion of Cajetan saith Gregory de Valentiâ that sin formally as sin is a positive thing which he expresly also affirmeth in primam 2 dae q. 71. art 6. Some hold saith Cumel that the formal nature of sin consisteth in some positive thing to wit in the manner of working freely with a positive repugnance to the rule of Reason and the law of God Ockam saith further that the very deformity in an act of Commission is nothing else but the act it self viz. actus elicitus against the Divine Law And these are cited by Dr. Field l. 3. c. 23. p. 120. § 24. To these I add many more which partly were not and partly could not have been observed by Dr. Field LESSIVS saith that an evil act is in somâ— sort evil even according to its Physical Entity Nay upon this passage of C. VORSTIVS Omne ens quà ens bonum est Piscator himself hath this note and it is a note of exception At vitiosa illa qualitas in nobis unde oriuntur actuâ—lia peccata bona non est The learned Professor of Divinity in Academiâ Tubingensi affirmes Original sin to be an accident as the opposite member to substantia and calls it the accident of a substance and compares it to the image of God in man which he also saith was not a substance but an Accident And that will be yielded to have a positive being especially if he means as Piscator did that that accident is a Quality Another learned Professor in Academiâ Oxoniensi by saying Concupiscence is a sin inferreth that sin to be a positive entity which concupiscence will be granted by all to be And if it is with consent it is an actual sin if without consent it is an inbred Rebellion of the flesh against the law of God He also takes it to be an accident by ascribing to it subjectum quo subjectum quod because by entring at the flesh it did infect the spirit Dr. GOAD who was sent to the Synod at DORT whilest he was speaking in that Tract which some do call his Retractation against an ordinary Calvinian distinction which he conceived to make God the Author of sin expressly used these words Might I here without waâ—dring discourse the nature of sin I could prove sin it self to be an action and confute this groundless distinction that way The tract is a Manuscript but divers have Copyes as well as I. And sure the world must enjoy it if not by other men's care at least by mine That Great Divine Dr. IACKSON who was withall a great Philosopher and inferiour to none for skill in Metaphysicks doth not content himself to say of original sin that it is not a mere privation but also defineth it to be a positive Renitency of the flesh or corrupt nature of man against the spiritual law of God especially against the negative Precepts c. And as he highly commends Illyricus for an extraordinary writer so he vindicates his notion by explaining his true sense of Original sin which if the Dr. took by the right handle Mr. Barlow took it by the wrong in the latter part of his 2. excercitation It was the businesse of Illyricus saith Dr. IACKSON to banish all such nominal or grammatical definitions as have been mentioned out of the Precincts of Theology and to put in continual caveats against the Admission of abstracts or mere relations into the definition of Original sin or of that unrighteousness which is inherent in the man unregenerate The Judicious Doctor doth also tell us and who could tell better then he that St. Austine Aquinas and Melanchthon do say in effect as much as Illyricus if their meanings were rightly weighed and apprehended by their Followers Nay Calvin and Martyr and many other good writers consort so well with Illyricus in their definitions of sin in the unregenerate that they must all be either acquitted or condemned together Illyricus himself explains his meaning by producing the definitions of Original sin not onely given by Calvin and Martyr but explained by themselves into Illyricus his sense In so much that Dr. Iackson ranking Calvin and Martyr with Illyricus doth affirm them to make original sin to be the whole nature of man and all his faculties so far forth as they are corrupted Yet still their meaning was no more
c. But let us hear Dr. Iackson also § 9. The Hypothesis for whose clearer Discussion these last Theses have been praemised is this Whether it being once granted or supposed that the Almighty Creator was the cause either of our mother Eves desire or of her actual eating of the forbidden fruit or of her delivery of it to her husband or of his taking and eating it though unawares the same Almighty God must not upon like necessity be acknowledged to be the Author of all the obliquiâ—ies which did accompany the positive acts or did necessarily result from them This is a case or Species Facti which we cannot determine by the Rule of Faith It must be tryed by the undoubted Rules of Logick or better Arts. These be the onely perspective Glasses which can help the eye of Reason to discover the truth or necessity of the consequence to wit whether the Almighty Creator being granted to be the cause of our mother Eves first longing after the forbidden Fruit were not the cause or Author of her sin Now unto any Rational man that can use the help of the forementioned Rules of Art which serve as prospective Glasses unto the eye of Reason that usual Distinction between the Cause or Author of the Act and the Cause or Author of the Obliquity which necessarily ensues upon the Act will appear at the first sight to be False or Frivolous yea to imply a manifest contradiction For Obliquity or whatsoever other Relation can have no cause at all besides that which is the Cause of the Habit of the Act or Quality whence it necessarily results And in particular that conformity or similitude which the first man did bear to his Almighty Creator did necessarily result from his substance or manhood as it was the work of God undefaced Nor can we search after any other true Cause of the First mans conformity to God or his integrity besides him who was the cause of his manhood or of his existence with such qualifications as by his creation he was endowed with In like manner whosoever was the cause whether of his coveting or eating of the Tree in the middle of the Garden was the true cause of that obliquity or crooked deviation from Gods Law or of that deformity or dissimilitude unto God himself which did necessarily result from the forbidden Act or Desire It was impossible there should be one Cause of the Act and another Cause of the Obliquity or Deformity whether unto Gods Laws or unto God himself For no Relation or Entity merely relative such are obliquitie and deformity can have any other Cause beside that which is the cause of the Fundamentum or Foundation whence they immediately result It remains then that we acknowledge the old Serpent to have been the first Author and Man whom God created male and female to have been the true positive Cause of that obliquity or deformity which did result by inevitable Nâ—câ—ssity from the forbidden Act or desire which could have no Necessary cause at all and more to this purpose p. 3013. c. § 10. Diotallevius doth also prove that they who make God the Author of the positive act of hatiâ—g God do make him the Author of the obliquity Because saith he God himself cannot effect what doth imply a contradiction that the moral obliquity of an Act which is intrinsecally evil and freely exerted by the creature shall not follow or rather attend the positive entity of the act which is such as hath been said and so exerted For it implies a contradiction that an act intrinsecally evil to wit the act hating God should be freely exerted and yet not evil or that it should not have a moral pravity conjoyned with it 2. They who hold all positive entities to be effected by God himself must needs believe him to be the cause as much of the worst as of the best actions in the world both because hating is as positive when it is fixed upon God as it can possibly be when it is fixed upon the Divel And because an obliquity is as vnavoidable to the one as rectitâ—de or conformity can be possibly to the other 3. If an immediate working of the formal obliquity be required to make an Author of anothers sin then neither Man nor Divel in perswading another to do wickedly can possibly be the Author of it because they are not any otherwise the causes of the obliquity then by tempting to that act to which the obliquity is annexed And for the very same reason no creature could be the cause of any such sin within himself because he doth not produce the moral obliquity of the act but by producing the act to which the obliquity is annext 4. When we do absolutely and simply inquire after the cause of another mans sin we do not inquire after the cause which immediately reacheth to the obliquity of the act but after the inducing or moving cause by which he is led to such a voluntary act whose object is repugnant to the rule of Reason That is the method of Aquinas De malo quaest 3. art 1. 3. 1.2 q. 75. per totam from whence it follows that if God doth induce us efficaciously to an aversion from himself and so to a hatred of his Divinity it is every whit as true that he is the Author of our sin as that he induceth us efficaciously to that aversion and hatred which is intrinsecally evil And therefore Mr. Hickman must recant the first or contentedly smart for the Impiety of the second § 11. Doctor STEARN is very severe and upon very just ground to the use that is made of the same Distinction For he doth not content himself to say that to be the cause of the action from which the obliquity cannot be separate is to be the very cause of the obliquity it self because the obliquity is annexed to the entity of the Action and thâ—t in a manner unavoidable Nor doth he onely add this That man himself is no otherwise the author of his sin then as he is author of that action to which the obliquity is annexed But he saith yet farther That if God well-knowing the absolute inseparability of the obliquity from the action doth wâ—llingly produce that very action he is so far from being free from the obliquity of the action that he is môre guilty of it then the man himself in whom that action is â—o produced as who does seldome or never think of the obliquity annext quam Deus nunquam non cognoscit animadvertit Nay he chargeth the Adversaries with a higher blasphemy then that even with making God more guilty then the divel which how they can answer let them consider whom it concern's I shall onely for the present subjoyn his words Immo Daemones hominem ad peccandum tentantes minori jure Authores peccati sunt censendi quam Causa Libera Actionis illam producens non tantùm sciens malitiam esse
illi annexam Nam Daemones non producunt Actiones quibus malitia est annexa sed tantum solicitant c. multo itaque magis Malitiae reus est qui sciens volens non tentat aut solicitat sed actionem reipsa producit cujus malitia ut ab ea prorsus inseparabilis ipsi quà m clarissimè patet What kind of Adversaries they are whom the Doctor thus handles and how much Mr. Hickman becomes concern'd he gives us to know by his two instances in Twisse and Zuinglius § 12. A whole Colledge of Remonstrants men of renown for their piety and learning too thought fit to shame the common subterfuge by these two wayes of Argumentation 1. Whensoever a superiour and omnipotent cause doth so move and determine the inferiour and impotent that it being so moved cannot choose but sin Then must the guilt of that sin be wholly transferred on the superiour and omnipotent cause But according to those men who affirm the positive acts of all the very worst sins to be the creatures and works of God the inferiour cause is so moved by the omnipotent and superiour as that it cannot choose but sin Therefore according to those men the sin is wholly to be transferred on the superiour cause 2. When two causes do concurr to one action to wit the action of hating God whereof the one act 's freely and the other of necessity then must the cause which acts freely sustain the whole fault of its coming to pass But according to the men aforesaid God acts freely in the producing of such an action which M. Hickman reckons amongst Gods creatures and the inferiour cause of necessity Therefore according to those men God sustains the whole fault of its coming to passe And we know in the whole fault is included the obliquity as well as the act § 13. The Apologist for Tilenus doth make this Answer to the distinction 1. That man doth seldom or never entertain sin or consent to it with a designe to oppose himself to the divine Law but to enjoy his Pâ—easure and satisfie his appetites 2. He supposeth that a man should consent to sin with such a set purpose to oppose Gods Law And then infers that according to Mr. H.'s Doctrine that consent and that purpose being positive entities and acts of the soul are from God and of his production from whence it followes either that man doth not sin when he commits such an act or that the fault is imputable to God who is called by Mr. Hickman the first cause of that Act. I wonder when Mr. H. will give that Author a Reply § 14. But after all and above all I commend to consideration the words of the Reverend Dr. HAMMOND who having shewed how those Doctrines which are commonly called Calvinistical are so noxious to the practice and lives of men as to be able to evacuate all the force of the Fundamentals of Christianity those I mean by him forementioned And coming to speak of the Distinction betwixt the act and the obliquity which the Assertors of those Doctrins have commonly used as an Artifice for the avoiding of those consequences by which their Doctrines are rendred odious at last proceeds to make it appear That this is no way applicable to the freeing of God from being the Author of that sin of which he is said by those men to predetermine the act For 1. Though a free power of acting good or evil be perfectly distinct and separable from doing evil and therefore God that is the Author of one cannot thence be inferred to be the author of the other yet the act of sin is not separable from the obliquity of that act the act of blasphemy from the obliquity or irregularity of blasphemie the least evil thought or word against an infinite good God being as crooked as the rule is straight and consequently he that predetermines the act must needs predetermine the obliquity Nay 2. if there were any advantage to be made of this distinction in this matter it would more truely be affirmed on the contrary side that God is the author of the obliquity and man of the act for God that gives the rule in transgressing of which all obliquity consists doth contribute a great deal though not to the production of that Act which is freely committed against that rule yet to the denominating it oblique for if there were no Law there would be no obliquity God that gives the law that a Jew shall be circumcised thereby constitutes uncircumcision an obliquity which had he not given that law had never been such But for the act as that differs from the powers on one side and the obliquity on the other it is evident that the man is the cause of that To conclude this Chapter It is a thing so undeniable that the Author of the act of hating God must needs be the Author of the obliquity that as the men of the Church of England affirm man to be the Author and the sole author of both and God of neither so the rigid Presbyterians as well as Papists affirm God to be the Author not onely of the act but of the obliquity of the Act. Witness Mr. Archer so much commended by Thomas Godwin in his Comfort for believers p. 36.37 Mr. Whitfield also and Mr. Hobbs Occham in sent 3. q. 12 cited by Dr Field p. 128. and Mr. Hickman in effect when he saith that God is the Cause of all Beings p. 78. and p. 95. and Pet. Mart. in 1 Sam. c. 2. CHAP. V. § 1. THE positive entity of sin is so clear from Scripture and from the writings of all the Fathers both Greek and Latine that as Mr. Hickman hath not attempted to give us Scripture for his opinion so the FATHERS are very few whose very figurative speeches do look that way And their meaning is so conspicuous by what the same Fathers say before and after that if he drank out of the Foâ—ntaines as I see he hath done out of several Cisterns I admire the greatness of his delusion His performance being no better then mine or any mans would be who should prove that an Idol hath not a positive being although the work of mens hands and made of Massy Gold or silver because it is said by the Apostle an Idol is nothing in the world Or that the Planters of Christianity had not onely no positive but not so much as a Real Being because it is said by the same Apostle that God hath chosen the things that are not to bring to naught things that are Yet this ad hominem is a strong way of arguing very much stronger then Mr. Hickmans by how much that of the Scripture is the greatest Authority in the world Now though it is said by the Holy Ghost that Circumcision is nothing that the foreskin is nothing that wicked men are of nothing that every man is but vanity yea and
confession of Learned VOSSIUS That the greatest part of the Amients do so speak as if they thought Original sin to be somâ—thing positive to wit either a Habit or some other Quality I call it the confession of GERARD VOSSIUS because I find it is none of his own opinions that Original sin is something positive whatever he speaks of actual sins And I think his confession to be of the greater consideration because of his being so very conversant in Antient writers and because or his abilitie to understand their true meaning and lastly of his unwillingness to understand them against himself Nay when he speaks of those Antients who were otherwise minded he takes their meaning to have been not so much that this sin was a meer defect of Original Righteousnesse as that it was rather an habitual aversion from God proceeding from the defect of Original righteousness They that held it to be a quality could not otherwise hold it in his opinion then by holding also that the soul was begotten with the body and sin begotten with the soul or that the spirit being created was at least infected by the flesh some thought that the soul was as it were kindled by the soul in generation and that the Leprosie of sin in childrens souls was by infection from the leprosy with which their parents had been infected Of which Opinion was TERTVLLIAN APOLLINARIVS and the greatest part of the Eastern Fathers Quomodo corpus ex corpore sic animam nasci ex animâ TERTVL Apoll. maxima pars Orientalium autumavit uti scribit Hieronymus ad Marcellinum Anapsychiam Epist. 45. RUFFINUS also and AUGUSTIN are cited for it But because of the latter t is said by VOSSIUS that he durst not publickly avow what was privately his opinion His words are the worthier to be observed For thus he writeth to OPTATVS se neque legendo neque orando neque ratiocinando invenire potuisse quomodo cum animarum Creatione peccatum Originis defendatur And for more to this purpose the Reader is referred to other places as Epist. 28. ad Hieronymum Lib. 10. in Genes ad lit cap 23. lib. 1 Retract c. 1. Nay even then when he is doubtful of the souls extraction whether created or begotten he still adheres to his opinion that it is infected by the flesh with some positive Quality as wine grows sowre by being put in a sowre vessel And VOSSIVS himself doth so explain him Haec enim mens est verborum Augustini profecto aut utrumque vitiatum exhomine trahitur aut alterum in altero tanquam in vase vitiato corrumpitur ubi occulta justitiâ— divinae legis includitur Quid autem horum sit verum libentius disco quà m dico ne audeam dicere quod nescio It seemes he doubted whether the soul were ex traduce or not although unlesse it were ex traduce he knew not how to defend Original sin But that he concluded it had a positive entity appears as by all that hath been spoken so by the motus bestialis bestialis Libido by which he expresseth the sin of Adam § 4. As the most of the Antients so the most eminent of the MODERNS have held the soul to be ex traduce and Original sin a positive entity two of which number are commended by learned Vossius but just now cited for men of Excellency and Renown And Vossius himself in divers places doth sufficiently assâ—rt the positivity of sin not so much when he saith of Original sin that it inclines the minde to vitious acts so that it may and is wont to be called a Habit as when he saith of its effects which arâ— Actual sins that they are grown over the soul as a spiritual Rust that carnal Concupiscence is wholy vitious as being a deflextion of the appetite from the Law of its Creation from whence ariseth a dispositâ—on and propensity to Râ—bellion that Morally vitious Acts are freely drawn out from that propensity that by the custom of such aâ—ts there is ingendered in the sinner a vitious Habit. Cùm affectus sic effraenis lascivit ut rationis imperium antevertat plurimùm adversus rationem insurgat ac nisi diligenter à ratione valletur facile aurigam rationem curru excutiat In graviori tentatione semper sit superior nisi ratio speciali juvetur Dei Judicio 2. And as they who affirme the propagation of the soul so also they who deny that God doth concur to the act of sin do eo ipso hold sin to have a positive being such as LOMBARD BONAVENTVRE ALEXANDER ALENSIS ASOTO DVRAND AVREOLVS the learned ARMACHANVS and others cited by Dr. STEARN in his Animi Medela p. 256 257. And though the Master of the sentences doth seem to some not to define which is truest the negative or the affirmative of Gâ—ds concurrence to acts of sin but leaves the Reader to judge of both tenets to Dist. 37. yet he is cited by CAMERACENSIS l. 1. q. 14. for the defence of the Negative Because according to his opinion God doth only permit those evils which are sin as saith our learned Dr. FIELD p. 128. 3. HEMMINGIVS the Scholar of Melanehthon and known to be of his minde defineth sin in general by disobedience against God and affirmes Disobedience to import four things in holy writ Defect corruption inclination and action Original sin he defines to be a propagated corruption of humane nature in which there is a material and formal part The Material saith he containeth both a defect in the intellect and a concupiscence in the heart In the fal of Adam there was a concurrence of these 8. sins 1. A doubting the truth of Gods word 2. A loss of faith or incredulity 3. Curiosity 4. Pride 5. Contempt of God 6. Apostacy 7. Ingratitude 8. A murdering of himself and his posterity And is expressed in Scripture by divers names Concupiscence Flesh the old man the Law of sin sin dwelling in us Rebellion the law of the members and sometimes sin without any epithâ—t Actuall sin he defines to be something done omitted said or thought fighting with the law of God Or as he puts it in other tearmes Actual sin is every action committed against the Law both in the Intellect and the will and in the heart and the outward members Thus that Regius Professor famous for learning and moderation 4. GREGORIE MARTIN of Silesia stating the sin of our first parents begins to expound the word Lapsus which he saith importeth a vitious act with which a man does any thing ill and is the same with peccatum Then coming to speak of the term originall sin he professeth to take the word for the positive act of eating the fruit which was forbidden And so the expression of Original sin he faith doth also include an actual From the importance of the word he comes to speak of the thing signified Which first he
is a high self-determining principle the great spring of our actions of Iudgement pag. 152. But Mr. B. as many others is produced by me in no fâ—â— place I not observing any order either of dignity or of time but giving to every one a place as he meets my memory or my eye The words of GROTIUS deserve great heed whilst he saith that the liberty of a man's will is not vitious but able by its own force to produce a thing that is vitious that is an action meaning that a vitious action as the action of hating God is meerly from the sinner man or Divel and not without impiety to be ascribed unto God either as a mediate or immediate cause And though I cited some part of his words before yet not to fail of his intenâ— I shall intreat my Reader to weigh the whole Neque ab eo quod diximus dimovere nos debet quod mala multa evenire cernimus quorum videtur origo Deo adscribi non posse ut qui perfectissimè sicut ante dictum est bonus sit Nam cum diximus Deum omnium esse Causam addidimus eorum quae verè subsistunt Nihil enim prohibet quominus ipsa quae subsistunt deinde causae sint Accidentium quorundam quales sunt actiones Deus hominem mentes sublimiores homine creavit cum agendi libertate quae agendi libertas vitiosa non est sed potest suâ vialiquid vitiosum producere Et hujus quidem generis malis quae moraliter mala dicuntur omnino Deum adscribere auctorem nefas est p. 27 28. LYCERUS vindicating God from the very same calumnie with which Mr. Hickman hath not feared to â—sperse him saith that the Divel did peccâ—re ex semetipso according to our Saviour Ioh. 8.44 that he alone is pater fons malorum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first inventor of evil things to which he accommodates that of Austin Quomodo Deus pater genuit filium veritatem sic Diabolus lapsus genuit quasi filium mendacium God is said to be omnipotent not because he can do all things saith LOMBARD out of Augustin but because he can do whatsoever he will who cannot will to do any thing but what is good But there are some things saith he which God cannot do to wit those things wich are unjust sunt alia quaedam quae Deus nullatenus facere potest ut pâ—ccata p. 247. Non potest Deus facere injusta p. 248. These following Doctrines quod voluntas hominis ex necessitate vult eligit quod liberum Arbitrium est potentia passiva quod necessitate movetur ab Appetibili item quod dignitas esset in causis superioribus posse facere peccata Item quod alâ—quis faciat aliquid omnino ut Deus vult ipsum facere voluâ—tate Beneplaciti quod talis peccet c. were condemned with an Anathema by the Bp. of Paris and all the Professors of Divinity in that university A. D. 1270. 1341. together with the Blasphemies of Ioannes de Mercurio of the Cistercian order that God is in some sort the cause of the sinful act And that whatever is caused by the will of the Creature is so caused by vertue of the first cause And that God is the cause of every mode of the act and of every Circumstance that is produced All which are the Blasphemies asserted as Necessary truths by Mr. Hickman accordingly do call for a condemnation Bp. BRAMHALL shewes it to be his judgement whilst he censures Mr. Hobbs for saying that God wills and effects by the second causes all their actions good and bad and saith it implyes a contradiction that God should willingly do what he professeth he doth suffer Act. 13.18 Act. 14.16 Then he thus states the matter God causeth all good permitteth all evil disposeth all things both good and evil The general power to act is from God in him we live move and have our being this is Good But the specification and Determination of this general power to the doing of any evil is from our selves and proceeds from the free will of man it is a good consequence This thing is unrighteous therefore it cannot proceed from God Thus Aquinas and others are also expounded by Diotallevius not to mean that God is any cause of the evil act but that he doth not withdraw his necessary support from the will which abuseth its liberty in determining it self to the evil act and so that God is only the condition without which we cannot do evil not the cause by which we do it And so saith Aquinas Licet Deus sit universale principium omnis intentionis motus humani quod tamen determinetur voluntas humana ad malum consilium hoc non esse à Deo sed ab ipsâ again he saith non à motione divinâ sed à dispâ—sitione humanae voluntatis oriri ut malae potius actionâ—s quà m boâ—ae sequantur He also cites for his opinion what I have cast into the Margin and of which the result is this Dâ—termiâ—ationâ—m ad producâ—ndam huâ—â—s actus enâ—itatem esse à voluntate humanâ non autem à Deo Deum ita nolle antecedenâ—er ut haec entitas sit ut eam eâ—iam esse patiatur suum concursum non subtrahendo si conditio id exigat ex Creaturae libertate opposita p. 92.93.94 mark how it is expressed by Dr. GO AD. God made Adam able to be willing to sin but he made him not to will sin that he chose death it was by the strength of his will given him by God but God did not binde him to chose death for that were a contradiction a necessitated choice if the Nature of a voluntary Agent be well observed this point will be most evident And now the judicious Dr. Hammond will be the fittest to shut up all He that first gives the Law and then preâ—etermines the Act of transgressing the disobedience the doing contrary to that law that first forbids eating of the tree of knowledge and then predetermines Adams will to choose and eat what was forbidden is by his decree guilty of the Commission of the act and by his Law the cause of its being an obliquity And indeed if the obliquity which renders the act a sinfull act be it self any thing it must necessarily follow that either God doth not predetermine all things or that he predetermines the obliquity and Regularity bearing the same pâ—oportion of Relation to any act of Duty as obliquity doth to sin it cannot be imagined that the Author of the sinful Act should not be the Author of the obliquity as well as the Author of the pious Act is by the disputers acknowledged to be the Author of the regularity of it To conclude this Chapter in the words of Dr Reynolds Let not any man resolve sins into any other original then his
here observe two things 1 His affirming the act of Blasphemy to be from God as he doth expresly lin 13 14. Next his denying those things to be the works of the Divel to which the Scripture hath given that Name He denyes it here partly and partly pag. 96. what yet the Scripture asserteth plainly 1 Ioh. 3.8 But more of this Reason in the following Section For § 13. After five pages of impertinence he argues thus If a thing be therefore sinful because it wants some perfection that it ought to have and cease to be sinful when it hath all the perfection which it ought to have then is sin a privation but a thing is therefore sinfull c. Ergo pag. 84. As this is also taken from Mr. Barlow but no more acknowledged by the Taker then all the rest so an Answer to it is given in my Reply to Mr. Barlow in vindication of Dr. Field who having proved that there are acts to which no rectitude can be due to make them perfect as the act of hating God had such an answer from Master Barlow as I shew'd to be invalid in five respects And in each of them Mr. Hickman is equally concern'd But yet I add 1. that this makes against those sins onely which are onely sins because forbidden not at all against those which are onely forbidden for being sins of which I have spoken ch 3. § 6. That something may be evil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is affirmed by Saint Basil as he confesseth And that the action of hating God is intrinsecally evil we have his word p. 94. But 2. This onely proves that some sins are privative not that sin is a 〈◊〉 privation And what is privative of one thing is also positive of another as hath been shewed § 1. and 4. 3. Doctor Field and others have often told him of a positive repugnance to the Law of God And when it was said by himself pag. 79. he could derive the irregularity from corruption and the Divels Temptation he did not say it was not positive unless nothing can be so that is fâ—om corrupâ—ion and the Divel A man may thus make him confute himself of the vitall acts speaking and Blasphemy or lying he saith the former is from God the latter from the Divel and yet the Blasphemy is as positive as speaking can be because it is speaking to Gods dishonour and so at once in opposition and yet according to Mr. Hickman who is often Antipus to himself there are some things positive which are neither God nor from God but from corruption and the Divels temptation § 14. What he is wiâ—ling to inferr from the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 85. which he saw urged by Mr. Barlow in no less then three places I shall shew to be faulty in six respects 1. He seems not to have known what Mr. Barlow well knew but considered not that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in composition hath a threefold importance and thence is called by three names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And that the Law is transgressed by him who adds to it or goes beyond it 2. By this way of arguing he might endeavour to prove God to be meerly privative because he is said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Infinite that is without any bounds or terms of being And Dionysius the Areopagite delights to tell us what he is by telling us what he is not as hath been shewd chap. 5. 3. What St. Iohn hath expressed by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 others commonly do express by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 each of which I now see in the same page of Athanasius who also puts 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as an instance of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 contra Gentes pag. 4. 4. There is nothing commoner in the N. T. then for words compounded with α to have a positive signification in one respect as well as a privative in another As Rom. 1.30.31 we find 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to import Rebellious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 covenant-breakers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 implacable 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cruel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is foolish but so as foolish signifies unreasonable actions as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth malice and mischief against Christ Luk. 6.11 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 those that were guilty of brutish practises Tit. 3.3 v. D. H. in locum so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Damascene is positively liberal and used as an Epithet of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 positively confident 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a positive sorrow The word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 1.28 does not onely denote a man who goes without a reward but that is positively opposite to every thing that is good as Doctor Ham. observes upon the place Noteh 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in aequivalence is the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which with the learnedest Remonstrants is actus hominis as hath been shew'd ch 3. § 25. And so it is with Hemmingius who saith the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unrighteousness which is used by Saint Iohn doth signifie in concreto whatsoever thing is done in a contrariety to the Law And accordingly I observe in the most Judicious Doctor Hammond that he takes the Transgressing of the Rule to be a positive thing a doing contrary to Gods commandment from whence ariseth the obliquity of any act 6. Nay Mr. Hick implies as much in the simplicity at least of his understanding which one Mr. Bagshâ—w was so ignorant â—s to believe he had expressed by a simplicity of heart whilst he confesseth that pravitas malitia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 import the same with peccatum p. 54. § 15. And that peccatum doth import concretively both a positive Act and an obliquity or inordination may be made undeniable from the origin of the word as well as from the Authors by whom it is used 1. Pecco is a verb active peccare an action just as much as malefacere Peccatum clearly comes from the passive voice of that verb even as much as benefactum from the passive voice of benefacio multa peccantur legitur apud Cic. 1. Off. And peccare is a Transiâ—ive Plant. Bacch'd 8.29 And peccatum is sometimes a passive participle Terent. in prol Eunuch 27. And accordingly 't is said by all kinde of writers as well by our Enemies as our Friends that sin connoteth two things whereof the one is materiaâ— the other formal Not Aquinas onely and all his followers but Dr. Twisse and all his do affirm all sin to import 2 things sins of Omâ—ssion not excepted And Hemmingius saith that the matter of the sin against the holy Ghost is a contempt of Christ and hâ—s Gospel which he also saith is demonstrated both by St. Matthew and St. Mark I hope Mr. H will not say that the contempt
Hypochondres as much as Fame hath affirmed it to have had dominion over his own I never was so inhumane as to upbraid my greatest enemy with any such bodily indisposition and have rather afforded my utmost help But since Mr. Hickman unprovoked could not abstain from objecting a sicknesse to me and such a sicknesse as I have ever by the blessing of God been exempted from it is his own fault onely though my misfortune that I am forced to expose him in this point also And for the future I do beseech him not to meddle in matters of which he hath not any knowledge nor to have so little mercy upon himself as to scourge his guilty self upon an innocent mans back but rather to conceal his great infirmities or onely reveal them to his Physician and apply himself to the means of cure I might in favour and mercy to him have prompted his Readers to believe that it was but his spleenative Conceit which made him say in his Epistle wherewith he dedicates his collection that the Doctrines printed before my birth were the meer chimaera's of my brain For which prodigious Adventure he is not capable of excuse unlesse his flatulent Hypocondres made him a kind of Pythagorean so as to fancy a transmigration of Calvin's soul into my body I am sure Pythagoras is reported to have thought himself to be Aethalides the son of Mercurie and that Aethalides being dead he became Euphorbus and that Euphorbus being departed he passed also into Hermotimus and that Hermotimus dying he lived in Pyrrhus the Fisherman And after Pyrrhus his decease he again survived in Pythagoras Sure 't were better for Mr. Hickman to think that my soul was once in Calvin or Zuinglius or Dr. Twisse then to call their writings the meer chimaera's of my brain or wilfully to deny what hath been read by thousands and may be seen in those Writers by all Mankind who can but read them The former I say were so much better then the later by how much better it is to be sick then sinfull And so 't were charity to imagine if that were possible to be done that this was one of Mr. Hickman's Hypochondriacal conceits § 76. It may be taken for one at least that he should charge me with Impudence against the Supreme Authority of the Nation p. 45. For if he deals syncerely as well as simply he hence inferr's the Oxford Visitors Mr. Cheynel and Mr. Wilkinson and such like things to have had the Supremacy in his opinion They alone being the men by whom I complaind I had been injur'd in their Transgressing the Prescriptions of those that sent them And loosers by a Proverb have still had liberty to complain I did but modestly hope Mr. Hickman would pay me my Arrears when again and again he tells his Readers I am impudent p. 45. and 47. so impudent I am as to own my Right though not so simple as to expect it And it is strange that Mr. Hickman should thus revile me for onely presuming to hope well of him or for refusing to dissemble what was so visibly my due So when the owner in the Parable sent for fruits of his Vineyard the Husbandmen abused his severall Messengers as well as sent them away empty I will not say of Mr. Hickman that he is impudent because his manners are none of mine but I must needs admire the strange nature of his modesty when he denyed a matter of Fact however attested by all mens eyes Sect. 77. If he means the two Houses by the Supreme Authority of the Nation as he seems to do pag. 47. he contradicts the fundamental Laws of the Land the Canons of the Church the Oathes of Allegeancâ— and Supremacy and implicitely censures all the Members of the House of Commons by whom the Visitors were sent in the year 1648. as guilty of willful perjury when they took those oathes bâ—fore they sate or could sit as members in the House of Commons 1. The members of Parliament did even swâ—ar in taking the Oath of Supremacy That the Kings Highnâ—ss is the onely Supreme Governour of this Realm and of all other his Dominions and Countreys as well in all Spiritual and Ecclesiasticall Things or Causes as Temporal 2. The King was ever acknowledged in the Prayers of the Clergie before their Seâ—mons to be the Supreme Head and Governour in all Causes and over all Pâ—rsons Ecclesiasticall and Civill Nor may we think that the Clergie were either taught oâ— commanded to lye to God in their Publick prayers Nay 3. he was uttâ—rly testified and in conscience declared as well by the members of Parliament as by other subjects upon oath to be not onely the Supreme which shews that none can be above him but Solus Supremus Moderator as Dr. Sanderson observes the Sole and Onely Supreme Head and Governour which shews that none can be so besides him or that none can be equal to him 4. In the generall judgement of knowing men and of Dr. Sanderson in particular The Kings Supremacy is imported by the stile of Dread Soveraign and Soveraign Lord and that of Majesty expressions used by the two Houses of the late long Parliament in their hâ—mble Petitions and addresses unto the King nor need I here tell my Reader what an humble Petition is set to signifie and as well in the most solemn establishment of Laws as in actions and forms of Jurisdiction 5. Magna Charta was first granted in effect by King Iohn and confirmed with that Title by Henry the third of his mere free will and so the liberties of the subject cannot with reason be presumed to lessen the King of his Supremacie 6. Other Statutes which have the force of Acts of Parliament are known to be directed as private Writs with a Teste Meipso And the common stile of most others is found to run in this strain The King with the advice of the Lords at the humble Petition of the Commons wills this or that so the form of passing Bills is still observed to be this Lâ— Roâ— le veult The King will have it And sâ—it faict comme il est desiré Let it be done as it is desired plainly speaking by way of Grant to something sought or petitioned for From whence by some it hath been gathered that the Râ—gaâ—ion of Laws does rightly belong to the two Houses but the Legislation unto the King That their Act is Preparâ—tive his onely Iussive 7. That Supremacy of Power which the Law hath invested the King withall is not onely over all particular persons but also over all states which all the subjects of this Realm and the Members of Parliament in particular are bound by oaâ—h both to acknowledge and to maintain And which they grant to be his Due when they desire him to protect them in their priviledges and call him alwayes in their Acts Their onely Soveraign Lord or their Royal Soveraign 8. The