therefore the Commoner shal be excluded But it will be objected that the Statute is that the Owners of the Ground may enclose But Sir Francis Barrington is not Owner for the Lord Rich is the Owner of the Ground I say that Sir Francis Barrington is the Owner for he hath the Herbage and the Trees so as he hath all the profit and he who hath the profit shall be said to have the Land it self and he vouched Paramour and Yardleys Case in Plow Com. Dyer 285. and 37. H. 6. 35. and 17. E. 4. 16. Also the Statute is in the disjunctive viz. the Owner or the Vendee and although he be not Owner of the soil yet he is Vendee of the Trees Secondly It will be objected that the same is not a general Law of which the Judges are to take notice and therefore he ought to plead it I hold it to be general enough of which you are to take knowledge although it be not pleaded he cited Hollands Case Thirdly It will be objected that by such general Law the particular interest of a private man shall not be destroyed To that I say that such general Statutes will include such particular interests and therefore the Case betwixt Sir Foulke Grevill and Stapleton was adjudged that where Willoughby Lord Brookes had Lands to him by Act of Parliament with authority to make Leases for one life and no more By the Statute of 32. H. 8. of Leases that authority is enlarged and he might make Leases for three lives Haughton Serjeant Although he be Owner of the profits he is not Owner of the soil and there is a difference betwixt the same and the soil And the Statute speaks of Trees growing in his own soil Foster Justice The Arbitrament the Assurance and the especial Act of Parliament is nothing to the purpose in this Case and to plead them was more then was needfull For by the Arbitrament and the Assurance the Commoner being a third person cannot be bounden in which he was not a party And by the special Act of Parliament he shall not be bound because the Act is against the Lord Rich and his Heirs so as a stranger shall not be bound by the Act And therefore upon the Statute of 18. Eliz. cap. 2. of Patents the Case was That the Queen made a Lease for years which was void for not reciting of a former Lease and afterwards she granted the Inheritance unto another And then came the Statute of 18. Eliz. which confirmed all Patents against her her Heirs and Successors by that Statute the Grantee in Fee was not bounden but he might avoid the Lease for years for the Statute is against the Queen and her successors and that case was adjudged But our case is without doubt as to that point for the right and interest of estrangers is saved by the Act then all rests upon the Statute of 22. E. 4. and I conceive that the same is a speciall Act and ought to be pleaded for it is not generally of all Woods but only of Woods in Forrests and Chases But admitting it to be a generall Act yet I conceive That it was not the meaning of it to exclude a Commoner and that appears fully by the later words of the Statute viz Without licence of c. which excludes only the Owners of the Forrest and it was not the meaning that he might inclose without the leave of the Commoner One thing hath troubled me in the Statute because it is said that before that time he could not inclose more then for 3. years so as before that statute he might enclose for 3 years as it seems without Licence and now by the Statute for 7 years Also for another cause I conceive that the Defendant shall not take advantage of the Statute as he hath pleaded for he hath pleaded that he did enclose and cut whereas the statute saies that he shall enclose after the Cutting so as I hold cleerely that he hath not pursued the authority of the Stat. for upon the St. of 35. H. 8. which is penned contrary to this Stat. scil that the Owner of the wood shall make enclosure and division for the Cōmoner and then he is to cut I hold cleerly that after the felling he cannot make any enclosure Also admitting that by the Stat. the Cōmoner shall be excluded I hold that by the Stat. of 35. H. 8. that that Stat. is repealed in that point for the Stat. of 35. H. 8. is That no man shall fell woods wherein Commoners have Interest by Prescription until he hath divided the fourth part so that the Authority if any were is restrained by that Stat. if he be a Cōmoner by Prescription as he is in our Case But if it had been a Common by grant it had not been within the Clause of Restraint And Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant especially the Stat. being in the Negative as it is here For by a Negative Statute the Cōmon Law shall be restrained otherwise if the Stat. were in the affirmative for these reasons I conclude That the plaintiff ought to have Judgment Warburton Justice contrary All the matter rests upon the Statute of 22. E. 4. First I hold that the same is a general act although it be particular in some things So you may say of all statutes which are particular in some one point or other I hold also That the Stat. of 22. E. 4. is not repealed in this point by the Stat. of 35 H. 8. because they were made to several purposes The one was for Forrests and Chases the other onely for other particular Woods And I hold that the Cōmoner shall be excluded for otherwise the Stat. should be void and contrary viz. to give power to one to enclose and exclude all beasts and yet to permit another to put in his cattel And by the words of the Statute which exclude all beasts and cattell the Deer shall not be excluded or intended for they shall not be said beasts or cattel As in 30. E. 3. One who chaseth a cow in a Park shall be said within the Statute de Malefactoribus in Parcis And then if the authority of enclosure be not to exclude the Deer it shall be to exclude the cattell of the Commoner and other the like estrangers or otherwise it should be to no purpose As to that which hath been said That there is not a person who may inclose by the Statute the Statute is that the Owner shall inclose or he to whom the Wood shall be sold so that although that hee be not Owner yet he is to have the Trees and the profits and the Statute doth intend that he may inclose who ought to have the profit and although the sale be not for monie yet such a person may be said Vendee well enough Wherefore I conclude that Judgment ought to be for the Defendant Walmesley Justice I hold that he hath not authoritie by the
in tail may have a Formedon against the Bishop But in our Case it is otherwise Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment and takes back an estate unto himself in tail the remainder in Fee to his right heirs The Bishop in such case shall not have the land forfeited for Treason because that the Bishop cannot have the estate tail but in such case the King shall have the Land by the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. And the Bishop in such case shall not have the Fee because it is one estate and the King shall not wait upon the Subject viz the Bishop The Right waits upon the possession For 11 H. 7. 12. If the son and a stranger disseiseth the father and the father dyeth this right infuseth it self into the possession and changeth the possession And it is a Release in fact by the father to the son 9 H. 7. 25. Br ' Droit 57. A Disseisor dyeth seised and his heir enters and is disseised by A. The first Disseisee doth release unto A. all his right All the right is now in the second Disseisor viz. A. because the right and the possession meet together in A. 40 E. 3. 18. b. Tenant in tail makes a Lease for life with warranty If Tenant for life be impleaded by the heir to whom the warranty doth discend he shall rebut the right in tail being annexed with the possession for that is in case of a saving of the land by that right But where one demands land there all the Right ought to be shewed 11 H. 4 37. If a man be to bring an Action to recover then he ought to make a good title by his best right if he hath many rights But if a man be in possession and an Action be brought against him then he may defend himself by any of his rights or by all his rights 11 H. 7. 21. Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment to his use upon Condition and afterwards upon his Recognisance the land is extended and afterwards the Condition is performed yet the interest of the Conusee shall not be avoided For although the Extent come upon the Fee and not upon the Tail yet when the Extent was it was extracted out of all the rights C. 7. part 41. A Tenant in tail makes a Lease for life now he hath gained a new Fee by wrong and afterwards he makes a Lease for years and Tenant for life dyeth He shall not avoid his Lease for years although he be in of another estate because he had a defeicible title and an ancient right the which if they were in several hands shall be good as the Lease of the one and the Confirmation of the other And being in one hand it shall be as much in Law as a saving of the Right In our Case the Right and Possession both were in Francis Bigot And Ratcliffe is entitled to the old estate tail and to the new also There is a difference betwixt him who claims the land so forfeited to the King and the heir of the body of the person attainted Littâ—719 Land is given to A and the issue males of his body the remainder to the heirs females of his body If the Father commit Treason both heir male and female are barred for they both claim by the Father but if the heir male after the death of his Father be attainted of Treason the King shall have the lands as long as he hath issue male of his body and then the heir female shall have the lands for she shall not forfeit them because she claimeth not by the brother but by the father Com. in Manxels case A man hath three several rights of estate tails and comes in as Vouchee If the Recovery pass it shall bar all his Rights for one Recompence and they shall be all bound by one possession There is a difference where the Kings title is by Conveyance of the party and where for forfeiture for Treason by this Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. v. the Abbot of Colchesters Case The Abbot seised in the right of his house did commit Treason and made a Lease for years and then surrendred his house to the King after the Statute of 26 H. 8. The question was whether the King should avoid the Lease It was adjudged That the King was in by the surrender and should not avoid the Lease and not by the Statute of 26 H. 8. But if the King had had it by force of the Statute then the King should have avoided the Lease Com. 560. Tenant in tail the reversion to the King Tenant in tail maketh a Lease for years and is attainted of Treason The King shall avoid the Lease upon the construction of the Statute of 26 H. 8. which gives the lands unto the King for ever The third point is upon the Remitter This point had been argued by way of Admittance For as I have argued The ancient right is given away unto the King and then there is no ancient right and so no Remitter There is a difference where the issue in tail is forced to make a Title and where not In point of defence he is not so precisely forced to make his Title as he is in case of demand Whereas the Defendant demands the lands from the King the Discent will not help him because the Attaindor of the Ancestor of Ratcliffe hinders him in point of title to make a demand Dyer 332 b. In this case he ought to make himself heir of the body of Francis Bigot and Katharine C. 8. part 72. C. 9. part 139 140. There Cook couples the Case of Fine levied and the Case of Attaindor together C. 8. part 72. Land is given to husband and wife and to the heirs of their two bodies The husband alone levies a Fine with proclamations Or is attainted of Treason and dyeth The wife before Entry dyeth The issue is barred and the Conusee or King hath right unto the land because the issue cannot claim as heir to them both viz. father and mother for by the father he is barred 5 H. 7. 32 33. C. 9. part 140. Husband and wife Tenants in tail If one of them be attainted of Treason as it was in our Case the lands shall not discend to the issue because he cannot make title And there Cook puts the Case That if lands be given to an Alien and his wife they have a good estate tail and yet it is not discendable to the issue The Consequence then of all this is That if Ratcliffe cannot take advantage of the discent by reason of the disability by Attaindor à fortiori he shall not be remitted And yet I confess that in some Cases one may be remitted against the King Com. 488 489 553. But that is where the King is in by matter of Law by Conveyance but in this Case the King is in by an Act of Parliament and there shall be no Remitter against a matter of Record Another reason is because that
removed but if the VVrit of Error want only form but is sufficient for the matter in substance the VVrit shall not abate but the partie may have a new VVrit of Error coram vobis residet c. Trin. 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 464. MILL's Case ACtion upon the Case for these words Thou hast Coyned Gold and art a Coyner of Gold Adjudged the Action will not lie for it may be he had Authority to Coyn and words shall be taken in mitiori sensu Pasch 3 Car in the Kings Bench. 465. BROOKER's Case THe question was VVhether the Feoffee of the Land might maintain a VVrit of Error to reverse an Attaindor by Vtglary and the Case was this William Isley seised in Fee of the Mannor of Sundridge in Kent had issue Henry Isley who was Indicted of Felony 18 Eliz. and 19. Eliz. the Record of the Indictment was brought into this Court and thereupon 20 Eliz. Henry Isley was outlawed William Isley died seised Henry Isley entred into the Mannor and Land as son and heir and being seised of the same devised the Mannor and Lands to C. in Fee who conveyed the same to Brooker and Brooker brought a Writ of Error to reverse the Outlawry against Henry Isley Holborn argued for the King and said that Brooker was no way privy to the attaindor of Henry Isley but a meer stranger and therefore could not maintain a Writ of Error And first he said and took exception that he had not set himself down Terre-Tenant in possession Secondly he saith in his Writ of Error That the Mannor and Lands descended to Henry Isley as son and heir when as he was attainted The third exception was That he saith that Henry Isley did devise the Lands and that he could not do because he was a person Attainted Fourthly he said that Brooker was not Tenant so much as in posse 4 H. 7. 11. If it were not for the words of Restitution the partie could not have the mean profits after the Judgment reversed 16 Ass 16. Lessee for years pleaded to a Precipe and reversed it the question was whether he should be in statu quo vi Librum for it is obscure If this Attaindor of Henry Isley were reversed yet it cannot make the devise good For there is a difference betwixt Relations by Parliament which nullifie Acts and other Relations Vi. 3 H. 7. Sentlegers Case Petition 18. The violent Relation of Acts of Parliament If a Bargain and Sale be the Inrollment after will make Acts before good but a Relation by Common Law will not make an Act good which was before void C. 3. part Butler and Bakers Case A gift is made to the King by Deed enrolled and before the enrollment the King granteth away the Land the Grant is void yet the enrollment by Relation makes the Lands to pass to the King from the beginning Admit in this Case that Brooker were Terre-Tenant yet he is not a party privy to bring a Writ of Error to reverse the Attaindor of him who was Tenant of the Land and I have proved That although the Attaindor were reversed yet he hath nothing because the Devise was void and is not made good by Relation It is a rule in our Books that no man can bring a VVrit of Error but a partie or privy 9 E. 4. 13. 22 E. 4. 31 32. 9 H. 6. 46. b. Ass 6 C. 3. part in the Marquiss of Winchesters Case The heir of the part of the mother cannot have the VVrit of Error but the heir of the part of the father may So if erronious Judgment be given in the time of profession of the eldest son and afterwards he is dereigned he shall have the Writ of Error In 22 H. 6. 28. The heir in special taile or by Custom cannot have Error But yet M. 18 Eliz. in Sir Arthur Henninghams Case it was adjudged That the special heir in tail might have a Writ of Error The Baile cannot maintain a Writ of Error upon a Judgment given against the Principal because he was not privy unto the Judgment therefore it shall be allowed him by way of plea in a Scire facias I never find that an Executor can have Error to reverse an Attaindor but for the misawarding of the Exigent Marshes Case was cited C. 5. part 111. Fitz 104. Feoffee at the Common Law could not have an Audita Quaerela in regard he was not privy 12 Ass 8. 41. Keâ—laway 193. There the Terre-Tenant brought a Writ of Error in the name of the heir and not in his own name 24 H. 8. Dyer 1. There it is said That he who is a stranger to the Record shall have Error To that I answer That he in the Reversion and the particular Tenant are but one Tenant for the Fee is demanded and drawn out of him But in the principal Case at Barr no Land is demanded but a personal Attaindor is to be reversed Also there it is put That if the Conusee extend before the day there it is said that the Feoffee may have Error 17 Ass 24. 18 E. 3. 25. Fitz. 22. To that I answer That the Feoffee is privy to that which chargeth him for the Land is extended in his hands and if the Feoffee there should not have a Writ of Error the Law should give him no manner of remedy for there the Conusor himself cannot have Error because the Lands are not extended in his hands Also it is there said that the Feoffee brought a Scirefacias against him who had execution of the Land To that I answer That that is by special Act of Parliament Also there it is said That if the Parson of a Church hath an Annuity and recovereth and afterwards the Benefice is appropriated to a Religious house the Soveraign of the house shall have a Scirefacias I answer That in that Case he is no stranger for that he is perpetual Parson and so the Successor of the Parson who recovered 12 H. 8. 8. There a Recovery was against a Parson and there Pollard said that the Patron might have Error I answer That Pollard was deceived there for it is said before that the Parson hath but an Estate for life and then he viz. the Patron is as a Recoverer who shall have a Writ of Error Dyer 1. But the Parson hath the Fee and therefore Pollard was mistaken as it appeareth by Brook Fauxi fier de Recovery 51. 19 H. 6. 57 Newton A false verdict is had against a Parson the Patron cannot have an Attaint There is a difference if one be partie to the Writ although not partie to the Judgment Error 72. A Quare Impedit was brought by the King against the Patron and the Incumbent and Judgment only was had against the Patron and the Incumbent Parson brought a Writ of Error but if he had not been partie to the Writ he could not have maintained Error So in Attaint the partie to the Writ though not to the Judgment shall
of the Justices was That the Fee was executed for a moitie Manwood If the Land be to one for life the Remainder for yeers the Remainder to the first Tenant for life in Fee there the Fee is executed so as if he lose by default he shall have a Writ of Right and not Quod ei deforceat for the term shall be no impediment that the Fee shall not be executed As a man may make a lease to begin after his death it is good and the Lessor hath Fee in possession and his wife shall be endowed after the Lease And I conceive in the principall case That the term shall not be extinct for that it is not a term but interesse termini which cannot be granted nor surrendred Mounson If he had had the term in his own right then by the purchase of the Fee the Term should be extinct But here he hath it in the right of another as Administrator Dyer If an Executor hath a term and purchaseth the Fee the term is determined So if a woman hath a term and takes an husband who purchaseth the Fee the term is extinct Manwood The Law may be so in such case because the Husband hath done an act which destroyes the term viz. the purchase But if the woman had entermarried with him in the Reversion there the term should not be extinguished for the Husband hath not done any act to destroy the term But the marriage is the act of Law Dyer That difference hath some colour But I conceive in the first case That they are Tenants in common of the Fee Manwood The Case is a good point in law But I conceive the opinion of Manwood was That if a Lease for yeares were to begin after the death surrender forfeiture or determination of the first lease for yeares that it shall not begin in that part for then perhaps the term in that part shall be ended before the other should begin Pasc 20. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 3. A Man seised of Copyhold land descendable to the youngest Son by Custome and of other Lands descendable to the eldest Son by the common Law leaseth both for yeers The Lessee covenanteth That if the Lessor his wife and his heirs will have back the land That then upon a yeers warning given by the Lessor his wife or his heirs that the Lease shall be void The Lessor dieth the Reversion of the customary Land descends to the younger son and the other to the eldest who granteth it to the younger and he gives a yeers warning according to the Covenant Fenner The interest of the term is not determined because a speciall heir as the youngest son is is not comprehended under the word Heir but the heir at common Law is the person who is to give the warning to avoid the estate by the meaning of the Covenant But Manwood and Mounson Justices were cleer of opinion That the interest of the term for a moity is avoyded for the Condition although it be an entire thing by the Descent which is the act of Law is divided and apportioned and the warning of any of them shall defeat the estate for a moity because to him the moity of the Condition doth belong But for the other moity he shall not take advantage by the warning because that the warning is by the words of the Condition appointed to be done by the Lessor his wife or his heirs And in that clause of the Deed the Assignee is not contained And they agreed That if a Feoffment of lands in Borough-English be made upon condition That the heir at common Law shall take advantage of it And Manwood said that hee would put another question Whether the younger son should enter upon him or not But all Actions in right of the Land the younger son should have as a Writ of Error to reverse a Judgment Attaint and the like quod nota Pasc 22. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 4 IT was holden by Meade and Windham Justices of the Common Pleas That a Parsonage may be a Mannor As if before the Statute of Quia emptores terrarum the Parson with the Patron and Ordinary grant parcel of the Glebe to divers persons to hold of the Parson by divers Services the same makes the Parsonage a Manor Also they held That a Rent-Charge by prescription might be parcel of a Manor and shall passe without the words cum pertinentiis As if two Coparceners be of a Manor and other Lands and they make partition by which the eldest sister hath the Manor and the other hath the other Lands and she who hath the Lands grants a Rent-charge to her sister who hath the Manor for equality of partition Anderson and Fenner Srjeants were against it Hill 23 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 5. THis Case was moved by Serjeant Periam That if a Parson hath Common appendant to his Parsonage out of the lands of an Abby and afterwards the Abbot hath the Parsonage appropriated to him and his Successors Whether the Common be extinct Dyer That it is Because he hath as high an estate in the Common as he hath in the Land As in the case of 2 H. 4. 19. where it is holden That if a Prior hath an Annuity out of a Parsonage and afterwards purchaseth the Advowson and then obtains an Appropriation thereof that the Annuity is extinct But Windham and Meade Justices conceived That the Abbot hath not as perdurable estate in the one as in the other for the Parsonage may be disappropriated and then the Parson shall have the Common again As if a man hath a Seignorie in fee and afterwards Lands descend to him on the part of the Mother in that case the Seignory is not extinguished but suspended For if the Lord to whom the Land descends dies without issue the Seignorie shall go to the heir on the part of the Father and the Tenancy to the heir on the part of the Mother And yet the Father had as high an estate in the Tenancy as in the Seignory And in 21 E. 3. 2. Where an Assize of Nusance was brought for straightning of a way which the plaintif ought to have to his Mill The defendant did alledg unity of possession of the Land and of the Mill in W. and demanded Judgment if c. The plaintif said that after that W. had two daughters and died seised and the Mill was allotted to one of them in partition and the Land to the other and the way was reserved to her who had the Mill And the Assize was awarded And so by the partition the way was revived and appendant as it was before and yet W. the Father had as high an estate in the Land as he had in the Way Hill 23 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 6. A Man makes a Feoffment in Fee of a Manor to the use of himself and his Wife and his heirs In which Manor there are Underwoods usually to be cut every one and twenty yeers and
the Nisi Prius the Defendant gave in Evidence That he had paid the Money to the Plaintiff before the day and that the Plaintiff had accepted of it all which Matter the Jury found specially and referred the same to the Justices And it was said by the whole Court That that payment before the day was a sufficient Discharge of the Bond but because the Defendant had not pleaded the same Specially but Generally that he had paid the Money according to the Condition the Opinion was That they must find against the Desendant for that the Speciall Matter would not prove the Issue and the Lord Dyer Chief Justice said That the Plaintiffs Councel might have demurred upon the Evidence Mich. 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 15 AN Action was brought upon the Statute of 1 2 Phil. Mar. And the Statute is That no Distresse shall be driven out of the Rape Hundred Wapentake or Laith where such distresse is or shall be taken except it be to the Pound Overt within the said County not exceeding three Miles distant from the place where the Distresse was taken and the Plaintiff declared of a Distresse taken in a Hundred in such a County and that he drove it six miles out of the County and because a Hundred may be in diverse Counties and the Statute is That the driving ought not be more then 3 miles out of the Hundred and that it might be that the driving was six miles from the place where the Distresse was taken in another County and yet not three miles from the Hundred where the taking was for that Cause it was not adjudged against the party And that was after Verdict in arrest of Judgment Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 16. A Feme sole seized of a Manor to which there were Copyholds One of the Copyholders did entermarry with the woman and afterwards he and his wife did suffer a Recovery of the Manor unto the use of themselves for their lives and afterwards to the use of the heires of the wife The Question was Whether the Copyhold were extinct And Anderson the Chief Justice said That if a Copyholder will joyn with his Lord in a Feoffment of the Mannor that thereby the Copy-hold is extinct The same Law is if a Copyholder do accept a Lease for years of his Copyhold which was agreed by the whole Court Pasc 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 17. I. N. Doth Covenant with I. S. by Indenture to pay him forty pounds yearly for one and twenty years and afterwards I. S. doth release to I. N. all Actions The Question was Whether the whole Covenant were discharged And it was holden by all the Justices that only the Arrerages were discharged because the Covenant is executory yearly to be executed during the Term of one and twenty years for he may have several Actions of Covenant for every time that it is behind and if it be behind the second year he may have a new Action for that and so of every year during the Term several Actions for nothing shall be discharged by the release of all Actions but that which was in Action or a Dutie at the time of the release made As in 5. E. 44. and L. 5. E. 4. 41. In debt for Arrerages of an Annuity the defendant pleaded a release of all Actions which bore date before any arrerages were behind And the opinion of the Justices was there That it was no Plea and so it was adjudged for it is not a thing in Action nor a Duty untill the day of paiment comes And it is there holden by Arden That if a man make a Lease for two years rendring Rent and that the Tenant shall forfeit twenty shillings nomine poenae for not paiment at the day there a release of all Actions personals made to the Tenant before the penalty be forfeited is no Bar for it is neither Duty nor thing in Action before the failer of paiment And in 42. E. 3. 33. A man did release to his Tenant for term of life all his Right for the Term of the life of the same Tenant for life And that he nor his heirs might any right demand nor challenge or claim for the life of the Tenant for life in the said Land and afterwards he died and the Tenant committed Waste and the heir brought an Action of Waste and the Tenant pleaded the same Release and it was holden no Plea for nothing was extinct by the same Release but that which was in Action at the time of the Release made and that the Waste was not Rhodes Serjant put a Case which he vouched to be adjudged 4. Eliz. which was That if a man Covenant with I. S. that if he will marry his daughter that then he will pay him twenty pounds If a Release were made by I. S. before the marriage the same will not determine the twenty pounds if he marry her afterwards because it was not a Duty before the marriage So in the principal Case notwithstanding that the Covenant was once broken for the non-paiment at the first day yet because a several Action of Covenant lieth for every day that it was arreare the Release shall extinguish but only that which was Arreare at the time of the Release made And so Note That a Release doth not discharge a Covenant which is not broken Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 18. UPon a special Verdict in an Action of Debt The Case was this I. S. and I. N. did submit themselves to the Award Order Rule and Judgemant of A. and B. for all Matters Quarrels and Debates and the Bond was made to perform the Award Order Rule and Judgement ment made by them And they Award Order Rule and Adjudge That I. S. shall pay to W. N. who was a Stranger twenty shillings The first Question was Whether the Award were good And it was holden by Anderson Chief Justice Meade and Periam Justices That the Award was void because it was out of their Submission for they cannot Award a man to do a thing which doth not lye in his power for in this Case W. N. to whom the money is to be paid is a Stranger and it is in his Election if he will accept of the money or not And so it is holden in 22. H. 6. 46. and 17. E. 4. 5. but vid. cont 5. H. 7. 2. Then if the Award be void The second Question was If yet the Bond to performe it be good or not And it was holden by the whole Court that it was void also against the Book of 22. H. 6. 46. because that the Condition was to performe that which was against the Law Quaere that Case for it seemes not to be Law at this day And it was then holden That Awards concerning Acts to be performed by them which have not submitted are void And in all Cases where each of the parties which submit have not some thing the Award is void Pasch
to the extinguishment of the Bond by the release of all Actions But the Court conceived That the Arbibitrament did consist of two matters which were distinct and might be severed For although that the Arbitrament be void as to one matter yet it shall stand good and shall be a good Arbitrament for the other matter And Foster Justice said That in that case the Award to make the Release might be severed viz. That it should be good for all Actions except the Bond. Cook contrary And said That it is so entire that it cannot be divided But the Court conceived That the Arbitrament was good as to the Bond to be made by the Defendant although it were void as to the Arbitrator At another day Dodderidge said That the Plaintiffe had not alledged any Breach of the Arbitrament for he hath put it That the Defendant and the Arbitrator had not entred into the Bond and although they two joyntly had not entred into the Bond yet it might be that the Defendant alone had entred into the Bond and it needed not that the Arbitrator enter the Bond for as to him the Arbitrament was void And that Exception was allowed as a good Exception by the whole Court. For they said That the Plaintiffe ought for to shew and alledge a breach according to the Book of L. 5. E. 4. 108. And they said That although it be after verdict yet it is not remedied by the Statute Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 231 FOLIAMBES Case IN a Writ of Dower brought by the Lady Foliambe It was agreed by the whole Court That if the Husband maketh a Lease for years rendring rent and dieth the wife shall recover her Dower and shall have present Execution of the Land and thereby she shall have the third part of the Reversion and of the Rent and execution shall not cease And all the Justices said That the Sheriffe should serve execution of the Land as if there were not any Lease for years for it may be that the Lease for years is void And although it be shewed in pleading that there is a Lease for years the wife cannot answer to it and it may be there is not any Lease and therefore the Execution shall be generall And he who claimes the Lease for years may re-enter into the Land notwithstanding the Recovery and the Execution of the Dower And if he be ousted he shall have his Action Nichols Serjeant who was of Councell against the Demandant said That he would agree that the Case in Perkins 67. was not Law But the Justices said That there is a difference betwixt the Case of Perkins and this Case for in the Case in Perkins the Husband had but an estate in Remainder so as no rent or attendancy was due so as the wife during that Term could not have any benefit Also in this case it was agreed by the Court That after judgement for part the Demandant might be Non-suit for the residue and yet have execution of that part for which he had judgment Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 232 RAPLEY and CHAPLEIN's Case IT was ruled by the whole Court That if a Custome be alledged That the eldest daughter shall solely inherit that the eldest sister shall not inherit by force of that Custome So if the Custome be That the eldest daughter and the eldest sister shall inherit the eldest Aunt shall not inherit by that Custome And so if the Custome be that the youngest son shall inherit the youngest brother shall not inherit by the Custome And Foster Justice said That so it was adjudged in one Denton's Case Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 233 SEAMAN's Case BArker Serjeant prayed the opinion of the Court in this Case Lessee for an hundred years made a Lease for forty years to Thomas Seaman if he should live so long and afterwards he leased the same to John his son Habendum after the Term of Thomas for 23. years to be accounted from the date of these presents The Question is If the Lease to John shall be said to begin presently or after the Term of Thomas And the Justices were cleer of opinion That the Lease to John shall not be accounted from the time of the date but from the end of the Term of Thomas because that when by the first words of the Limitation it is a good Lease to begin after the Term of Thomas it shall not be made void by any subsequent words And Cook Chiefe Justice said That this is no new reason for there is the same reason given in 2. E. 2. Grants And he put the Case in Dyer 9. Eliz. 261. and said That if the Limitation be not certain when the Term shall begin it shall be taken most beneficiall for the Lessee Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 234 WARD and POOL's Case AN Action upon the Case was brought for speaking these words Thou mayest well be richer then I am for thou hast coined thirty Shillings in a day thou art a Coiner of money c. I will justifie it It was moved in arrest of Judgment That the words were not Actionable because he might have a good Authority to coine Money for men who work in the Mint are said to coine Money and are called Coiners of Money And so it was adjudged Quod Querens nihil capiat per Billam Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 235 CHALK and PETER's Case CHalk brought a Replevin against Peter the Defendant did avow the taking as Bailiff of Sir Francis Barrington in sixteen Acres of wood in Hatfield Chase and shewed that an Arbitrament was made by the Lord Burghley late Lord Treasurer betwixt the Lord Rich and the Ancestors of Sir Francis by which it was awarded That the said Ancestors of the said Sir Francis Barrington and his Heirs should have the herbage of a certain number of Acres within the said Chase and also that he should have to him and his Heirs the Trees and Bushes of the said number of Acres within the said Chase and that he might fell and cut sixteen Acres every year of the said Acres and that he should enclose them according to the Laws and Statutes of the Realm and that Assurance was made by the Lord Rich accordingly and that the same was confirmed by a speciall Act of Parliament with a saving of the right and interest of all strangers and said That Sir Francis Barrington did inclose and cut down sixteen Acres and did enclose the same and there took the Defendants cattel Damage feasants upon which the Defendant did demurr in Law The Question in the case was If by the Statute of 22. E. 4. cap. 7. or the Statute of 35. H. 8. câ—p 17. which give Authority to make inclosures of Woods the Commoner shall be excluded Harris Serjeant I conceive That the Commoner shall be excluded by the Statute of 22. E. 4. cap. 7. which gives Authority to inclose and exclude all Beasts and
Statute to enclose For the Statute is When any man fels trees in his proper soile so that he not being owner of the ground he is not within the Statute and that was the effect of his argument And as to the other point he did not speak at all Cook chief Justice I hold that the plaintiffe ought to have judgment all the matter doth consist upon the Statute of 22. E. 4. which is to be considered And first is to be considered what was the common Law before that Statute and that was That one who had a Wood within a Forrest might fell it as it appeareth by the Statute de Forresta and the Statnte of 1 E. 3. 2. by licence and also he might enclose it for three yeers as it appeareth by the Statute of 22. E. 4. but the enclosure was to be cum parvo fossato haia bassa as it appeareth by the Register in the Writ of Ad quod damnum so as before that Statute there was an enclosure But the Law is cleer That before that Statute by the enclosure the Commoner shall not be excluded Then wee are to consider of the Statute And first Of the persons to whom the Statute doth extend and that appeareth by the preamble to be betwixt the King and other owners of Forrests and Chases and the owners of the Soil so as a Commoner is not any person within the meaning of the Statute And for the body of the Statute you ought to intend that the sentence is continued and not perfected untill the end of the Statute and the words Without licence c. prove That no persons were meant to be bounden by the statute but the Owners of the Forrests and Chases and not the Commoners Like the case in Dyer And although you will expound the words of the bodie of the Statute generally yet they shall be taken according to the intent of the preamble and therefore the Case of 21. H. 7. 1. of the Prior of Castleacre although it be not adjudged in the Book yet Judgment is entred upon the Roll which Case is Pasch 18. H. 7. Rot. 460. By which case it appeareth that although that a Statute be made which giveth Lands to the King yet by that statute the Annuity of a stranger shall not be extinguished And the Case which hath been put by Justice Foster upon the Statute of 18. Eliz. was the case of Boswel for the Parsonage of Bridgwater That although that one who hath a lease for years of the King which was void for misrecitall might by the said Statute hold it against the King yet the Patentee in Fee shall not be prejudiced by the said Statute So I conclude That the Commoner is not a person within this Statute of 22. E. 4 Secondly It is to be considered if a Wood in which any one hath Common be within the Statute and I hold it is not but onely severall Woods For as I have said the Wood which before the Statute might be enclosed for three years was onely a severall Wood and not such a Wood in which any one had common And the statute of 22. E. 4. doth extend onely to such Woods which might be felled and enclosed for three yeers and I conceive contrary to my Brother Warburton That the Deer of the Forrest shall well enough be said to be beasts and cattell And whereas by the common Law before this statute the enclosure was onely to be as I have said cum parvo fossato haia bassa by which the Deer were not excluded now by this statute I hold that they may make great hedges to exclude aswell the Deer as other beasts And I agree with Justice Foster that if he will take advantage of the Statute that hee ought to have pleaded that first hee felled and afterwards enclosed and è contrà upon the Statute of 35. H. 8. scil that hee ought first to divide and afterwards to fell c. And also I agree with him that in that point the Statute of 35. H. 8. being contrary doth repeal the Statute of 22. E. 4. if by that Statute the Commoner shall be excluded But I am of opinion with my Brother Warburton cleerly That hee is a Vendee of the Trees and so within the Statute for it is not neeessary that in the Grant there be the word Sell or that money by given nor that it be a contract for a time onely and not to have cantinuance as it is in our case But he who hath the Trees to him and his heirs shall be said to be a Vendee well enough As to the other matter which hath been moved Whether the Statute of 22. E. 4 be a generall law or not I hold cleerly that we are to take knowledg of it although it be not pleaded because it concerneth the King for it is made for the Kings Forrests and of all the Acts made between the King and his subjects wee ought to take knowledg for so was Stowel's Case And also it was adjudged that wee ought to take knowledg of the act concerning the Creation of the Prince because it concerneth the King And Cook in his argument said That if there had not been a speciall proviosin for the Commoner in the Statute of 35. H. 8. the Commoner had not been excluded by that Statute And afterwards Judgment was entred for the plaintiffe Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 236 NOte That it was holden by three of the Justices viz. Walmâ—sley Warburton and Foster Cook and Daniel being abâ—ent for law cleerly That a Tenant at will cannot by any custome make a Lease for life by licence of the Lord and that there cannot be any such custome for a lease for life as there is for a lease for years Pasch 8. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 237 BERRY's Case NOte That upon an Evidence given to a Jury in a Case betwixt Berry and New Colledg in Oxford it was ruled by Walmesley Warburton Foster Justices in an Action of Trespass If it appear upon the Evidence that the plaintiff hath nothing in the land but in common with a stranger yet the Jury ought to finde with the Plaintiff and if the Defendant will have advantage of the Tenancy in common in the plaintiff he ought to have pleaded it Nichols Serjeant was very earnest to the contrary and took a difference where the Plaintiffe and Defendant are Tenants in common and where the Plaintiff is tenant in common with a stranger But he was over-ruled the action was an action of Trespass Quare clausum fregit c. Cook and Daniel were absent Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 238 IT was holden by Walmesley Warburton and Foster Justices That if a Rent be granted to one and his heirs for the life of another man and the grantee dieth that his heir shall not be an occupant of the Rent And Foster said that the reason was because he cannot plead a Que estate of a Rent
man and his heirs such Seat and he and his heirs have used to repair the said Seat If another will libell against him in the Spirituall Court for the same Seat he shall have a Prohibition And he said That he had seen a Judgement in 6. E. 6. That if Executors lay a Grave Stone upon the Testator in the Church or set up his Coat-armour in the Church If the Parson or Vicar doth remove them or carry them away that they or the heir may have their Action upon the Case against the Parson or Vicar Note in the principall no Prohibition for the reasons before Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 287 The Archbishop of York Sedgwick's Case THe Archbishop of York and Doctor Ingram brought and exhibited a Bill in the Exchequer at York upon an Obligation of seven hundred pound and declared in their Bill in the nature of an Action of Debt brought at the common Law which matter being shewed unto the Court of Common Pleas by Sedgwick the Defendant there A Prohibition was awarded to the Archbishop and to the said Court at York And Cook chief Justice gave the reasons wherefore the Court granted the Prohibition 1. He said because the matter was meerly determinable at the common Law and therefore ought to be proceeded in according to the course of the common Law 2. Although the King hath granted to the Lord President and the Councel of York to hold pleas of all personall Actions yet he said they cannot alter the form of the proceedings For as 6. H. 7. 5. is The King by his Grant cannot make that inquirable in a Leet which was not inquirable there by the Law nor a Leet to be of other nature then it was at the common Law And in 11. H. 4. it is holden That the Pope nor any other person can change the common Law without a Parliament And Cook vouched a Record in 8. H. 4. That the King granted to both the Universities that they should hold plea of all Causes arising within the Universities according to the course of the Civil Law and all the Judges of England were then of opinion That that grant was not good because the King could not by his Grant alter the Law of the Land with which case agrees 37. H. 6. 26. 2. E. 4. 16. and 7. H. 7. But at this day by a speciall Act of Parliament made 13. Eliz. not printed The Universities have now power to proceed and judge according to the Civil Law 3. He said That the Oath of Judges is viz. You shall do and procure the profit of the King and his Crown in all things wherein you may reasonably effect and do the same And he said That upon every Judgement upon debt of forty pound the King was to have ten shillings paid to the Hamper and if the debt were more then more But he said by this manner of proceeding by English Bill the King should lose his Fine 4. He said That if it was against the Statute of Magna Charta viz. Nec super eum ibimus nec super eum mittemus nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem terrae And the Law of the Land is That matters of fact shall be tried by verdict of twelve men but by their proceedings by English Bill the partie should be examined upon his oath And it is a Rule in Law That Nemo tenetur seipsum prodere And also he said That upon their Judgement there no Writ of Error lyeth so as the Subject should by such means be deprived of his Birth-right 5. It was said by all the Justices with which the Justices of the King's Bench did agree That such proceedings were illegall And the Lord Chancellor of England would have cast such a Bill out of the Court of Chancery And they advised the Court of York so to do and a Prohibition was awarded accordingly Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 288 Doctor HUTCHINSON's Case DOctor Hutchinson libelled in the Spirituall Court against one of his Parishioners for Tithes The Defendant there shewed that the Doctor came to the Parsonage by Symony and Corruption And upon suggestion thereof made in the Common Pleas prayed a Prohibition Doctor Hutchinson alledged that he had his pardon and pleaded the same in the Spirituall Court And notwithstanding that the Court granted a Prohibition because the Pardon doth not make the Church to be plena but maketh the offence onely dispunishable But in such case If the King doth present his presentee shall have the Tithes Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 289 NOte by Cook Chief Justice that these words viz. Thou wouldest have taken my purse from me on the high way are not actionable But Thou hast taken my money and I will carry thee before a Justice lay felony to thy charge are actionable Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 290 HATCH and CAPEL's Case IN an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit brought against the Defendant The Plaintiffe declared How that one Hallingworth who was the Defendants Husband was indebted unto the Plaintiffe eight pound ten shillings for beer and that he died and that after his death the Plaintiff demanded the said mony of the Defendant his wife and she in consideration that he would serve her withbeer promised that she would pay unto the said Plaintiff eight pound ten shillings and for the rest of the beer at such a day certain And the Plaintiffe did averr That he did sell and deliver to her Beer and gave her day for the payment of the other money as also for the Beer delivered unto her and that at the day she did not pay the Money Cook and all the other Justices agreed That the Action would well lie and that it was a good Assumpsit and a good consideration for they said That the forbearance of the money is a good consideration of it selfe and they said That in every Assumpsit he who makes the promise ought to have benefit thereby and the other is to sustain some losse And judgement was given for the Plaintiff Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 291 NORTON and LYSTERS Case IN the Case of a Prohibition the Case was this Queen Elizabeth was seised of the Manor of Nammington which did extend into four Parishes viz. Stangrave and three other And the Plaintiff shewed That he was seised of three Closes in Stangrave and prescribed That the said Queen and all those whose Estate he hath in the said Closes had a Modus decimandi for the said three Closes and for all the Demeanes of the said Manor in Stangrave And whether the Venire facias should be de parochia de Stangrave or of the Manor was the question And it was resolved by the whole Court That the Visne should be of the Parish of Stangrave and not of the Manor And the Difference was taken when one claimes any thing which goes unto the whole Manor and when only to
parcel of it for in the one Case the Visne shall be of the Manor in the other not Vide 9. Eliz. Dyer ar But it was said That in this Case the Modus did extend only to things in Stangrave and therefore the Visne should be of Stangrave only Nichols Justice said That although the Parish be a Town and of one name yet the Visne shall be from the Parish to which the Court agreed And in the principall Case the Pleading was That the Manor was in Parochia and the Modus alledged to be in Parochia and the Prohibition de Parochia and therefore the Venire facias ought to be de Parochia and not de Manerio or de Villâ—â— Cook cited 4. E. 4. and 23. E. 4. that in Trespass de Parochia is a good addition for it shall not be intended that there are two Towns in one Parish And it was said by the Court in this Case That before the Statute of 2. E. 6. all Prohibitions to the Spirituall Court were quia secutus est de Laico feodo for when a man had a Modus dicimandi the Corn and other things were lay things Then it was moved by a Serjeant at Bar That at the Assizes where the tryall of the Modus decimandi was one of the principal Panel did appear only upon the Venire facias and the question was If in such Case a tales might be awarded de circumstantibus And it was holden by the Court that such tales might be well awarded and 10. Eliz. Dyer vouched to prove the same It was also said by the Court That at the common Law if not in appeal the tales might be of odd number as quinque tales or novem tales but now since the Statute of 35. H. 8. the tales may be even or odd as pleaseth the party But it was adjudged in this Case That in no Case where a triall is at the Bar shall any Tales de circumstantibus be awarded And so are all the Presidents Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 292 LEIGHTON against GREEN and GARRET THomas Leighton an Administrator durante minori 〈◊〉 of J. S. did libell in the Court of Admiralty against the Defendants and shewed in the Libel That there were Covenants made betwixt them by a Charter party they being Owners of the Ship called the Mary and John of Lynn that the Defendants should victuall the said Ship for a Voyage into Denmark and that the Ship should be staunch and without leak And shewed in his Libel that the Ship being upon the Seas did spring a leak by reason of which the Plaintiff did lose a great part of the Freight of the said Ship consisting in divers Commodities viz. Coney skins The Defendant pleaded That the Covenants were made infra Portum de Lynn And further pleaded That the Plaintiffe had before that time brought an Action of Covenants against the same Defendant upon the same Deed in which Action the Plaintiffe was Non-suit and it was adjudged That it was a good Plea in Bar and thereupon a Prohibition was awarded to the Court of Admiralty Cook Chief Justice in this Case said That charter party est charta partita and is all one in the Civil Law as an Indenture is in the Common Law And in this Case it was adjudged That the Triall should be there where the contract was made and so was it adjudged in Constantine and Gynns Case Where the Originall Act was in England and the subsequent matter upon the Sea the Tryall shall be where the Originall Act is done And so it was agreed in this Case that the Tryal should be Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Star-Chamber 293 MILLER against REIGNOLDS and BASSET SIr Henry Mountagu the Kings Serjeant did informe the Lords in the Star-Chamber How that the Defendants had conspired and practised Malitiosè to draw the Plaintiffs life in question being a man of One thousand Pounds per annum and otherwise very rich The Case was shortly thus Basset the Defendant was Tenant unto the Plaintiffe of a house in R. in Kent rendring a Rent the rent was behind and the Plaintiff demanded his Rent of him the Defendant told him That he was not able to satisfie him the Rent but he promised to give unto the Plaintiffe all his Goods in satisfaction of the Rent or so many of them as should countervaile the Rent and it was agreed betwixt the Plaintiff and the Defendant Basset that the Goods should be apprised by two men which was done accordingly and the Plaintiff came to the Defendants house at the time the said Goods were apprised but it was deposed and proved did not go out of the room where the apprisement was made at the time he was in the said house which was the 10 of May 7. Jacobi ar Afterwards the Defendants Reignolds being an Atturny at Law and Basset did conspire to accuse the Plaintiffe because that when he came to the Defendant Bassets house at the time of the apprising of the said Goods that the Plaintiffe went up into an upper Chamber in the said house and broke up a Chest and out of the same took a Gold Ring 10. s. in Money and the Defendant Bassets Lease of his house and thereupon brought the Plaintiff before divers Justices of the Peace who upon Examination of the matter found no ground of suspicion against the Plaintiff and therefore they did not bind him over to the Sessions to answer the same Accusation After this the Defendants made severall motions to the Plaintiff that he would give unto them 300l. and so he should be acquitted and there should be no proceeding against him and because the Plaintiffe refused so to do they told him that divers Courtiers had begged his Estate of the King and that the same was granted unto them when as in truth there was not any thing moved to any Courtier of any such matter but all this was said in a shew only to the end they might get great sums ef mony from him And in that matter they layed the scandall upon S. Rob. Car then Viscount Rochester that he was made privy to it who then was the Kings Maj. great Favorite And when all this could not prevail to gain any Composition from the Plaintiff the Defendants did prefer a Bill of Indictment at the Assizes in Kent against the Plaintiff and there upon Evidence given unto the Grand Jury they found an Ignoramus upon the Bill and divers other plots and divises were contrived by the Defendants all to the end the Plaintiff might lose his life his estate And this matter came to Sentence before the Lords and the Bill proved in every point and circumstance as well by the confession of the Defendants themselves as by divers writings depositions of witnesses and letters read and shewed in open Court and it was said by the whole Court of Lords in this case that this was a very great offence and an offence in Capite and that if such
Contracts made upon the Sea by them or their Factors And for the Antiquity of the Court v. t' E. 1. sitz t' Annuity 7 R. 2. t' trespas in Statham And so long as there hath been any Commerce and Traffique by this Kingdom so long there hath been a Court of Admiralty 3. He said The Court of Admiralty is no Court of Record in which a Writ of Error lieth 37 H. 6. acc ' 4. He considered the place And that he said was of things super altum mare only as appeareth by the Stat. of 13 R. 2. And he said That all the Ports and Havens within England are infra corpus Comitatus and vouched 23 H. 6. 30 H. 6. Hollands Case who was Earl of Exeter and Admiral of England who because he held plea in the Court of Admiralty of a thing done infra Portam de Hull damages were recovered against him of 2000l And he said That if the Court and Civil Law be allowed then he said the Customs of that Court ought to be allowed and he said That the Custome of the Civil Law is That in no case the Surety is chargeable when the Principal is sufficient And he agreed with the Doctors That the word Haeredes ought to be in the Stipulation because those beyond the Seas did not take any cognisance of the word Executors Also he said That they may take the body in Execution which are for the most part the Masters of the ships and Merchants who are transeuntes and therefore if they could not arrest their bodies they might perhaps many times lose the benefit of their suits But he said that in no case they might take forth Execution upon Lands And he said That if a Contract be made in Paris in France it shall be tryed either by the Common Law or by the Law of France and if it be tryed here then those of France shall write to the Justices of England and shall certifie the same unto them And he said That in Sir Robert Dudley's Case it was allowed for good Law where a Fine was levied and acknowledged in Orleance in France which was certified and allowed for good by the Common Law here in England But he said That the Civil Law could not determine of the Fine And to conclude he said That no Custome can be good which is against an Act of Parliament The principal Case was adjourned Mich. 13 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 360. The MAIOR of YORK'S Case IN an Action of False Imprisonment brought It was holden by the whole Court 1. That no man can claim to hold a Court of Equity viz of Chancery by Prescription because every Prescription is against Common Right and a Chancery-Court is founded upon Common Right and is by the Common Law 2. It was holden per Curiam That the King by his Charter cannot grant to another any of the Customs of London But the like Liberties Franchises and Customs as London holdeth or useth the King by his Letters Patents may grant Quaere because the Customs in London are confirmed by Act of Parliament Mich. 13 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 361. LAMBERT and SLINGBY'S Case A Man brought an Action of Debt as Administrator and took the Defendants body in Execution The Sheriffe suffered him to escape And afterwards a Will was found by which Will the said Administrator is nominated Executor The Question now was Whether he might maintain an Action against the Sheriffe for the Escape as Executor when he was but Administrator at the time and it was the opinion of the Court that the action of Debt against the Sheriff upon the Escape would lie and that the same Debt should be assets in the Executors hands And it was holden cleer That the Executor of an Executor might have Debt upon the Escape for that he is Executor to the first Testator and therefore à fortiori the Action in the principal Case would lie Mich. 13 Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 362. IT was holden by the Court That if a man present by Usurpation to my Advowson within six moneths I may have a Quare Impedit But after the six moneths past if the Church become void I cannot present but am put to my Writ of Right of Advowson And that if a man usurpeth upon the King he is put to his Quare Impedit within the six moneths And it was holden That a double Usurpation upon the King doth put him to his Writ of Right v. 22 24 E. 3 acâ— Pasch 13 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 363. OWEN alias COLLIN'S Case JOhn Owen alias Collins of Godstow in the County of Oxford was indicted and arraigned of High-Treason for speaking these traiterous English words at Sandwich in the County of Kent viz. If the King be excommunicate by the Pope it is lawfull for every man to kill him and it is no murder For as it is lawfull to put to death a man that is condemned by a Temporal Judge so it is lawfull to kill the King if he be excommunicate by the Pope For that is the execution of the Law and this of the Popes supreme sentence The Pope being the greater includes the King being the lesser To which words he pleaded Not guilty And the Evidence to the Jury was the Major of Sandwich a Parson of the same Town and the Servant of the Town-Clark And this was the sum of the Evidence That the said Owen coming from S. Lucar in Spain spake the said words to divers persons who told them to the Major whereupon the said Major had conference with Owen and then he spake the like words unto the Major and thereupon the Major tendred unto him the Oath of Allegiance which he refused to take and he put his hand to awriting containing the said words as his opinion and further said That if he had twenty hands he would put them all to it The Exception which Owen took unto the Evidence given against him was That he did not speak of the King of England But the same was said to be a simple Exception For before he spake the words to the Major the Major asked him if he were an Englishman or not To which he answered that he was and then after he spake the said words to the Major which must necessarily have reference to the speeches which were before betwixt him and the Major And Cook Chief Justice said That if he had not spoken of the King of England but of the King generally yet it had included the King of England The matter of his Indictment of Treason was not grounded upon the Statute of Supremacie but upon the Common-Law of which the Statute of 25 â— 3. is but an Explâ—nation which was his intent to compass the death of the King And he said That notwithstanding that the words as to this purpose were but conditional viz. If he were Excommunicate yet he said it was High-Treason For proof of which two Cases were cited The Duke of Buckingham in
and where not For in the principal Case notwithstanding that the Jury find the Assumpsit yet the same doth not reach to the Request and without that the Assumpsit is void Dodderidge Justice cited 5 E. 4. That if the Declaration be vitious in a point material and issue is taken upon another point there the finding of it by the Jury doth not make the Declaration to be good And so in the principal Case Judgment was given for the Defendant In this Case it was agreed That if a man bring an Action of Trover and Conversion and not alleadge a place where the Conversion was Although the issue for the Trover be found for the Plaintiff yet he shall not have Judgment Hill 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 388. GODFREY and DIXON'S Case COrnelius Godfrey brought an Action of Debt upon a Lease against Dixon and declared That Cornelius Godfrey his Father being an Alien had issue Daniel Godfrey born in Flanders the Father is made a Denizen and hath issue the Plaintiffe his second son born in England The Father dieth Daniel is Naturalized by Act of Parliament and made the Lease to Dixon for years rendring Rent and dyed without issue And the Plaintiffe his brother brought an Action of Debt for the Arrearages as heire and upon that it was demurred in Law And George Crook in his Argument said That Inheritance is by the common-Common-Law or by Act of Parliament And that three persons cannot have heirs in travnsersali linea but in recta linea viz. 1. A Bastard 2. A person Attainted 3. An Alien see for that 39 E. 39. Plow Dom. 445. 17. E. 4. 1. 22 H. 6. 38. 3 E. 1. sitz t' Cousinage 5. Dr. Student And he said That Denization by the Kings Charter doth not make the heir inheritable 36 H. 8. Br. to Denizen and C. 7. part 77. And he said That he who inheriteth ought to be 1. Next of blood 2. Of the whole blood and 3. He ought to derive his Pedigree and discent from the stock and root Bracton lib. 2. fol. 51. And he said That if a man doth covenant to stand seised to the use of his brother being an Alien that the same is not good and the use will not rise But that was denyed by the Court. And he said That an Alien should not have an Appeal of the death of his brother And he took a difference betwixt an Alien and a person Attainted and said that the one was of corrupt blood the other of no blood and cited 9 E. 4. 7. 36 Eliz. Hobby's Case Dodderidge upon the argument of this Case said That if a man claim as Cousin and Heir he must shew how he is Cousin and Heir but not when he claims as Brother or Son and Heir The Case was adjourned Hill 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench 389 GRAY'S Case AN Action of Debt was brought upon a Bond with Condition to stand to an Arbitrement and also that he should not begin proceed in or prosecute any suit against the Obliger before such a Feast The Obliger did continue a Suit formerly brought George Crook said That the Bond was forfeited because it is the act of the Obliger to continue or discontinue a suit and profit accrues to him therefore it shall be adjudged his act But it is otherwise of an Essoin because that that may be cast by a stranger And he cited the books of 36 H. 6. 2. 5 H. 7. 22 14 E. 41. 18 H. 6. 9. And he held That it was a good Award to continue or discontinue a suit because it is in the power of the party to do it or not Hill 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 390 SLYE'S Case IN a Scire facias to have Execution the Sheriffe retorned That by vertue of a Writ of Fieri facias he took the goods in Execution ad valentiam of 11l. which remained in his custody for want of buyers and that they were rescued out of his possession Mountagu Chief Justice and Dodderidge Justice The Plaintiffe shall have an Execution against the Sheriff relyed upon the book of 9 E. 4. 50. 16 E. 4. Faulconbridge Case 7 Eliz. Dyer 241. 5 E. 3. t' Execution C. 5. par Pettifers Case And Dodderidge said That by this Retorn he had concluded himself and was liable to the value of 11l. And he took this difference where the Sheriffe by vertue of the Writ Venditioni exponas sels the thing under the value there he shall be discharged but otherwise where he sels the goods ex officio Crook and Haughton Justices The Plaintiffe shall not have a Scire facias against the Sheriffe but where he hath the money in his purse And they said That the Plaintiffe must have a Distringas directed to the new Sheriffe or a Venditioni exponas Note the Court was divided in opinion But the Law seems to be with Crook and Haughton and the books before cited prove their difference and warrant it Hill 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 391 Sir JOHN BRET and CUMBERLAND'S Case IN an Action of Covenant brought by Sir John Bret against Cumberland Executor of I. C. the Case was this Q. Eliz. by her Letters Patents did demise a Mill unto the Testator for 30 years reserving Rent and these words were in the Letters-Patents viz. That the Lessee his Executors and Assignes should repair the Mill during the Term. The Lessee assigned over all his interest unto Fish who attorned Tenant and paid the Rent to the Queen and afterwards the Queen granted the Reversion to Sir John Bret and Margaret his wife The Assignee is accepted Tenant the Mill came to decay for want of Reparations and Sir John Bret brought an Action of Covenant against the Executor of the first Lessee And it was adjudged for the Plaintiffe And Dodderidge Justice gave the reasons of the Judgment 1. Because that by the Statute of 32 H. 8. all the benefit which the Queen had was transferred to the Grantee of the Reversion 2. It might be parcel of the Consideration to have the Covenant against the Lessee For a Mill is a thing which without continual Reparations will be ruinous and perish and decay And he said That the Assignee had his election to bring his Action against the Lessee or against the Assignee because it was a Covenant which did run with the Land Mountagu Chief Justice said That the reason of the three Cases put in Walkers Case is in respect of the Interest And took a difference where there is privity of Contract and where not It was adjourned Hill 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 392. WEBB and TUCK'S Case IN an Action of False Imprisonment it was agreed That a Fine may be assessed for Vert and Venison And it was said in this Case by the Justices That a Regarder is an Officer of whom the Law takes knowledge and so are Justices in Eyre 2. It was agreed That such things of which the Law takes notice
disseised and the Disseisor levieth a Fine with proclamations and five years passe and afterwards Tenant in tail dyeth there the issue in tail is barred for there after the Fine levied the Tenant in tail himself had right so as the issue in tail was not the first to whom the Right did accrue after the Fine levied C. 3. part 87. Com. 374. a. When Ralph Bigot made the Feoffment 6 H. 8. Francis Bigot had a Right by his own Feoffment 21 H. 8. his Right was extinguished The second Objection was upon the Form of pleading in a Formedon viz. Post cujus mortem discendere debet to him viz. the issue Then the Ancestor had such a Right which after his death might have discended to his issue Then that proveth that the Ancestor by his Feoffment hath not given away all the Right I answer The form is not Post cujus mortem but Per cujus mortem and the Post cujus mortem discendere debet is not traversable and therefore it is but matterof form and not of substance Old Entres 240. One dum non fuit compos mentis maketh a Feoffment he shall not avoid the Feoffment because that the Law doth not allow a man to stultifie himself C. 4. part 123. But his heir after his death may avoid the Feoffment of his Ancestor for de ipso discendit jus although the Father had not a Right in his life It was thirdly objected out of C. 4. part 166. b. where it is said That if an Ideot maketh a Feoffment the King shall avoid the same after Office found I answer That the Book it self doth cleer the objection For it is in regard of the Statute of Prerogativa Regis cap. 9. Ita quod nullatenus per eosdem fatuos alienentur c. and not in respect of any Right which the party hath who maketh the Feoffment By the Common Law Tenant in tail viz. He who had a Fee-simple conditional had not any right after his Feoffment Then the Act of West 2 cap. 1. makes such a Fee an Estate in tail and provides for the issue in tail for him in the Remaindor or in Reversion but not for the party who made the Feoffment or Grant for a Grant of Tenant in tail is not void as to himself Magdalen-Colledge Case A Lease by a Parson is good against himself but voidable against his Successor And so the same is no Exception Discendit jus post mortem c. The fourth Objection was That although Tenant in tail had made a Feoffment yet he remained Tenant to the Avowry of the Donor and therfore some right of the old estate tail did remain in him I answer 5 E. 4. 3 a. 48 E. 3. 8. b. 20 H. 6. 9. 14 H. 4. 38. b. C. 2. part 30. a. The matter of the Avowry doth not arise out of the Right or Interest which a man hath in the Land but out of the Privity As when the Tenant maketh a Feoffment he hath neither right nor interest in the Land yet the Lord is not compellable to avow upon the Alienee before notice In a Precipe quod reddat the Tenant alieneth yet he remaineth Tenant as to the Plaintiffe and yet he hath not either a Right or any Estate as to the Alienee The fifth Objection was upon the Statute of 1 R. 3. cap. 1. All Feoffments c. by Cestuy que use shall be effectual to him to whom it was made against the Feoffor and his heirs I answer The words of the Statute are to be considered All Feoffments c I desire to know how this affirmative Law doth take away the power of the Feoffees And the Feoffees are bound by the Feoffment of Cestuy que use and are seised to the use of such Alienees 27 H. 8. 23. b. by Fitzherbert If Cestuy que use enter and maketh a Feoffment with warrantie c. but there are not words that the old rights are given away The Feoffees to use before the Statute of 1 R. 3. c. 1. might only make Feoffments but after that Statute Cestuy que use might also make Feoffments of the Lands And so the Statute of 1 R. 3. did not take away the power of the Feoffees for they yet may make Feoffments but it did enlarge the power of Cestuy que use Com. 351 â—52 Then the Question further riseth If Francis Bigot had any Right in the Tail which might be forfeited by the Statutes by 26 H. 8. and 31 H. 8. A particular Act made for the Attaindor of the said Francis Bigot From the time of West 2. cap. 1â— untill the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. there were many Bills preferred in Parliament to make Lands which were entailed to be forfeited for high Treason but as long as such Bils were unmasked they were still rejected But Anno 26 H. 8. then at a Parliament a Bill was preferred That all Inheritances might be forfeited for Treason so that as under a vail lands in tail were forfeited for Treason which was accepted of The Statutes of 26 H. 8. 31 H. 8. are not to be taken or extended beyond the words of the Statute which are That every Offender hereafter lawfully convict of any manner of high Treason by Presentment confession Verdict or Process of Outlawry shall forfeit c. It doth not appear that Francis Bigot was attainted in any of these wayes For the Inquisition is That he was Indicted and convicted but Non sequitur that he was convict by any of those wayes viz. Verdict Confession or Outlawry And one may be attainted by other means 4 E. 4. in Placito Parliamenti Mortimer was attainted by Parliament 1 R. 2. Alice Percy was attainted by Judgment of the Lords and Peers of the House of Lords in Parliament It was objected That after an Indictment Verdict ought to follow I answer Non sequitur for it may be without Verdict viz. by standing mute And then the Statute of 26 H. 8. doth not extend unto it C. 3. part 10 11. Admit it were an Attaindor within the Statute of 2â— H. 8. yet Francis Bigot had not such lands which might be forfeited C. 3. part 10. For this Statute doth not extend to Conditions or Rights And C. 7. part 34. this Act of 26 H. 8. doth not extend to Rights and Titles And it is cleer that Francis Bigot had not any Estate within the letter of the Act. It was objected That if we have not set forth the full Title of the King in the Monstrans de Droit then is the Monstrans de Droit naught and void I answer 9 E. 4. 51. 16 E. 4. 6. I find no book that in a Monstrans de Droit we should be put to observe that Rule For a Petition were a going about The Statute of 2 E. 6. cap. 6. gives the Monstrans de Droit 16 E. 4. 7. If a Petition be void for want of instructing the King and if all his Title be not set forth in it
then the Court is to abate the Petition but after Judgment to find such a fault he must have a Scire facias and not a new Petition and in our Case there was none who gave in such matter for the King Now I come to the Statute of 31. H. 8. The particular Act for the Attainder of Francis Bigot and that he should forfeit all such Lands c. Conditions Rights c. in Fee and Fee tail saving c. and as the lands of Francis Bigott stood stated at the time of the making of this Act of 3. H. 8. the Statute did not extend to him to make him forfeit any thing In the Statute of 33. H. 8. Cap. 20. there were as many words as in this Statute of 31. H. 8. and many Cases upon the Statute of 33. H. 8. are adjudged upon the words shall lose and forfeit There is a difference betwixt an Act of Assurance and an Act of Forfeiture If the words be That the King shall enjoy and have it is then an Act of Assurance and the lands are given to the King without Office but by an Act of Forfeiture the Lands are not in the King without Office found Exceptio firmat regulam but our Case is out of the Rule Savings in Acts of Parliaments were but of late days 1. E. 4. there was a private Act A Petition was preferred against divers in Parliament for sundry misdemeanours and it was Enacted that they should forfeit unto the King and his heirs c. in that Act there was no exception of saving for it was but a forfeiture of their Rights and Savings were but of late times Trin. 8. H. 8. Rot. 4. A Petition of Right in the Chancery upon that was a plea which was after the Attainder of the Duke of Suffolk That the Duke did disseise him it was shewed that the Attainder was by Parliament and he shewed no saving to be in the Statute in the Petition and yet it was well enough Com. 552. Wyat Tenant in tail of the Gift of the King made a Feoffment and by Act of Parliament 2 Mariae was attainted of Treason by which he was to forfeit c. as in our Case I answer That within two years after that Judgment upon solemn argument it was adjudged contrarie Com. 562. It was objected that in that Case a Writ of Error was brought Com. 562. and that the Judgement was affirmed in the Case of Walsingham I answer that the same was by reason of the Plea in Barr And Com 565. there Plowden confesseth that the Judges were not agreed of the matter in Law and the Lands in question in Walsingams Case do remain with Moulton and at this day are enjoy'd contrary to the Judgment given in Walsinghams Case It was objected That although this Act of 31. H. 8. was made after the Attainder yet that it should relate to all the Lands which Francis Bigot had at the time of the Treason committed I answer That this Act of 31. H. 8 is but a description what Lands he shall forfeit viz. all the Lands which he had at the time of the Treason committed The second Point is upon the Remitter of Roger Ratcliff before the Inquisition for there was a discent to Roger Ratcliff When Tenant in Tail is attainted of Treason his blood is not corrupted C. 9. part 10. Lumleys Case And the Statute of 33. H. 8. is the first Statute which vests Lands forfeit for Treason in the King without Office found So as according to the Lord Lumley's Case C. 3. part 10. before this Statute of 33 H. 8. the Land did discend to the issue in tail The Rule of Nullum tempus occurrit Regi is to be meant for the preserving of the Kings Right but not to make the King to do wrong Com. 488. there the Remitter is preferred before the King 49. E. 3. 16. there the Devise of a Common person was preferred before the Right of the King 3. H. 7. 2. the Lord Greistock's Case The Dean of York did recover against him and before Execution the Lord died his heir within age the Dean shall have his Execution notwithstanding that the King hath right to have the Ward A fortiori a Remitter shall be preferred before the Kings Title C. 7. part 28. The Rule Nullum tempus occurrit Regi is to be intended when the King hath an Estate or Interest certain and permanent and not when his Interest is specially limited when and how he shall take it and not otherwise The third Point was Whether Ratcliff hath brought his proper Action The words of the Act of 2 E. 6. cap. 8. which giveth the Monstrans de Droit are to be considered A Remitter is within the words of the Act. Divers Errors were assigned by the other side for matter of Form 1. Because the Venire facias want these words tam milites quam alios Sheffield being a Noble man and a Peer of the Realm It appeareth by the Register 7. that the same was the ancient Form in every common persons Case but of late that Form was left 2. Admit that it were a good Exception then it ought to have been taken by way of Challenge as it appeareth 13. E. 3. Challenge 115. Dyer 107. 208. 3. The Statute of 35. H. 8. Cap. 6. makes a new Law and prescribes a Form Precipimus c. quod Venire facias coram c. 12 Liberos Legales homines c. and then if it ought to be by the Register tam milites quam alios yet here is a new Statute against it And by the Statute of 2. E. 6. Cap. 32. this Statute of 35 H. 8. is made perpetual And by the Statute of 27. Eliz. Cap. 6. the Statute of 35. H. 8. is altered in parvo and augmented in the worth of the Jurors and by the Statute of 18. Eliz. Cap. 14. It is Enacted That after Verdict c. the Judgment thereupon shall not be stayed or reversed by reason of any default in Form or lack of Form or variance from the Register The second Error assigned was because that there are two Venire facias and two Distringas after that Issue was joyned The Lord Sheffield sueth unto the King to have the first Venire facias and first Distringas quashed and it was quashed with Ratcliff's consent Secondly admit there were two Venire facias yet it ought to be intended that the proceedings was but upon one of them and that the best M. 17. Jacobi in the Common Pleas Bowen and Jones's Case In Error upon a Recovery in Debt there were two Originals certified and there the one was good and the other naught the Judges did take it that the Judgment and proceedings were upon the good Original and the Judgment was affirmed in the Kings Bench M. 15 H. 8. Rott 20. the same Case Two Originals one bearing date after the Judgment the other before the Judgment and upon a Writ of Error brought the
the possession is bound by the Judgment of Attaindor and the Act of Parliament 5 H. 7. 31. 7 H. 7. 15. 16 H. 7. 8. A discent of land shall not make a title against the King or any other who hath the land by an Act of Parliament But then in our Case If there should be a Remitter yet the same is overreached by the Office 〈◊〉 part 10. before the Statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 20. there ought to have been an Office found in the Case of Attaindor of Treason Br. Cases 103. Brook Office Devant c. 17. I do not mean an Office of intitling but an Office declaratory of a conspicuous title C. 5. part 52. There are two manner of Offices One which vesteth the estate and possession of the land c. in the King Another which is an Office of Instruction and that is when the estate of the land is lawfully in the King but the particularity thereof doth not appear upon record And the Office of Instruction shall relate to the time of the Attaindor not to make Queen Elizabeth in our Case in by discent but to avoid all meâ—ne Incombrances And is not this Remitter an Incombrance And for that purpose the Office shall relate For in things of Continuance Nullum tempus occurrit Regi C. 7. part 28. For so the rule of Nullum tempus c. is to be understood of a thing of Continuance and not a thing unica vice v. Fitz. Entre Congeable 53. Trav. 40. where it is said Where the King hath cause to seise for the forfeiture of Tenant for life if the Tenant for life dyeth the Reversion may enter for in that case Tempus occurrit Regi and the King cannot seize after the death of the Tenant for life 35 H. 6. 57. There is no discent against the King and if there be no discent then there is no Remitter The consequence of all this is That the Office doth relate to the Right And that the Monstrans de Droit doth not lie And the want of Office found for all this time was the fault of the Kings Officers and shall not prejudice the King But if the Office should not relate then the Monstrans de Droit would lie because then the King was in but by one single matter of Record We shew in the Office 33 Eliz. That there issued forth a Commission directed to certain of the Privy-Councel to enquire of the Treason and if Francis Bigot upon the Treason were Indicted And in our Case we shew immediately another Commission was directed to the Lord Chancellor and the two Chief Justices c. to arraign Francis Bigot And all that is confessed by Ratcliffe himself viz. modo forma And therefore the Objection which Glanvile made was frivolous viz. That it did not appear that Francis Bigot was attainted by Verdict by Confession or by Outlawry And so he concluded That for these causes the Judgment given in the Court of Common-Pleas ought to be reversed George Crook argued for Ratcliffe and he prayed that the Judgment might be affirmed I will argue only these points following 1. That Francis Bigot had not so much as a right of Action at the time of his Attaindor for he had not any right at all 2. Admit that he had a right of Action If this right of Action be given to the King by the said Statutes of 26 31 H. 8. It was objected That the right being clothed with a possession that the same is given to the King But I will prove the contrary 3. When Francis Bigot being Tenant in tail and being attainted and executed for Treason and then Katherine his wife dyeth being one of the Donees in tail 21 H. 8. and the lands discend to Ratcliff If the Office afterwards found shall relate to take away the Remitter I say it doth not but that his Remitter doth remain to maintain his Monstrans de Droit and he is not put to his Petition The chief point is What right Francis Bigot had at the time of his Attaindor 1. When Ralph Bigot being Tenant in tail 6 H. 8. made a Feoffment in Fee what right remained in Francis his Son The right is in abeyance viz. in nubibus that is in custodia Legis And then Francis Bigot had no right of that entail 21 H. 8. when he made the Feoffment Com. 487. There Jus is divided viz. Jus recuperandi Jus in randi Jus habendi Jus retinendi Jus percipiendi Jus possedendi but here Francis Bigot had not any of these rights Com. 374. if the Discontinuee of Tenant in tail levieth a Fine with proclamations and five years passe and Tenant in tail dyeth the issue in tail shall have other five years because he is the first to the right 19 H. 8. 7. C. 7. part 81. If Donee in tail maketh a Feoffment in Fee in rei veritate the Donee hath not jus in re neque ad rem C. 3. part 29. Litt. 649. There it appeareth that the right to an estate tail may be in abeyance Com. 552. Walsinghams Case There the King gave land in tail to Wyat who made a Feoffment unto Walsingham Afterwards Wyat was attainted of Treason and there the estate tail of Wyat was forfeited but the cause there was because that the reversion was in the Crown and so no discontinuance by his Feoffment because that the reversion was in the Crown In our Case no right of the estate tail was in Francis Bigot after the Feoffment unto his own use but the right is in abeyance It was objected That the Writ of Formedon is Discendit jus and the Monstrans de Droit was so I answer It is so in point of form in the Writ but not in substance C. 7. part 14. Tenant in tail makes a Lease for life and Tenant for life dyeth Now he hath an ancient right and the Donor may avow upon the Tenant in tail notwithstanding his Feoffment but that is by reason of privity and not by reason of any right he hath Jus recuperandi did discend to the issue in tail viz. Francis Bigot 21 H. 8. He who hath a right of Action giveth the same away by his Livery and Feoffment as appeareth by the Cases put in C. 1. part 111. It was objected That Cestuy que use was an Attorney or Servant therefore he doth not passe his own right for he cannot make an Attorney to make Livery and 9 H. 7. 26. was cited to be adjudged so But it is adjudged to the contrary M. 25 H. 8. in the Kings Bench rot 71. betwixt the Bishop of London and Kellet as it appeareth in Dyer 283. and Bendloe's Reports and C. 9. part 75. For there it is expresse that Cestuy que use may make a Letter of Attorney to make Livery which proves that he makes not the Feoffment as a Servant but as Owner of the Land It was objected That Cuesty que use was as an Executor but that I deny 49
but in Francis Bigot which may be regained in due time Dyer 340. there was Scintilla juris as here in our Case 19 H. 8. 7. Where Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment and the Feoffee levieth a fine and five years pass there it is said that the Issue in tail shall have five years after the death of Tenant in tail who made the Feoffment and the reason is because he is the first to whom the right doth discend This Case was objected against me yet I answer that Tenant in tail in that Case hath right but he cannot claim it by reason of his own Feoffment he cannot say he hath right but another may say he hath right In our Case Francis Bigot cannot say he hath a Right in him but another may say he hath a Right It is like where Tenant in Fee taketh a Lease for years by Deed Indented of his own Lands He during the years cannot say that he hath Fee yet all other may say that he hath the Fee C. 4. part 127. The King shall avoid the Feoffment for the benefit of a Lunatique which Feoffment the Lunatique had made and shall not the King avoid a Feoffment which a Lunatique hath made for his own benefit viz for the benefit of the King himself I conceive that he shall Secondly Admit the right be in the person viz. in Francis Bigot yet they object that it is a right of Action and so not forfeited If this right be in the person at the time of the Attainder it shall be forfeited if it be not in his person but in Nubibus yet it shall be forfeited Tenant in tail makes a Feoffment unto the use of himself and his wife in tail if the old right of entail rest or not in his person it is forfeited to the King 34 Eliz. this very Point was then adjudged Where Tenant in tail before the Statute of 27 H. 8. of Uses made a Feoffment unto the use of himself and his wife in tail It was resolved upon mature deliberation by all the Judges of England that the old Estate tail was in such case forfeited for Treason Set this Judgment aside yet it rests upon the Statute of 26 H. 8. A general Act for forfeiture for Treason and the particular Act of 31 H. 8. which was made for the particular Attaindor of Francis Bigot I will argue argue only upon the Statute 26 H. 8. which hath three clauses First to take away Sanctuary Secondly to provide that no Treason be committed and the Offender punished The third which clause I am to deal with which giveth the forfeiture of Lands of Inheritance c These three clauses do depend upon the Preamble It was high time to make this Statute For when H. 8. excluded the Pope he was to stand upon his guard And that year of 26 H. 8. there were five several Insurrections against the King therefore it was great wisdom to bridle such persons King Ed. 6. and Queen Mary repealed divers Statutes for Treason and Felony yet left this Statute of 26 H. 8. to stand in force Anno 5 E. 6. cap. 5. this Statute of 26 H. 8. somewhat too strict was in part repealed viz. That the Church lands should not be forfeited for the Treason of the Parson This third branch doth insist upon a Purview aâ—d a Saving and both agree with the Preamble The Purview is ample Every Offender and Offenders of any manner of High Treason shall forfeit and lose c. I observe these two words in the Statute shall Forfeit those things which are forfeitable and Lose those things which are not forfeitable But it shall be lost that the heir of the Offender shall not find it shall Forfeit and lâ—se to the King his heirs and successors for ever so it is a perpetual forfeiture shall forfeit all his Lands which includes Use Estate and Right by any right title or means So you have Estate Right Title and Use Here Francis Bigot shal forfeit the Castle and Mannor of Mulgrave unto the King his heirs and Successors and he must forfeit the Land Right Title and Use otherwise it cannot be to the King for ever and what is saved to strangers all shall be saved and what will you not save to the Offender and his heirs all his Lands Right c. as was saved to strangers It was objected that it was not an Act of Assurance but an Act of Forfeiture which is not so strong as an Act of Assurance I do not doubt of the difference but how much will that difference make to this Case doth the Statute goe by way of Escheat it doth not but in case of Petty Treason Land shall Escheat but when the Statute of 25 E. 3. speaketh of High Treason the words of the said Statute are Shall forfeit the Escheat to the King But is the Right devided from the King Truely no the word Forfeit take it in nomine or in natura is as strong a word as any word of Assurance Alienare in the Statute of West 2. cap. 1. Non habeant illi potestatem alienandi so non habent illi potestatem forisfaciendi is in the nature of a Gift Com. 260. Forfeiture is a gift in Law Et fortior est dispositio legis quam hominis and so as strong as any assurance of the partie If a Statute give the Land to the King then there needeth not any Office 27 H. 8. Br. Office Com. 486. The Right vests before Office It was objected that the statute of 26 H 8. doth not extend to a right of Action but to a right of Entrie The purpose of this Act of 26 H. 8. is not to attaint any particular person as the Statute of 31 H. 8. was made for the particular Attaindor of Francis Bigot 5 E. 4. 7. Cestuy que use at the Common Law did not forfeit for Felony or Treason but by this Act of 26. H. 8. Cestuy que use shall forfeit both Use and Lands out of the hands of the Feoffees 4 E. 3. 47. 4 Ass 4. The husband seised in the right of his wife at the Common Law for Treason shall not forfeit but the profits of the lands of his wife during his life and not the Freehold it self but by this Act of 26 H. 8. the Freehold it self is forfeited 18 Eliz. in the Common Pleas Wyats Case C. 10. Lib. Entries 300. And if the Statute of 26 H. 8. had had no saving all had been forfeited from the wife 7 H. 4. 32. there it is no forfeiture yet by this Statute it is a forfeiture A right of Action shall not Escheat 44 E 3. 44 Entre Cong 38 C. 3 part the Marquess of Winchesters Case and Bowtiâ—s Case and C 7. part Inglefieldâ—s Case A right of Action per se shall not be forfeited by the Rules of the Common Law nor by any Statute can a right of Action be transferred to another but by the Common Law a right of Action may
is in the wife but the cause thereof is because it was once coupled with a possession C. 7. part Nevils Case There was a question whether an Earldom might be entailed and forfeited for Treason which is a thing which he hath not in possession nor use but is inherent in the blood And there resolved that the same cannot be forfeited as to be transferred to the King but it is forfeited by way of discharge and exoneration 12 Eliz. Dyer the Bishop of Durhams Case There if it had not been for the saving the Regal Jurisdiction of the Bishop had been given to the King by the Statute of 26 H. 8. This Statute of 26 H. 8. was made for the dread of the Traitor For the times past saw how dangerous Traitors were who did not regard their lives so as their lands might discend to their issue It was then desperate for the King Prince and Subject For the time to come it was worse The Law doth not presume that a man would commit so horrid an act as Treason so it was cited by Mr. Crook who cited the case That the King cannot grant the goods and lands of one when he shall be attainted of Treason because the Law doth not presume that he will commit Treason If the Law will not presume it wherefore then were the Statutes made against it If the Land be forfeited by the Statute of 26 H. 8. much stronger is it by the Statute of 31 H. 8. But then admit there were a Remitter in the Case yet by the Office found the same is defeated Without Office the Right is in the King Com. 486. c. 5. part 52 where it is said There are two manner of Offices the one which vests the estate and possession of the Land c. in the King where he had but a Right as in the case of Attaindor the Right is in the King by the Act of Parliament and relates by the Office Com. 488. That an Office doth relate 38 E. 3. 31. The King shall have the mean profits The Office found was found in 33 Eliz. and the same is to put the King in by the force of the Attaindor which was 29 H. 8. and so the same devests the Remitter Tenant in tail levieth a Fine and disseiseth the Conusee and dyeth the issue is remitted then proclamations pass now the Fine doth devest the Remitter C. 1. part 47 Tenant in tail suffereth a common Recovery and dyeth before Execution the issue entreth and then Execution is sued the Estate tail is devested by the Execution and so here in our Case it is by the Office C. 7. part 8. Tenant in tail maketh a Lease and dyeth his wife priviment ensient without issue the Donor entreth the Lease is avoided afterwards a Son is born the Lease is revived Com. 488. Tenant in capite makes a Lease for life rendring rent and for non-payment a re-entry and dyeth the rent is behind the heir entreth for non-payment of the rent and afterwards Office is found of the dying seised and that the land is hoâ—den in capite and that the heir was within age In the case the Entry for the Condition broken was revived and the Estate for life revived 3 E. 4. 25. A Disseisor is attainted of Felony the Land is holden of the Crown the Disseisee entreth into the Land and afterwards Office is found that the Disseisor was seised the Remitter is taken out of the Disseisee which is a stronger case then our Case for there was a right of Entire and in our Case it is but a right of Action which is not so strong against the King And for these Causes he concluded That the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas ought to be reversed And so prayed Judgment for the Lord of Sheffield Plaintiffe in the Writ of Error This great Case came afterwards to be argued by all the Judges of England And upon the Argument of the Case the Court was divided in opinions as many having argued for the Defendant Ratcliffe as for the Plaintiffe But then one new Judge being made viz. Sir Henry Yelverton who was before the Kings Sollicitor his opinion and argument swayed the even ballance before and made the opinion the greater for his side which he argued for which was for the Plaintiffe the Lord Sheffield And thereupon Judgment was afterwards given That the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas should be reversed and was reversed accordingly And the Earl Lord Sheffield now Earl of Mulgrave holdeth the said Castle and Mannor of Mulgrave at this day according to the said Judgment Note I have not set here the Arguments of the Judges because they contained nothing almost but what was before in this Case said by the Councel who argued the Case at the Bar. Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 418. IT was the opinion of Ley Chief Justice Chamberlain and Dodderidge Justices That a Defendants Answer in an English Court is a good Evidence to be given to a Jury against the defendant himself but it is no good Evidence against other parties If an Action be brought against two and at the Assises the Plaintiffe proceeds only against one of them in that case he against whom the Plaintiffe did surcease his suit may be allowed a Witnesse in the Cause And the Judges said That if the Defendants Answer be read to the Jury it is not binding to the Jury and it may be read to them by assent of the parties And it was further said by the Court That if the party cannot find a Witnesse then he is as it were dead unto him And his Deposition in an English Court in a Cause betwixt the same parties Plaintiffe and Defendant may be allowed to be read to the Jury so as the party make oath that he did his endeavour to find his Witnesse but that he could not see him nor hear of him Pasch 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 419. THe Husband a wife seised of Lands in the right of the wife levied a Fine unto the use of themselves for their lives and afterwards to the use of the heirs of the wife Proviso that it shall and may be lawfull to and for the husband and wife at any time during their lives to make Leases for 21 years or 3 lives The wife being Covert made a Lease for 21 years And it was adjudged a good Lease against the husband although it was made when she was a Feme Covert and although it was made by her alone by reason of the Proviso Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 420. NOte that Hobart Chief Justice said That it was adjudged Mich. 15 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas That in an Action of Debt brought upon a Contract the Defendant cannot wage his Law for part and confesse the Action for the other part And it was also said That so it was adjudged in Tart's Case upon a Shop-book And vide 24 H. 8. Br. Contract 35. A Contract cannot be divided
Billam Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 435. SHOETER against EMET and his WIFE THe plaintif being a midwife the Defendants wife said to the plaintif Thou art a Witch and wert the death of such a mans child at whose birth thou wert Midwife In an Action upon the Case in Arrest of Judgment it was moved that the words were not actionable Hill 15 Jacobi in the Common Pleas Stone and Roberts Case adjudged That an Action upon the Case doth not lie for saying thou art a Sorcerer 9 Jac. Godbolds Case in the Kings Bench Thou art a Sorcerer or an Inchanter 30 Eliz. betwixt Morris and Clark for saying Thou art a Witch no Action will lie for of the words Witch or Sorcerer the Common Law takes no notice but a Witch is punishable by the Statute of 1 Jacobi cap. 12. Pasch 44 Eliz Lowes Case Thou hast bewitched my cattel or my child there because an Act is supposed to be done an Action upon the Case will lie for the words 1. Jacobi Sir Miles Fleetwoods Case He was Receiver for the King in the Court of Wards and Auditor Curle said of him Thou hast deceived the King and it was adjudged that an Action upon the Case would lie for the words because it was in his calling by which he got his living Chamberlain Justice Since the Statute 1 Jacobi for calling one Witch generally an Action will lie For for the hurting of any thing a Witch is punishable by shame viz. Pillory in an open place Dodderidge Justice Thief or Witch will bear Action and the reason of the Case before cited by the Councel is because that the common Law doth not take notice of a Witch But punishment is inflicted upon a Witch by the Statute of 1 Jacobi and by that Statute a Witch is punishable Trin. 21 Jacobi Betwixt Mellon and Herâ— Judgment was stayed where the words were Thou art a witch and hast bewitched my child because that the words shall be taken in mitiori sensu as thou hast bewitched him with pleasure And in that sense Saint Paul said Who hath bewitched you O Galatians That case was adjudged in the Common Pleas. Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 436. KNOLLIS and DOBBINE'S Case KNollis did assume and promise apud London within such a Parish that he would cast so much Lead and cover a Church in Ipswich in Suffolk and one Scrivener promised him to give him 10l for his costs and pains Scrivener died Knollis brought an Action upon the Case against Dobbins who was Administrator of Scrivener and declared that he such a day did cast the Lead and cover the said Church apud London The Defendant pretended that the Intestator made no such promise and it was found for the Plaintiffe and in arrest of Judgment it was moved That the Declaration was not good by reason that the Agreement was to cover a Church in Ipswich and he declared he had covered such a Church apud London which is impossible being 60 miles asunder and so the Declaration is not pursuing the promise Dyer 7 Eliz. 233. In Avowry for Rent upon a Lease for life c. That the Prior and Covent of c. at Bathe demiserunt Lands which was out of Bathe it was void for they being at Bathe could not make Livery of Land which was out of Bathe Vi. Dyer 270. The second Exception to the Declaration was That the Commissary of the Bishop of Norwich apud London did commit Administration of the Goods and Chattels of Scrivener to Dobbins apud London which was said not to be good because he had not power in London to execute any power which appertained unto him at Norwich Dodderidge Justice The plaintiffe declares that apud London he did cover the said Church that is not good and makes the Declaration to be insufficient because it is not according to the promise The place where the Commissary of the Bishop of Norwich did grant the Administration is not material For if the Bishop of Norwich be in London yet his power as to granting of Letters of Administration and making of Deacons and Clarks in his own Diocese doth follow the person of the Bishop although his other Jurisdiction be Local to which the Court agree And it was adjudged that the Declaration was not good and therefore Judgment was given Quod querens nihil capiat per Billam Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 437. BULLEN and SHEENE'S Case SHeene brought a Writ of Error upon a Judgment given in the Common Pleas. The Case was Bullen being a Commoner intituling himself by those whose Estate he had in the Land brought an Action upon the Case against Sheene because he had digged clay in the land where the Plaintiffe had Common and had carried away the same over the Common per quod he lost his Common and by that could not use his Common in as ample manner as he did before Sheene entitled himself to be a Commoner and have common in the said land also and so justified the Entrie and set forth a prescription That every Commoner had used to dig clay there and the first issue was found for the Defendant Sheene viz. that he was a Commoner but the other issue was found for the Plaintiffe Bullen viz. that there was no such prescription That a Commoner might dig clay And the Jury did assesse damages to the Plaintiffe generally and the same was moved to be Error because that the Plaintiffe had not damage by carrying away of the clay because the same did not belong to him for that he was but a Commoner and so the Judgment given in the Court of Common Pleas was Erroneous Ley Chief Justice By the digging of a pit the Commoner is prejudiced by the laying of the clay upon the Common the Commoner is prejudiced and so the damages are given for the digging and carrying away of the clay per quod Commoniam suam amisit and the damages are not given for the clay Chamberlain Justice If he had suffered the clay to lie by the pit it had been damage to the Commoner If the Owner of the soil plough up or maketh conyburies in the Land an Action upon the case lyeth against him by the Commoner for thereby the Common is much the worse and the Commoner prejudicedS If the pit be deep it is dangerous to the Commoner and so a damage unto him for it is dangerous lest his cattel should fall into it and it will not suddenly be filled up again and so no grass there for a long time and the longer because that which should fill up the pit is carried away Haughton Justice The proceedings are Erroneous both Plaintiffe and Defendant are Commoners The wrong is in two points First That the Defendant had with his cattell fed the Common Secondly That the Defendant had digged clay there and carried the same away The Defendant makes Title to both First he prescribes to have Common there Secondly That the Commoners
the Kings Bench by the opinion of the whole Court the Judgment was reversed Trin. 21 Jacobi Intratur Hill 20 Jac. Rot. 137. in the Kings Bench. 444. KITE and SMITH's Case ONe Recovered by Erronious Judgment and the Defendant did promise unto the Plaintiffe That if he would forbear to take forth Execution that at such a day certain he would pay him the debt and damages And Action upon the Case was brought upon that Promise And now it was moved by the Defendants Councel That there was not any Consideration upon which the Promise could be made because the Judgment was an Erronious Judgment It was adjourned But I conceive that because it doth not appear to the Court but that the Judgment is a good Judgment that it is a good Consideration Otherwise if the Judgment had been reversed by a Writ of Error before the Action upon the Case brought upon the Promise for there it doth appear judicially to the Court that the Judgment was Erronious Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 445. TOTNAM and HOPKIN's Case AN Action upon the Case was brought upon an Assumpsit And the Plaintiff did declare That in Consideration of c. the Defendant 1 Martii did promise to pay and deliver to the Plaintiffe 20 Quarters of Barley the next Seed-time Upon Non Assumpsit pleaded it was found for the Plaintiffe It was moved for the Defendant That the Plaintiffe ought to have shewed in his Declaration when the Seed-time was which he hath not done But it was answered That he needeth not so to do because he brings his Action half a year after the Promise for not payment of the same at Seed-time which was betwixt the Promise and the Assumpsit Dodderidge Justice If I promise to pay you so much Corn at Harvest next If it appeareth that the Harvest is ended before the Action brought it is good without shewing the time of the Harvest for it is apparent to the Court that the Harvest is past And here the Action being brought at Michaelmas it sufficiently appears that the Harvest is past And Judgment was given for the â—laintiffe Trin. 21 Iacobi Iatratur Hill 1â— Iacobi Rot. 652. inter Hard Foy in the Kings Bench. 446. KELLAWAY's Case IN an Ejectione Firme brought for the Mannor of Lillington upon a Lease made by Kellaway to Fey It was found by a special Verdict That M. Kellaway seised of the Mannor of Lillington in Fee holden in Soccage did devise the same by his Will in writing in these words viz. For the good will I bear unto the name of the Kellawayes I give all my Lands to John Kellaway in tail the Remainder to my right Heirs so long as they keep the true intent and meaning of this my Will To have to the said John Kellaway and the heirs of his body untill John Kellaway or any of his issues go about to alter and change the intent and meaning of this my Will Then and in such case it shall be lawfull to and for H. Kellaway to enter and have the Land in tail with the like limitation And so the Lands was put in Remainder to five several persons the Remainder to the right heirs of the Devisor M. Kellaway dyed without issue John Kellaway is heir and entred and demised the same to R. K. for 500 years and afterwards granted all his estate to Hard. Afterwards John Kellaway did agree by Deed indented with W. K. to levy a Fine of the Reversion to W. and his heirs H. Kellaway entred according to the words of the Proviso in the Will and made the Lease to Foy who brought an Ejectione Firme against Hard. And whether H. Kellaway might lawfully enter or no was the Question It was objected That in the Case there is not any Forfeiture because the Fine was without proclamations and so it was a Discontinuance only The first Question is If the Remainder doth continue The second is If it be a Perpetuity or a Limitation John Kellaway is Tenant in tail by Devise untill such time as John Kellaway or any of his issues agree or go about to alter or change the estate tail mentioned in the Will with Proviso to make Leases for 21 years 3 lives or to make Jointures Then his Will is That it shall be lawfull for H. K. to enter and to have the Land with the same limitations If it be a Perpetuity then it is for the Plaintiffe but if it be but a Limitation then it is for the Defendant The Fine was levied without proclamations and H. K. entreth for the Forfeiture Damport It is no Perpetuity but a Limitation which is not restrained by the Law as Perpetuities are Untill such time as c. shall discontinue c. The Jury find an Agreement by Indenture The act which is alleadged to be the breach is Conclusivit agreavit not to levy a Fine with proclamations but to levy a Fine without proclamations which is but a Discontinuance Yelverton If the Fine had been with proclamations then without doubt he in the Remainder during the life of him who levied it had been barred The Devise was To have to them and to the heirs of their bodies so long as they and every of their issues do observe perform fulfill and keep the true meaning of this my Will touching the entailed Lands in form following and no otherwise And therfore I M. Kellaway do devise unto John Kellaway the issue of his body the Remainder c. â—o have to the said John Kellaway and the issue of his body untill he or any of his issue shall go about to conclude do or make any act or acts to alien discontinue or change the true meaning of this my Will That then my Will is and I do give and bequeath to H K in tail And that it shall be lawfull for him the said H. K. or his issue to enter immediately upon such assent conclusion or going about to conclude c. And that H. K. and his issue shall leave it untill he or any of them go about c. C. 9 part Sundayes Case 128. where it was resolved That no Condition or Limitation be it by act executed or by limitation of an Use or by a Devise can bar Tenant in tail to alien by a common Recovery v. C. 3. part acc The Case was not resolved but it was adjourned to another day to be argued and then the Court to deliver their opinions in it Trin. 21. Intratur Trin. 20 Jacobi Rot. 811. in the Kings Bench. 447. KNIGHT's Case IN this Case George Crook said That Land could not belong to Land yet in a Will such Land which had been enjoyed with other might pass by the words cum pertinaciis As where A. hath two houses adjoyning viz. the Swan and the Red-Lyon and A. hath the Swan in his own possession and occupieth a Parlour or Hall which belongs in truth to the Red-Lyon with the Swan-house and then leaseth the Red-lyon
pay the money there he shall recover damages besides the dutie Here the Action was brought before the request made and so no damage to the Plaintiff and the Judgment was that the Plaintiff recuperet damna predict viz. the damages laid in the Declaration Dodderidge Justice The Judgment ought to be Consideratum est quod Gleede recuperet damna quae sustinuit and not damna predict which are mentioned in the Declaration and then a Writ is awarded to enquire of the damages quae sustinuit The Judgment was reversed per Curiam Mich. 1 Caroli in the Kings Bench. Rot. 189. 455. TAYLOR and HODSKIN's Case IN an Ejectione firme upon a special Verdict it was found That one Moyle was seised of divers Lands in Fee holden in Socage and having issue four daughters viz. A B C D. A. had issue N. and died And afterwards Moyle devised the said Lands unto his wife for life and after her decease then the same equally to be divided amongst his daughters or their heirs Moyle died and afterwards his wife died and Hodskins in the right of B C D. three of the daughters did enter upon the Lands N. the daughter of A. married F. who entred and leased the Lands to the Plaintiff Taylor Whitfield for the Plaintiff The only point is Whether N. the daughter of A. one of the sisters shall have the fourth part of the lands or not by reason of the word Or in the Will It is apparent in our books C. 10. part 76 the Chancellor of Oxfords Case C. 3. part Butler and Bakers Case That Wills shall be construed and taken to be according to the intent of the Devisor And therefore Br. Devise 39. A devise to one to sell to give or do with at his will and pleasure is a Fee-simple And in our Case if N. shall not take a fourth part the word heirs should be of no effect C. 1. part in Shellies Case All the words in a Deed shall take effect without rejecting any of them and if it be so in a Deed à fortiori in a Will which is most commonly made by a sick man who hath not Councell with him to inform or direct him In this Case the three sisters who were living at the time of the Devise took presently by way of remainder and the word heirs was added only to shew the intent of the Devisor That if any of the three sisters had died before his wife that then her heir should take by discent because her mother had taken by purchase And by reason of the word heirs the heir of A. shall take by purchase and the disjunctive word or shall be taken for and as in Mallories Case C. 5. part A reservation of a Rent to an Abbot or his Successors there the word or shall be taken for and reddendo singula singulis Trin. 7. Jacobi in the Common Pleas Arnold was bound in a Bond upon Condition that he suffer his wife to devise Lands of the value of 400l to her son or her daughter and she devised the Lands to her son and her daughter And it was resolved that it was a good performance of the Condition And there the word or was taken for and And there Justice Warburton put this Case If I do devise all my goods in Dale or Sale it shall be a Devise of all my goods in both places and or shall be taken for and. In this Case the word heirs was not added of necessity for the heir of any of the sisters to take by purchase but only to make the heir of A. to take part of the Lands The Court was of opinion that it was stronger for the Plaintiff to have it or in the disjunctive For they said that if it were and then it would give the three sisters the Fee and not give the heir of A. a fourth part but being or there is more colour that she shall take a fourth part by force of the Devise It was adjourned Trin 2 Caroli Rot 913. in the Kings Bench. 456. ASHFIELD and ASHFIELD's Case THe Case was An Enfant Copyholder made a Lease for years by word not warranted by the Custome rendring Rent The Enfant at his full age was admitted to the Copyhold and afterwards accepted of the Rent The question was Whether this Lease and the acception of the Rent should bind or conclude the Enfant Crawley Serjeant argued That it was a void Lease and that the acception should not bar him It is a ground in Law That an Enfant can do no Act by bare contract by word or by writing can do any Act which is a wrong either to himself or unto another person or to his prejudice In this Case if the Lease should be effectual it were a wrong unto a stranger viz. the Lord and a prejudice unto himself to make a forfeiture of the Inheritance If an Enfant commandeth A. to enter into the land of I. S. and afterwards the Enfant entreth upon A. A is the Disseisor and Tenant and the Enfant gaineth nothing So if A entreth to the use of the Enfant and the Enfant afterwards agreeth to it in this Case here is but a bare contract and an agreement will not make an Enfant a Disseisor No more shall he be bound by a bare Deed or matter in writing without Livery 26 H. 8. 2. An Enfant granteth an Advowson and at full age confirmeth it all is void Br. Releases 49. Two Joynt-Tenants one being an Enfant releaseth to his Companion it is a void Release 18 E. 4. 7. An Enfant makes a Lease without reserving Rent or makes a Deed of grant of goods yet he shall maintain Trespass nay though he deliver the goods or Lease with his own hand the same will not excuse the Trespass nor will it perfect the Lease or make the grant of the goods good If the Contract have but a mixture of prejudice to the Enfant it shall be void ◠Jacobi in the Kings Bench Bendloes and Holydaies Case An Obligation made by an Enfant with a Condition to pay so much for his apparel because the Bond was with a penaltie it was adjudged void If Tenant at Will make a Lease for years he was a Disseisor at the Common Law before the Statute of West 2. cap. 25. 12 E. 4 12. Tenant at Will makes a Lease for years 10 E. 4. 18. 3 E. 4. 17. But if an Enfant be Tenant at will and he maketh a Lease he is no Disseisor In our Case if he had made Livery then I confess it had been a defeisible forfeiture and he mignt have been remitted by his entrie upon the Lord. Farrer for the Plaintiff The Lease is not void but voidable 7 E. 4. 6. Brian 18 E. 4. 2. 9 H. 6. 5. An Enfant makes a Lease for years and at full age accepts of the Rent the Lease is good because the Law saith that he hath a recompence Com. 54. A Lease for years the remainder
The Case shortly is A. being seised in Fee makes a gift in tail to B. and that descends to four daughters c. And the Plaintiff replies That A. was seised in Fee and gave the Lands to B. and to his Heirs Males and the Plaintiffe claimes the entail as Heir Male and the Defendants under the generall tail absque hoc that A. was seised in Fee 27. H. 8. 4. by Englefield If in Trespass the Defendant plead the Feoffment of a stranger and the Plaintiff saith That he was seised in Fee and made a Lease for years to the said stranger who enfeoffed the Defendant he need not to traverse absque hoc that he was seised in Fee C. 6. part 24. The seisin in Fee is traversable Br. Travers 372. acc Dodderidge Justice The seisin in this Case is traverseable Ley Chief Justice Take away the Seisin and then no gift and therefore the Seisin here is Traverseable Haughton and Chamberlain Justices agreed The Court resolved That either the Seisin in Fee or the gift in tail is traverseable Dodderidge Justice If you both convey from one and the same person then you must traverse the conveyance It is a rule C. 6. part 24. there the Books are cited which warrants the traverse of either Quod nota It was adjudged for the Plaintiff Trinit 21. Jacobi In the Kings Bench. 494 Sir EDWARD FISHER and WARNER's Case THE Testator being indebted unto Fisher made Warner his Executor and Warner in consideration that Fisher would forbear suing of him upon the Assumpsit of the Testator did promise to pay him Fifty Pounds and in an Action upon the Case upon this promise Warner pleaded Non Assumpsit in the Common Pleas and it was found for the Plaintiff And a Writ of Error was brought in this Court because it was not shewed for what consideration the Testator did promise 2. Because it was not shewed That Warner the Executor had Assets in his hands It was said by the Councel of Sir Edward Fisher That they need not shew that he hath Assets because the Defendant Warner was sued upon his own promise C. 9. part 94. The Testator made a promise to pay to Fisher fifty pound and died The Executor in consideration of the forbearance of a Suit upon that promise of the Testator doth assume to pay c. The Jury find for the Plaintiff The Error is that no time is limited nor no place where the promise was made and also it is not shewed when the Testator died and so it is not shewed whether the promise were made in the life time of the Testator or not for if it were in the life time of the Testator then the promise was void Nor is the time of the forbearance shewed and so no good consideration Hill 5. Jacobi a consideration to forbear paululum tempus is no good consideration by Cook And the like case was adjudged 36. Eliz. Rot. 448. Sackbdos case We do alledge de facto that we have forborn our Suit and that the Defendant hath not paid us the money Dodderidge Justice It is alledged that the Plaintiff paid money to the Testator upon which he promised And the Action now brought is upon the promise of the Executor Part of the promise is That he paid the fifty pound to the Testator and that ought to be proved in evidence to the Jury C. 6. part Gregories case if it be not specially named how he shall prove it Haughton to forbear to sue him is for all his life time and not paululum tempus Dodderidge Justice Exception was taken that he doth not shew that the Testator was dead at the time of the promise by the Executor It was shewed That after the death of the Testator that he took upon him the Execution of the Will and then promised and that of necessity must be after the death of the Testator Trinit 21. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 495 WILLIAM's and FLOYD's Case IN an Ejectione firme The Array was challenged because it was made at the Nomination of the Plaintiffe And by consent of the parties two Atturneys of the Court did try the Array The question was Whether the Triall of the Array was good It was said by the Councel which argued for the Defendant That it was not good If one of the four Knights be challenged the three other Knights shall try that challenge and if he be found favourable he shall be drawn and if another of the Knights be challenged hee shall be tried by the other two and if one of the two be challenged then a new Writ shall issue forth to cause three Knights to appear 9. E. 4. 46. The two which quash the Array ought to try the Array of the Tales for that they are strangers to them The assent of the parties in this case is to no purpose for the consent of the parties cannot alter the Law neither can the King alter the Law but an Act of Parliament may alter the Law 29. Ass 4 19. H. 6. 9. by Newton 27. H. 8. 13. Where a triall cannot be out of the County by the assent of the parties and if it be it is errour By the Councel of the other side contrary This triall of the Array is much in the discretion of the Judges for sometimes it is tried by the Coroners and they are strangers to the Array 21. Ass 26. 20. Ass 10. there the Judges at their discretion appointed one of the Array and the Coroners to try it 27. Ass 28. there upon such a challenge it was tried by the Coroners and Shard said That the triall by any of them was sufficient and by Forriners de Circumstantibus 31. Ass 10. so as it rests much in the discretion of the Judges 29. Ass 3. there it was denied But note That that was in Oyer and Terminer and there it did not appear that the Array was made at the Nomination of one of the parties but in other challenges it may be tried by one of the Panell But in our case they were all challenged was the objection 9. E. 4. 20. Billing For if one of the parties will nominate all of the Jurours to the Sheriffe it is presumed that they are all partiall and 〈◊〉 â—his case the whole Array is challenged but in other cases he may challenge one or two of the Array and yet the others may be indifferent But admit it had been errour yet being by the assent of the parties it is no errour Baynams case in Dyer A Venire facias by assent of the parties was awarded to one of the Coroners and good Dyer 367. 43. E. 3. Office of Court 12. One of the twelve doth depart If the Justices do appoint one of the panell to supply his place it is erroneus but yet if it be with the assent of the parties it is good So in our case 21. E. 4. 59. Brian saith That he hath not seen more then two to try the Array yet by assent of the