Enemies there is no end for the War will continue by a perpetual Subdivision and when it ends they will be in the same Estate they were before That they are often Abused by Men who to them seem wise when then their Wisdom is nothing else but Envy to those that are in Grace and in profitable Employments and that those Men do but abuse the Common People to their own ends that set up a private Mans Propriety against the publick Safety But say withal that the King is Subject to the Laws of God both Written and Unwritten and to no other and so was William the Conqueror whose Right it all Descended to our present King La. As to the Law of Reason which is Equity 't is sure enough there is but one Legislator which is God Ph. It followeth then that which you call the Common-Law Distinct from Statute-Law is nothing else but the Law of God La. In some sense it is but it is not Gospel but Natural Reason and Natural Equity Ph. Would you have every Man to every other Man alledge for Law his own particular Reason There is not amongst Men an Universal Reason agreed upon in any Nation besides the Reason of him that hath the Soveraign Power yet though his Reason be but the Reason of one Man yet it is set up to supply the place of that Universal Reason which is expounded to us by our Saviour in the Gospel and consequently our King is to us the Legislator both of Statute-Law and of Common-Law La. Yes I know that the Laws Spiritual which have been Law in this Kingdom since the Abolishing of Popery are the Kings Laws and those also that were made before for the Canons of the Church of Rome were no Laws neither here nor any where else without the Popes Temporal Dominions farther than Kings and States in their several Dominions respectively did make them so Ph. I grant that But you must grant also that those Spiritual Laws Legislators of the Spiritual Law and yet not all Kings and States make Laws by Consent of the Lords and Commons but our King here is so far bound to their Assents as he shall Judge Conducing to the Good and safety of his People for Example if the Lords and Commons should Advise him to restore those Laws Spiritual which in Queen Maries time were in Force I think the King were by the Law of Reason obliged without the help of any other Law of God to neglect such Advice La. I Grant you that the King is sole Legislator but with this Restriction that if he will not Consult with the Lords of Parliament and hear the Complaints and Informations of the Commons that are best acquainted with their own wants he sinneth against God though he cannot be Compell'd to any thing by his Subjects by Arms and Force Ph. We are Agreed upon that already since therefore the King is sole Legislator I think it also Reason he should be sole Supream Judge La. There is no doubt of that for otherwise there would be no Congruity of Judgments with the Laws I Grant also that he is the Supream Judge over all Persons and in all Causes Civil and Ecclesiastical within his own Dominions not only by Act of Parliament at this time but that he has ever been so by the Common-Law For the Judges of both the Benches have their Offices by the Kings Letters Patents and so as to Judicature have the Bishops Also the Lord Chancellour hath his Office by receiving from the King the Great Seal of England and to say all at once there is no Magistrate or Commissioner for Publick Business neither of Judicature nor Execution in State or Church in Peace or War but he is made so by Authority from the King Ph. 'T is true But perhaps you may â—â—ink otherwise when you Read such Acts of Parliament as say that the King shall â—ave Power and Authority to do this or that by Virtue of that Act as Eliz. c. 1. That your Highness your Heirs and Successors Kings or Queens of this Realm shall have â—â—ll Power and Authority by Virtue of this Act by Letters Patents under the Great Seal of England to Assign c. Was it not this Parliament that gave this Authority to the Queen La. For the Statute in this Clause is no more than as Sir Edw. Coke useth to speak an Affirmance of the Common-Law For she being Head of the Church of England might make Commissioners for the deâ—iding of Matters Ecclesiastical as freely â—s if she had been Pope who did you know pretend his Right from the Law of God Ph. We have hitherto spoken of Laws without considering any thing of the Naâ—ure and Essence of a Law and now unless we define the word Law we can go no â—arther without Ambiguity and Fallacy which will be but loss of time whereas on the contrary the Agreement upon our words will enlighten all we have to say â—hereafter La. I do not remember the Definition of Law in any Statute Ph. I think so For the Statutes were made by Authority and not drawn from any other Principles than the care of the safety of the People Statutes are not Philosophy as is the Common-Law and other disputable Arts but are Commands or Prohibitions which ought to be obeyed because Assented to by Submission made to the Conqueror here in England and to whosoever had the Soveraign Power in other Common wealths so that the Positive Laws of all Places are Statutes The Definition of Law was therefore unnecessary for the makers of Statutes though very necessary to them whose work it is to Teach the sence of the Law La. There is an Accurate Definition of a Law in Bracton Cited by Sir Edw. Coke Lex est sanctio justa jubens honesta prohibens contraria Ph. That is to say Law is a just Statute Commanding those things which are honest and Forbidding the contrary From whence it followeth that in all Cases it must be the Honesty or Dishonesty that makes the Command a Law whereas you know that but for the Law we could not as saith St. Paul have known what is sin therefore this Definition is no Ground at all for any farther Discourse of Law Besides you know the Rule of Honest and Dishonest refers to Honour and that it is Justice only and Injustice that the Law respecteth But that which I most except against in this Definition is that it supposes that a Statute made by the Soveraign Power of a Nation may be unjust There may indeed in a Statute Law made by Men be found Iniquity but not Injustice La. This is somewhat subtil I pray deal plainly what is the difference between Injustice and Iniquity Ph. I pray you tell me first what is the difference between a Court of Justice and a Court of Equity La. A Court of Justice is that which hath Cognizance of such Causes as are to be ended by the Possitive Laws of the Land and a
God made Kings for the People and not People for Kings How shall I be defended from the domineering of Proud and Insolent Strangers that speak another Language that scorn us that seek to make us Slaves Or how shall I avoid the Destruction that may arise from the cruelty of Factions in a Civil War unless the King to whom alone you say belongeth the right of Levying and disposing of the Militia by which only it can be prevented have ready Money upon all Occasions to Arm and pay as many Souldiers as for the present defence or the Peace of the People shall be necessary Shall not I and you and every Man be undone Tell me not of a Parliament when there is no Parliament sitting or perhaps none in being which may often happen and when there is a Parliament if the speaking and leading Men should have a design to put down Monarchy as they had in the Parliament which began to sit Nov. 3. 1640. Shall the King who is to answer to God Almighty for the safety of the People and to that end is intrusted with the Power to Levy and dispose of the Souldiery be disabled to perform his Office by virtue of these Acts of Parliament which you have cited If this be reason 't is reason also that the People be Abandoned or left at liberty to kill one another even to the last Man if it be not Reason then you have granted it is not Law La. 'T is true if you mean Recta Ratio but Recta Ratio which I grant to be Law as Sir Edw. Coke says 1 Inst. Sect. 138. Is an Artificial perfection of Reason gotten by long Study Observation and Experience and not every Mans natural Reason for Nemo nascitur Artifex This Legal Reason is summa Ratio and therefore if all the Reason that is dispersed into so many several Heads were united into one yet could he not make such a Law as the Law of England is because by many Successions of Ages it hath been fined and refinâ—d by an infinite number of Grave and Learned Men. And this is it he calls the Common-Law Ph. Do you think this to be good Doctrine though it be true that no Man is born with the use of Reason yet all Men may grow up to it as well as Lawyers and when they have applyed their Reason to the Laws which were Laws before they Studyed them or else it was not Law they Studied may be as fit for and capable of Judicature as Sir Edw. Coke himself who whether he had more or less use of Reason was not thereby a Judge but because the King made him so And whereas he says that a Man who should have as much Reason as is dispersed in so many several Heads could not make such a Law as this Law of England is if one should ask him who made the Law of England Would he say a Succession of English Lawyers or Judges made it or rather a Succession of Kings and that upon their own Reason either solely or with the Advice of the Lords and Commons in Parliament without the Judges or other Professors of the Law You see therefore that the Kings Reason be it more or less is that Anima Legis that Summa Lex whereof Sir Edw. Coke speaketh and not the Reason Learning or Wisdom of the Judges but you may see that quite through his Institutes of Law he often takes occasion to Magnifie the Learning of the Lawyers whom he perpetually termeth the Sages of the Parliament or of the Kings Council therefore unless you say otherwise I say that the Kings Reason when it is publickly upon Advice and Deliberation declar'd is that Anima Legis and that Summa Ratio and that Equity which all agree to be the Law of Reason is all that is or ever was Law in England since it became Christian besides the Bible La. Are not the Canons of the Church part of the Law of England as also the Imperial Law used in the Admiralty and the Customs of particular places and the by-Laws of Corporations and Courts of Judicature Ph. Why not for they were all Constituted by the Kings of England and though the Civil Law used in the Admiralty were at first the Statutes of the Roman Empire yet because they are in force by no other Authority than that of the King they are now the Kings Laws and the Kings Statutes The same we may say of the Canons such of them as we have retained made by the Church of Rome have been no Law nor of any force in England since the beginning of Queen Elizabeth's Raign but by Virtue of the Great Seal of England La. In the said Statutes that restrain the Levying of Money without consent of Parliament Is there any thing you can take exceptions to Ph. No I am satisfied that the Kings that grant such Liberties are bound to make them good so far as it may be done without sin But if a King find that by such a Grant he be disabled to protect his Subjects if he maintain his Grant he sins and therefore may and ought to take no Notice of the said Grant For such Grants as by Error or false Suggestion are gotten from him are as the Lawyers do Confess Void and of no Effect and ought to be recalled Also the King as is on all hands Confessed hath the Charge lying upon him to Protect his People against Forraign Enemies and to keep the Peace betwixt them within the Kingdom if he do not his utmost endeavour to discharge himself thereof he Committeth a Sin which neither King nor Parliament can Lawfully commit La. No Man I think will deny this For if Levying of Money be necessary it is a Sin in the Parliament to refuse if unnecessary it is a sin both in King and Parliament to Levy But for all that it may be and I think it is a Sin in any one that hath the Soveraign Power be he one Man or one Assembly being intrusted with the safety of a whole Nation if rashly and relying upon his own Natural sufficiency he make War or Peace without Consulting with such as by their Experience and Employment abroad and Intelligence by Letters or other means have gotten the Knowledge in some measure of the strength Advantages and Designs of the Enemy and the Manner and Degree of the Danger that may from thence arise In like manner in case of Rebellion at Home if he Consult not with of Military Condition which if he do then I think he may Lawfully proceed to Subdue all such Enemies and Rebels and that the Souldiers ought to go on without Inquiring whether they be within the Country or without For who shall suppress Rebellion but he that hath Right to Levy Command and Dispose of the Militia The last long Parliament denied this But why Because by the Major part of their Votes the Rebellion was raised with design to put down Monarchy and to that end Maintained Ph. Nor do
Court of Equity in that to which belong such Causes as are to be determined by Equity that is to say by the Law of Reason Ph. You see then that the difference between Injustice and Iniquity is this that Injustice is the Transgression of a Statute-Law and Iniquity the Transgression of the Law of Reason was nothing else but the Law of Reason and that the Judges of that Law are Courts of Justice because the breach of the Statute-Law is Iniquity and Injustice also But perhaps you mean by Common-Law not the Law it self but the manner of proceeding in the Law as to matter of Fact by 12 Men Freeholders though those 12 Men are no Court of Equity nor of Justice because they determine not what is Just or Unjust but only whether it be done or not done and their Judgment is nothing else but a Confirmation of that which is properly the Judgment of the Witnesses for to speak exactly there cannot possibly be any Judge of Fact besides the Witnesses La. How would you have a Law defâ—n'd Ph. Thus A Law is the Command of him or them that have the Soveraign Power given to those that be his or their Subjects declaring Publickly and plainly what every of them may do and what they must forbear to do La. Seeing all Judges in all Courts ought to Judge according to Equity which is the Law of Reason a distinct Court of Equity seemeth to me to be unnecessary and but a Burthen to the People since Common-Law and Equity are the same Law Ph. It were so indeed If Judges could not err but since they may err and that the King is not Bound to any other Law but that of Equity it belongs to him alone to give Remedy to them that by the Ignorance or Corruption of a Judge shall suffer dammage La. By your Definition of a Law the Kings Proclamation under the Great Seal of England is a Law for it is a Command and Publick and of the Soveraign to his Subjects Ph. Why not If he think it necessary for the good of his Subjects For this is a Maxim at the Common-Law Alledged by Sir Edward Coke himself 1 Inst. Sect. 306. Quando Lex aliquid concedit concedere videtur id per quod devenitur ad illud And you know out of the same Author that divers Kings of â—ngland have often to the Petitions in Parliament which they granted annexed such exceptions as these unless there be necessity saving our Regality which I think should be always understood though they be not expressed and are understood so by Common Lawyers who agree that the King may recall any Grant wherein he was deceiv'd La. Again whereas you make it of the Essence of a Law to be Publickly and plainly declar'd to the People I see no necessity for that Are not all Subjects Bound to take notice of all Acts of Parliament when no Act can pass without their Consent Ph. If you had said that no Act could pass without their knowledge then indeed they had been bound to take notice of them but none can have knowledge of them but the Members of the Houses of Parliament therefore the rest of the People are excus'd or else the Knights of the Shires should be bound to furnish People with a sufficient Number of Copies at the Peoples Charge of the Acts of Parliament at their return into the Country that every man may resort to them and by themselves or Friends take notice of what they are obliged to for otherwise it were Impossible they should be obeyed And that no Man is bound to do a thing Impossible is one of Sir Edw. Cokes Maxims at the Common-Law I know that most of the Statutes are Printed but it does not appear that every Man is bound to Buy the Book of Statutes nor to search for them at Westminster or at the Tower nor to understand the Language wherein they are for the most part Written La. I grant it proceeds from their own Faults but no Man can be excused by the Ignorance of the Law of Reason that is to say by Ignorance of the Common-Law except Children Mad-men and Idiots But you exact such a notice of the Statute-Law as is almost Impossible Is it not enough that they in all Places have a sufficient Number of the Poenal Statutes Ph. Yes If they have those Poenal Statutes near them but what Reason can you give me why there should not be as many Copies abroad of the Statutes as there be of the Bible La. I think it were well that every Man that can Read had a Statute-Book for certainly no knowledge of those Laws by which Mens Lives and Fortunes can be brought into danger can be too much I find a great Fault in your Definition of Law which is that every Law either forbiddeth or Commandeth something 'T is true that the Moral-Law is always a Command or a Prohibition or at least Implieth it but in the Levitical-Law where it is said that he that Stealeth a Sheep shall Restore four Fold what Command or Prohibition lyeth in these words Ph. Such Sentences as that are not in themselves General but Judgments nevertheless there is in those words Implied a Commandment to the Judge to cause to be made a Four-fold Restitution La. That 's Right Ph. Now Define what Justice is and what Actions and Men are to be called Just. La. Justice is the constant will of giving to every Man his own that is to say of giving to every Man that which is his Right in such manner as to Exclude the Right of all men else to the same thing A Just Action is that which is not against the Law A Just Man is he that hath a constant Will to live Justly if you require more I doubt there will no Man living be Comprehended within the Definition Ph. Seeing then that a Just Action according to your Definition is that which is not against the Law it is Manifest that before there was a Law there could be no Injustice and therefore Laws are in their Nature Antecedent to Justice and Injustice and you cannot deny but there must be Law-makers before there was any Laws and Consequently before there was any Justice I speak of Humane Justice and that Law-makers were before that which you call Own or property of Goods or Lands distinguished by Meum Tuum Alienum La. That must be Granted for without Statute-Laws all Men have Right to all things and we have had Experience when our Laws were silenced by Civil War there was not a Man that of any Goods could say assuredly they were his own Ph. You see then that no private Man can claim a Propriety in any Lands or other Goods from any Title from any Man but the King or them that have the Soveraign Power because it is in virtue of the Soveraignty that every Man may not enter into and Possess what he pleaseth and consequently to deny the Soveraign any thing necessary to
also if he will And they say true but they have no reason to think he will unless it be for his own profit which cannot be for he loves his own Power and what becomes of his power when his Subjects are destroyed or weakned by whose multitude and strength he enjoyes his power and every one of his Subjects his Fortune And lastly whereas they sometimes say the King is bound not only to cause his Laws to be observ'd but also to observe them himself I think the King causing them to be observ'd is the same thing as observing them himself For I never heard it taken for good Law that the King may be Indicted or Appealed or served with a Writ till the long Parliament practised the contrary upon the good King Charles for which divers of them were Executed and the rest by this our present King pardoned La. Pardoned by the King and Parliament Ph. By the King in Parliament if you will but not by the King and Parliament you cannot deny but that the pardoning of Injury to the Person that is Injur'd Treason and other Offences against the Peace and against the Right of the Soveraign are Injuries done to the King and therefore whosoever is pardoned any such Offence ought to acknowledge he ows his Pardon to the King alone But as to such Murders Felonies and other Injuries as are done to any Subject how mean soever I think it great reason that the parties endammaged ought to have satisfaction before such pardon be allow'd And in the death of a Man where restitution of Life is Impossible what can any Friend Heir or other party that may appeal require more than reasonable satisfaction some other way Perhaps he will be content with nothing but Life for Life but that is Revenge and belongs to God and under God to the King and none else therefore if there be reasonable satisfaction tendred the King without sin I think may pardon him I am sure if the pardoning him be a sin that neither King nor Parliament nor any earthly Power can do it La. You see by this your own Argument that the Act of Oblivion without a Parliament could not have passed because not only the King but also most of the Lords and abundance of Common People had received Injuries which not being pardonable but by their own Assent it was absolutely necessary that it should be done in Parliament and by the assent of the Lords and Commons Ph. I grant it but I pray you tell me now what is the difference between a general Pardon and an Act of Oblivion La. The word Act of Oblivion was never in our Books before but I believe it is in yours Ph. In the State of Athens long ago for the Abolishing of the Civil War there was an Act agreed on that from that time forward no Man should be molested for any thing before that Act done whatsoever without exception which Act the makers of it called an Act of Oblivion not that all Injuries should be forgotten for then we could never have had the story but that they should not rise up in Judgment against any Man And in imitation of this Act the like was propounded though it took no effect upon the death of Julius Caesar in the Senate of Rome By such an Act you may easily conceive that all Accusations for offences past were absolutely dead and buried and yet we have no great reason to think that the objecting one to another of the Injuries pardoned was any violation of those Acts except the same were so expressed in the Act it self La. It seems then that the Act of Oblivion was here no more nor of other nature than a General Pardon Of Courts Ph. SInce you acknowledge that in all controversies the Judicature originally belongeth to the King and seeing that no Man is able in his own person to execute an Office of so much business what order is taken for deciding of so many and so various Controversies La. There be divers sorts of Controversies some of which are concerning Mens Titles to Lands and Goods and some Goods are Corporeal and Lands Money Cattel Corn and the like which may be handled or seen and some Incorporeal as Priviledges Liberties Dignities Offices and many other good things meer Creatures of the Law and cannot be handled or seen And both of these kinds are concerning Meum and Tuum Others there are concerning Crimes punishable divers wayes and amongst some of these part of the punishment is some Fine or Forfeiture to the King and then it is called a Plea of the Crown in case the King sue the party otherwise it is but a private Plea which they call an Appeal And though upon Judgment in an Appeal the King shall have his Forfeiture yet it cannot be called a Plea of the Crown but when the Crown pleadeth for it There be also other Controversies concerning the Government of the Church in order to Religion and virtuous Life The offences both against the Crown and against the Laws of the Church are Crimes but the offences of one Subject against another if they be not against the Crown the King pretendeth nothing in those Pleas but the Reparation of his Subjects injur'd Ph. A Crime is an offence of any kind whatsoever for which a penalty is Ordain'd by the Law of the Land But you must understand that dammages awarded to the party injur'd has nothing common with the nature of a penalty but is meerly a Restitution or satisfaction due to the party griev'd by the Law of Reason and consequently is no more a punishment than is the paying of a Debt La. It seems by this Definition of a Crime you make no difference between a Crime and a sin Ph. All Crimes are indeed Sins but not all Sins Crimes A Sin may be in the thought or secret purpose of a Man of which neither a Judge nor a Witness nor any Man take notice but a Crime is such a Sin as consists in an Action against the Law of which Action he can be Accused and Tryed by a Judge and be Convinced or Cleared by Witnesses Farther that which is no Sin in it self but indifferent may be made Sin by a positive Law As when the Statute was in force that no Man should wear Silk in his Hat after the Statute such wearing of Silk was a Sin which was not so before Nay sometimes an Action that 's good in it self by the Statute Law may be made a Sin as if a Statute should be made to forbid the giving of Alms to a strong and sturdy Beggar such Alms after that Law would be a Sin but not before For then it was Charity the Object whereof is not the strength or other Quality of the poor Man but his Poverty Again he that should have said in Queen Maries time that the Pope had no Authority in England should have been Burnt at a Stake but for saying the same in the time of Queen Elizabeth
this the fault of his Councellor Nor when a Judge in the Common-Pleas hath given an Erroneous Sentence it is always likely that the Judge of the Kings-Bench will reverse the Judgment though there be no Question but as you may find in Bracton and other Learned Men he has power to do it because being Professors of the same Common-Law they are perswaded for the most part to give the same Judgments For Example if Sir Edw. Coke in the last Terme that he sate Lord-Chief-Justice in the Court of Common-Pleas had given an Erroneous Judgment that when he was removed and made Lord-Chief-Justice of the Kings-Bench would therefore have reversed the said Judgment it is possi he might but not very likely And therefore I do believe there is some other power by the King constituted to reverse Erroneous Judgments both in the Kings-Bench and in the Court of Common-Pleas La. I think not for there is a Statute to the contrary made 4 o Hen. 4. cap. 23. in these words Whereas as well in Plea Real as in Plea Personal after Judgment in the Court of our Lord the King the Parties be made to come upon grievous pain sometimes before the King himself sometimes before the Kings Council and sometimes to the Parliament to answer thereof anew to the great Impoverishing of the Parties aforesaid and to the subversion of the Common-Law of the Land it is ordained and established that after Judgment given in the Court of our Lord the King the Parties and their Heirs shall be there in Peace until the Judgment be undone by Attaint or by Error if there be Error as hath been used by the Laws in the times of the Kings Progenitors Ph. This Statute is so far from being repugnant to that I say as it seemeth to me to have been made expresly to confirm the same For the substance of the Statuâ—e is that there shall be no Suit made by either of the Parties for any thing adjudged either in the Kings-Bench or Court of Common-Pleas before the Judgment be undone by Error or Corruption prov'd and that this was the Common-Law before the making of this Statute which could not be except there were before this Statute some Courts authorised to examine and correct such Errors as by the Plaintiff should be assign'd The inconvenience which by this Statute was to be remedied was this that often Judgment given in the Kings Courts by which are meant in this place the Kings-Bench and Court of Common-Pleas the Party against whom the Judgment was given did begin a new Suit and cause his Adversary to come before the King himself here by the King himself must be understood the King in Person for though in a Writ by the words Coram nobis is understood the Kings-Bench yet in a Statute it is never so nor is it strange seeing in those days the King did usually sit in Court with his Council to hear as sometimes King James and sometimes the same Parties commenced their Suit before the Privy-Council though the King were absent and sometimes before the Parliament the former Judgment yet standing For remedy whereof it was ordained by this Statute that no Man should renew his Suit till the former Judgment was undone by Attaint or Error which Reversing of a Judgment had been impossible if there had been no Court besides the aforesaid two Courts wherein the Errors might be Assigned Examin'd and Judg'd for no Court can be esteemed in Law or Reason a Competent Judge of its own Errors There was therefore before this Statute some other Court existent for the hearing of Errors and Reversing of Erroneous Judgments What Court this was I enquire not yet but I am sure it could not be either the Parliament or the Privy-Council or the Court wherein the Erroneous Judgment was given La. The Doctor and Student discourses of this Statute cap. 18. much otherwise than you do For the Author of that Book saith that against an Erroneous Judgment all Remedy is by this Statute taken away And though neither Reason nor the Office of a King nor any Law positive can prohibit the remedying of any Injury much less of an unjust Sentence yet he shows many Statutes wherein a Mans Conscience ought to prevail above the Law Ph. Upon what ground can he pretend that all Remedy in this case is by this Statute prohibited La. He says it is thereby enacted that Judgment given by the Kings Courts shall not be examin'd in the Chancery Parliament nor elsewhere Ph. Is there any mention of Chancery in this Act It cannot be examin'd before the King and his Council nor before the Parliament but you see that before the Statute it was examin'd somewhere and that this Statute will have it examin'd there again And seeing the Chancery was altogether the highest Office of Judicature in the Kingdom for matter of Equity and that the Chancery is not here forbidden to examine the Judgments of all other Courts at least it is not taken from it by this Statute But what Cases are there in this Chapter of the Doctor and Student by which it can be made probable that when Law and Conscience or Law and Equity seem to oppugne one another the written Law should be preferr'd La. If the Defendant wage his Law in an Action of Debt brought upon a true Debt the Plaintiff hath no means to come to his Debt by way of Compulsion neither by Subpoena nor otherwise and yet the Defendant is bound in Conscience to pay him Ph. Here is no preferring that I see of the Law above Conscience or Equity for the Plaintiff in this case loseth not his Debt for want either of Law or Equity but for want of Proof for neither Law nor Equity can give a Man his Right unless he prove it La. Also if the Grand-Jury in Attaint affirm a false Verdict given by the Petty-Jury there is no farther Remedy but the Conscience of the party Ph. Here again the want of Proof is the want of Remedy for if he can prove that the Verdict given was false the King can give him remedy such way as himself shall think best and ought to do it in case the Party shall find surety if the same Verdict be again affirmed to satisfie his Adversary for the Dammage and Vexation he puts him to La. But there is a Statute made since viz. 27 Eliz. c. 8. by which that Statute of Hen. 4. 23. is in part taken away for by that Statute Erroneous Judgments given in the Kings-Bench are by a Writ of Error to be examin'd in the Exchequer-Chamber before the Justices of the Common-Bench and the Barons of the Exchequer and by the preamble of this Act it appears that Erroneous Judgments are only to be reform'd by the High Court of Parliament Ph. But here is no mention that the Judgments given in the Court of Common-Pleas should be brought in to be examin'd in the Exchequer-Chamber why therefore may not the Court of Chancery
examinâ—â— Judgment given in the Court of Common-Pleas La. You deny not but by the Antient Law of England the Kings-Bench may examine the Judgment given in the Court of Common-Pleas Ph. 'T is true but why may not also the Court of Chancery do the same especially if the fault of the Judgment be against Equity and not against the Letter of the Law La. There is no necessity of that for the same Court may examine both the Letter and the Equity of the Statute Ph. You see by this that the Jurisdiction of Courts cannot easily be distinguished but by the King himself in his Parliament The Lawyers themselves cannot do it for you see what Contention there is between Courts as well as between particular Men. And whereas you say that Law of 4 Hen. 4. 23. is by that of 27 Eliz. cap. 8. taken away I do not find it so I find indeed a Diversity of opinion between the makers of the former and the latter Statute in the preamble of the latter and Conclusion of the former The Preamble of the latter is forasmuch as Erroneous Judgments given in the Court called the Kings-Bench are only to be reformed in the High Court of Parliament and the Conclusion of the former is that the contrary was Law in the times of the Kings Progenitors These are no parts of those Laws but Opinions only concerning the Antient Custom in that Case arising from the different Opinions of the Lawyers in those different times neither Commanding nor Forbidding any thing though of the Statutes themselves the one forbids that such Pleas be brought before the Parliament the other forbids it not But yet if after the Act of Hen. 4. such a Plea had been brought before the Parliament the Parliament might have Heard and Determin'd it For the Statute forbids not that nor can any Law have the force to hinder the Law of any Jurisdiction whatsoever they please to take upon them seeing it is a Court of the King and of all the People together both Lords and Commons La. Though it be yet seeing the King as Sir Edw. Coke affirms 4 Inst. p. 71. hath committed all his power Judicial some to one Court and some to another so as if any Man would render himself to the Judgment of the King in such case where the King hath committed all his power Judicial to others such a render should be to no effect And p. 73. he saith farther That in this Court the Kings of this Realm have sitten on the High Bench and the Judges of that Court on the Lower Bench at his feet but Judicature belongeth only to the Judges of that Court and in his presence they answer all Motions Ph. I cannot believe that Sir Edw. Coke how much soever he desir'd to advance the authority of himself and other Justices of the Common-Law could mean that the King in the Kings-Bench sate as a Spectator only and might not have answered all motions which his Judges answer'd if he had seen cause for it For he knew that the King was Supream Judge then in all causes Temporal and is now in all Causes both Temporal and Ecclesiastical and that there is an exceeding great penalty ordained by the Laws for them that shall deny it But Sir Edw. Coke as he had you see in many places before hath put a Fallacy upon himself by not distinguishing between Committing and Transferring He that Transferreth his power hath deprived himself of it but he that Committeth it to another to be Exercised in his name and under him is still in the Possession of the same power And therefore if a Man render himself that is to say Appealeth to the King from any Judge whatsoever the King may receive his Appeal and it shall be effectual La. Besides these 2 Courts the Kings-Bench for Pleas of the Crown and the Court of Common-Pleas for Causes Civil according to the Common-Law of England there is another Court of Justice that hath Jurisdiction in Causes both Civil and Criminal and is as Antient a Court at least as the Court of Common Pleas and this is the Court of the Lord Admiral but the proceedings therein are according to the Laws of the Roman Empire and the Causes to be determin'd there are such as arise upon the Marine Sea For so it is ordain'd by divers Statutes and confirm'd by many Precedents Ph. As for the Statutes they are always Law and Reason also for they are made by the Assent of all the Kingdom but Precedents are Judgments one contrary to another I mean divers Men in divers Ages upon the same case give divers Judgments Therefore I will ask your Opinion once more concerning any Judgments besides those of the King as to their validity in Law But what is the difference between the proceedings of the Court of Admiralty and the Court of Common-Law La. One is that the Court of Admiralty proceedeth by two Witnesses without any either Grand-Jury to Indict or Petty to Convict and the Judge giveth Sentence according to the Laws Imperial which of old time were in force in all this part of Europe and now are Laws not by the Will of any other Emperor or Forraign Power but by the Will of the Kings of England that have given them force in their own Dominions the reason whereof seems to be that the causes that arise at Sea are very often between us and People of other Nations such as are Governed for the most part by the self same laws Imperial Ph. How can it precisely enough be determin'd at Sea especially near the mouth of a very great River whether it be upon the Sea or within the Land For the Rivers also are as well as their Banks within or a part of one Country or other La. Truly the Question is difficult and there have been many Suits about it wherein the Question has been whose Jurisdiction it is in Ph. Nor do I see how it can be decided but by the King himself in case it be not declar'd in the Lord Admirals Letters Patents La. But though there be in the Letters Patents a power given to hold Plea in some certain cases to any of the Statutes concerning the Admiralty the Justices of the Common-Law may send a Prohibition to that Court to proceed in the Plea though it be with a non-obstante of any Statute Ph. Methinks that That should be against the Right of the Crown which cannot be taken from it by any Subject For that Argument of Sir Edw. Coke's that the King has given away all his Judicial Power is worth nothing because as I have said before he cannot give away the Essential Rights of his Crown and because by a non-obstante he declares he is not deceived in his Grant La. But you may see by the Precedents alledged by Sir Edw. Coke the contrary has been perpetually practised Ph. I see not that perpetually for who can tell but there may have been given other Judgments in such cases
King after the report of the Judge heard give the Sheriff command to do it Fourthly that the general verdict of the King hinders not the King but that he may Judge of it upon the special matter for it often happens that an ill-disposed Person provokes a Man with words or otherwise on purpose to make him draw his Sword that he may kill him and pretend it done in his own defence which appearing the King may without any offence to God punish him as the cause shall require Lastly contrary to the Doctrine of Sir Edw. Coke he may in his own Person be Judge in the case and annul the Verdict of the Jury which a deputed Judge cannot do La. There be some cases wherein a Man though by the Jury he be found not Guilty shall nevertheless forfeit his Goods and Chattells to the King For example a Man is slain and one A. hating B. giveth out that it was B. that slew him B. hearing thereof fearing if he be tryed for it that through the great power of A. and others that seek his hurt he should be condemned flieth and afterwards is taken and tryed and upon sufficient evidence is by the Jury found Not Guilty yet because he fled he shall forfeit his Goods and Chattels notwithstanding there be no such Judgment given by the Judge nor appointed by any Statute but the Law it self authoriseth the Sheriff to seize them to the use of the King Ph. I see no reason which is Common-Law for it and am sure it is grounded upon no Statute La. See Sir Edw. Coke Inst. 1. Sect. 709. and read Ph. If a Man that is Innocent be accus'd of Felony and for fear flieth for the same albeit that he be judicially acquitted of the Felony yet if it be found that he fled for the same he shall notwithstanding his Innocence forfeit all his Goods and Chattells Debts and Duties O unchristian and abominable Doctrine which also he in his own words following contradicteth For saith he as to the forfeiture of them the Law will admit no proof against the presumption of the Law grounded upon his flight and so it is in many other cases But that the general Rule is Quod stabitur praesumptioni donec probetur in contrarium but you see it hath many exceptions This general Rule contradicts what he said before for there can be no exceptions to a general Rule in Law that is not expresly made an exception by some Statute and to a general Rule of equity there can be no exception at all From the power of Punishing let us proceed to the power of Pardoning La. Touching the power of Pardoning Sir Edw. Coke says 3 Inst. p. 236. That no Man shall obtain Charter of pardon out of Parliament and cites for it the Statute of 2 Ed. 3. cap. 2. and says farther that accordingly in a Parliament Roll it is said that for the peace of the Land it would help that no pardon were granted but by Parliament Ph. What lawful power would he have left to the King that thus disableth him to practice Mercy In the Statute which he citeth to prove that the King ought not to grant Charters of Pardon but in Parliament there are no such words as any Man may see for that Statute is in Print and that which he says is in the Parliament Roll is but a wish of he tells not whom and not a Law and 't is strange that a private wish should be inroll'd amongst Acts of Parliament If a Man do you an injury to whom think you belongeth the Right of pardoning it La. Doubtless to me alone if to me alone be done that injury and to the King alone if to him alone be done the injury and to both together if the injury be done to both Ph. What part then has any Man in the granting of a pardon but the King and the party wrong'd if you offend no Member of either House why should you ask their pardon It is possible that a Man may deserve a pardon or he may be such a one sometimes as the defence of the Kingdom hath need of may not the King pardon him though there be no Parliament then sitting Sir Edw. Coke's Law is too general in this point and I believe if he had thought on 't he would have excepted some Persons if not all the Kings Children and his Heir apparent and yet they are all his Subjects and subject to the Law as other Men. La. But if the King shall grant pardons of Murder and Felony of his own head there would be very little safety for any Man either out of his House or in it either by Night or by Day And for that very cause there have been many good Statutes provided which forbid the Justices to allow of such pardons as do not specially name the Crime Ph. Those Statutes I confess are reasonable and very profitable which forbid the Judge to pardon Murders but what Statute is there that forbids the King to do it There is a Statute of 13 Rich. 2. c. 1. wherein the King promiseth not to pardon Murder but there is in it a clause for the saving of the Kings Regality From which may be inferr'd that the King did not grant away that power when he thought good to use it for the Common-wealth Such Statutes are not Laws to the King but to his Judges and though the Judges be commanded by the King not to allow pardons in many cases yet if the King by writing command the Judges to allow them they ought to do it I think if the King think in his conscience it be for the good of the Common-wealth he sinneth not in it but I hold not that the King may pardon him without sin if any other Man be damnified by the Crime committed unless he cause reparation to be made as far as the party offending can do it And howsoever be it sin or not sin there is no power in England that may resist him or speak evil of him lawfully La. Sir Edw. Coke denies not that and upon that ground it is that the King he says may pardon high Treason for there can be no high Treason but against the King Ph. That 's well therefore he confesseth that whatsoever the offence be the King may pardon so much of it as is an injury to himself and that by his own right without breach of any Law positive or natural or of any grant if his Conscience tell him that it be not to the dammage of the Common-wealth and you know that to judge of what is good or evil to the Common-wealth belongeth to the King only Now tell me what it is which is said to be pardoned La. What can it be but only the offence If a Man hath done a Murder and be pardoned for the same is it not the Murder that is pardoned Ph. Nay by your favour if a Man be pardoned for Murder or any other offence it is the Man that is
little worth if they tended not to the preservation and improvement of Mens Lives seeing then without Humane Law all things would be Common and this Community a cause of Incroachment Envy Slaughter and continual War of one upon another the same Law of Reason Dictates to Mankind for their own preservation a distribution of Lands and Goods that each Man may know what is proper to him so as none other might pretend a right thereunto or disturb him in the use of the same This distribution is Justice and this properly is the same which we say is one owns by which you may see the great Necessity there was of Statute Laws for preservation of all Mankind It is also a Dictate of the Law of Reason that Statute Laws are a necessary means of the safety and well being of Man in the present World and are to be Obeyed by all Subjects as the Law of Reason ought to be Obeyed both by King and Subjects because it is the Law of God Ph. All this is very Rational but how can any Laws secure one Man from another When the greatest part of Men are so unreasonable and so partial to themselves as they are and the Laws of themselves are but a dead Letter which of it self is not able to compel a Man to do otherwise than himself pleaseth nor punish or hurt him when he hath done a mischief La. By the Laws I mean Laws living and Armed for you must suppose that a Nation that is subdued by War to an absolute submission of a Conqueror it may by the same Arm that compelled it to Submission be compelled to Obey his Laws Also if a Nation choose a Man or an Assembly of Men to Govern them by Laws it must furnish him also with Armed Men and Money and all things necessary to his Office or else his Laws will be of no force and the Nation remains as before it was in Confusion 'T is not therefore the word of the Law but the Power of a Man that has the strength of a Nation that makes the Laws effectual It was not Solon that made Athenian Laws though he devised them but the Supream Court of the People nor the Lawyers of Rome that made the Imperial Law in Justinian's time but Justinian himself Ph. We agree then in this that in England it is the King that makes the Laws whosoever Pens them and in this that the King cannot make his Laws effectual nor defend his People against their Enemies without a Power to Leavy Souldiers and consequently that he may Lawfully as oft as he shall really think it necessary to raise an Army which in some occasions be very great I say raise it and Money to Maintain it I doubt not but you will allow this to be according to the Law at least of Reason La. For my part I allow it But you have heard how in and before the late Troubles the People were of another mind Shall the King said they take from us what he please upon pretence of a necessity whereof he makes himself the Judg What worse Condition can we be in from an Enemy What can they take from us more than what they list Ph. The People Reason ill they do not know in what Condition we were in the time of the Conqueror when it was a shame to be an English-Man who if he grumbled at the base Offices he was put to by his Norman Masters received no other Answer but this Thou art but an English-Man nor can the People nor any Man that humors them in their Disobedience produce any Example of a King that ever rais'd any excessive Summ's either by himself or by the Consent of his Parliament but when they had great need thereof nor can shew any reason that might move any of them so to do The greatest Complaint by them made against the unthriftiness of their Kings was for the inriching now and then a Favourite which to the Wealth of the Kingdom was inconsiderable and the Complaint but Envy But in this point of raising Souldiers what is I pray you the Statute Law La. The last Statute concerning it is 13 Car. 2. c. 6. By which the Supream Government Command and disposing of the Militia of England is delivered to be and always to have been the Antient Right of the Kings of England But there is also in the same Act a Proviso that this shall not be Construed for a Declaration that the King may Transport his Subjects or compel them to march out of the Kingdom nor is it on the contrary declared to be unlawful Ph. Why is not that also determined La. I can imagine cause enough for it though I may be deceiv'd We love to have our King amongst us and not be Govern'd by Deputies either of our own or another Nation But this I verily believe that if a Forraign Enemy should either invade us or put himself in t a readiness to invade either England Ireland or Scotland no Parliament then sitting and the King send English Souldiers thither the Parliament would give him thanks for it The Subjects of those Kings who affect the Glory and imitate the Actions of Alexander the Great have not always the most comfortable lives nor do such Kings usually very long enjoy their Conquests They March to and fro perpetually as upon a Plank sustained only in the midst and when one end rises down goes the other Ph. 'T is well But where Souldiers in the Judgment of the Kings Conscience are indeed necessary as in an insurrection or Rebellion at home how shall the Kingdom be preserved without a considerable Army ready and in pay How shall Money be rais'd for this Army especially when the want of publick Treasure inviteth Neighbour Kings to incroach and unruly Subjects to Rebel La I cannot tell It is matter of Polity not of Law but I know that there be Statutes express whereby the King hath obliged himself never to Levy Money upon his Subjects without the consent of his Parliament One of which Statutes is 25 Ed. 1. c. 6. in these words We have granted for us and our Heirs as well to Arch-Bishops Bishops Abbots and other Folk of the Holy Church as also Earls Barons and to all the Commonalty of the Land that for no Business from henceforth we shall take such Aids Taxes or Prizes but by the common Consent of the Realm There is also another Statute of Ed. 1. in these words No Taxes or Aid shall be taken or Leveyed by us or our Heirs in our Realm without the good will and assent of the Arch-Bishops Bishops Earls Barons Knights Burgesses and other Freemen of the Land which Statutes have been since that time Confirmed by divers other Kings and lastly by the King that now Reigneth Ph. All this I know and am not satisfied I am one of the Common People and one of that almost infinite number of Men for whose welfare Kings and other Soveraigns were by God Ordain'd For
nor that any Judgment be given without due Process of Law Ph. This is no unreasonable Petition for the Common-Law is nothing else but Equity And by this Statute it appears that the Chancellors before that Statute made bolder with the Courts of Common Law than they did afterward but it does not appear that Common-Law in this Statute signifies any thing else but generally the Law Temporal of the Realm nor was this Statute ever Printed that such as I might take notice of it but whether it be a Statute or not I know not till you tell me what the Parliament Answer'd to this Petition La. The Kings Answer was the Wages heretofore shall stand so as the Kings Royalty be saved Ph. This is slatly against Sir Edw. Coke concerning the Chancery La. In another Parliament 17 Rich. 2. It is Enacted at the Petition of the Commons That forasmuch as People were Compelled to come before the Kings Council or in Chancery by Writs grounded upon untrue Suggestions that the Chancellor for the time being presently after such Suggestions be duly found and proved untrue shall have power to Ordain and Award Dammages according to his discretion to him which is so Travelled unduly as is aforesaid Ph. By this Statute it appears that when a Complaint is made in Chancery upon undue Suggestions the Chancellor shall have the Examination of the said Suggestions and as he may avoid Dammages when the Suggestions are untrue so he may also proceed by Process to the detemining of the Cause whether it be Real or Personal so it be not Criminal La. Also the Commons Petitioned in a Parliament of 2 Hen. 4. not Printed That no Writs nor Privy-Seals be sued out of Chancery Exchequer or other places to any Man to appear at a day upon a pain either before the King and his Council or in any other place contrary to the ordinary Course of Common-Law Ph. What Answer was given to this Petition by the King La. That such Writs should not be granted without necessity Ph. Here again you see the King may deny or Grant any Petitions in Parliament either as he thinks it necessary as in this place or as he thinks it prejudicial or not prejudicial to his Royalty as in the Answer of the former Petition which is a sufficient proof that no part of his Legislative Power or any other Essential part of Royalty can be taken from him by a Statute Now seeing it is granted that Equity is the same thing with the Law of Reason and seeing Sir Edw. Coke 1 Inst. Sect. 21. Defines Equity to be a certain Reason comprehended in no Writing but consisting only in right Reason which interpreteth and amendeth the Written-Law I would fain know to what end there should be any other Court of Equity at all either before the Chancellor or any other Person besides the Judges of the Civil or Common-Pleas Nay I am sure you can alledge none but this that there was a necessity of a Higher Court of Equity than the Courts of Common-Law to remedy the Errors in Judgment given by the Justices of Inferior Courts and the Errors in Chancery were irrevocable except by Parliament or by special Commission appointed thereunto by the King La. But Sir Edw. Coke says that seeing matters of Fact by the Common-Law are Tryable by a Jury of 12 Men this Court should not draw the matter ad aliud Examen i. e. to another kind of Examination viz. by Deposition of Witnesses which should be but evidence to a Jury Ph. To the Deposition of Witnesses any more or less then to evidence to the Lord-Chancellor 'T is not therefore another kind of Examination nor is a Jury more capable of duly examining Witnesses than a Lord-Chancellor Besides seeing all Courts are bound to Judge according to Equity and that all Judges in a Case of Equity may sometimes be deceiv'd what harm is there to any Man or to the State if there be a subordination of Judges in Equity as well as of Judges in Common-Law Seeing it is provided by an Act of parliament to avoid Vexation that Subpoenas shall not be granted till surety be found to satisfie the Party so grieved and vexed for his Dammages and Expences if so be the matter may not be made good which is contained in the Bill La. There is another Statute of 31 Hen. 6. cap. 2. wherein there is a Proviso cited by Sir Edw. Coke in these words Provided that no matter determinable by the Laws of the Realm shall be by the said Act determined in other Form then after the course of the same Law in the Kings Courts having the Determination of the same Law Ph. This Law was made but for Seven years and never continued by any other Parliament and the motive of this Law was the great Riots Extortions Oppressions c. used during the time of the Insurrection of John Cade and the Indictments and Condemnations wrongfully had by this usurped Authority and thereupon the Parliament Ordained that for 7 years following no Man should disobey any of the Kings Writs under the Great Seal or should refuse to appear upon Proclamation before the Kings Council or in the Chancery to Answer to Riots Extortions c. For the first time he should lose c. Wherein there is nothing at all concerning the Jurisdiction of the Chancery or any other Court but an extraordinary power given to the Chancery and to the Kings Privy-Council to Determine of those Crimes which were not before that time Tryable but only by the Kings-Bench or special Commission For the Act was made expresly for the punishment of a great Multitude of Crimes committed by those that had Acted by the said Cade's Authority to which Act the Proviso was added which is here mention'd that the Proceeds in those Courts of Chancery and of the Kings Council should be such as should be used in the Courts to which the said Courts before this Act was made do belong That is to say such causes as were Criminal should be after the order of the Kings-Bench and such Causes as were not Criminal but only against Equity should be Tryed after the manner of the Chancery or in some cases according to the Proceedings in the Exchequer I wonder why Sir Edw. Coke should cite a Statute as this is above two hundred years before expir'd and other two Petitions as if they were Statutes when they were not passed by the King unless he did it on purpose to diminish as he endeavours to do throughout his Institutes the Kings Authority or to insinuate his own opinions among the People for the Law of the Land For that also he endeavours by Inserting Latin Sentences both in his Text and in the Margin as if they were Principles of the Law of Reason without any Authority of Antient Lawyers or any certainty of Reason in themselves to make Men believe they are the very grounds of the Law of England Now as to the Authority you
and a Traytor But now let us come to his Comment upon this Statute The Statute says as it is Printed in English when a Man doth Compass or Imagine the Death of our Lord the King c. What is the meaning of the word Compassing or Imagining La. On this place Sir Edw. Coke says that before the making of this Act Voluntas reputabatur pro facto the Will was taken for the Deed. And so saith Bracton Spectatur Voluntas non Exitus nihil interest utrum quis occidat aut causam praebeat That is to say the Cause of the killing Now Sir Edw. Coke says this was the Law before the Statute and that to be a Cause of the killing is to declare the same by some open Deed tending to the Execution of his Intent or which might be Cause of Death Ph. Is there any English-man can understand that to Cause the Death of a Man and to declare the same is all one thing And if this were so and that such was the Common-Law before the Statute by what words in the Statute is it taken away La. It is not taken away but the manner how it must be prov'd is thus Determin'd that it must be prov'd by some open Deed as providing of Weapons Powder Poyson Assaying of Armour sending of Letters c. Ph. But what is the Crime it self which this Statute maketh Treason For as I understand the words To Compass or Imagine the Kings Death c. The Compassing as it is in the English is the only thing which is made High Treason so that not only the killing but the Design is made High Treason or as it is in the French Record Fait Compasser That is to say the causing of others to Compass or Design the Kings Death is High Treason and the words par overt fait are not added as a specification of any Treason or other Crime but only of the Proof that is requir'd by the Law Seeing then the Crime is the Design and Purpose to kill the King or cause him to be killed and lyeth hidden in the Breast of him that is Accused what other Proof can there be had of it than words Spoken or Written And therefore if there be sufficient Witness that he by words Declared that he had such a Design there can be no Question but that he is Comprehended within this Statute Sir Edw. Coke doth not deny but that if he Confess this Design either by Word or Writing but that he is within the Statute As for that Common saying that bare words may make a Heretick but not a Traytor which Sir Edw. Coke on this occasion maketh use of they are to little purpose seeing that this Statute maketh not the words High Treason but the Intention whereof the words are but a Testimony and that Common-saying is false as it is generally Pronounced for there were divers Statutes made afterwards though now expir'd which made bare words to be Treason without any other Deed As 1 El. cap. 6. 13. El. cap. 1. If a Man should Publickly Preach that the King were an Usurper or that the Right of the Crown belonged to any other than the King that Reigned there is no doubt but it were Treason not only within this Statute of E. 3. but also within the Statute of 1 Ed. 6. c. 12. which are both still in Force La. Not only so but if a Subject should counsel any other Man to kill the King Queen or Heir apparent to the Crown it would at this day be Judged High Treason and yet it is no more than bare words In the third year of King James Henry Garnet a Jesuit-Priest to whom some of the Gun-Powder Traytors had Revealed their design by way of Confession gave them Absolution without any Caution taken for their desisting from their purpose or other provision against the danger was therefore Condemned and Executed as a Traytor though such Absolution were nothing else but bare words Also I find in the Reports of Sir John Davis Attorney-General for Ireland that in the time of King Henry the 6th a Man was Condemned of Treason for saying the King was a Natural Fool and unfit to Govern but yet this Clause in the Statute of Edw. 3. viz. That the Compassing there mentioned ought to be proved by some Overt Act was by the Framers of the Statute not without great Wisdom and Providence inserted For as Sir Edw. Coke very well observeth when Witnesses are Examin'd concerning words only they never or very rarely agree precisely about the words they Swear to Ph. I deny not but that it was wisely enough done But the Question is not here of the Treason which is either Fact or design but of the Proof which when it is doubtful is to be Judged by a Jury of 12 Lawful Men Now whether think you is it a better Proof of a Mans Intention to kill that he declares that same with his own Mouth so as it may be Witnessed or that he provide Weapons Powder Poyson or Assay Arms If he utter his Design by words the Jury has no more to do than to consider the Legallity of the VVitnesses the Harmony of their Testimonies or whether the words were spoken advisedly For they might have been uttered in a Disputation for Exercise only or when he that spake them had not the use of Reason nor perhaps any Design or wish at all towards the Execution of what he talked of But how a Jury from providing or buying of Armour or buying of Gun-Powder or from any other overt Act not Treason in it self can infer a Design of Murdering the King unless there appear some words also signifying to what end he made such Provision I cannot easily conceive Therefore as the Jury on the whole matter VVords and Deeds shall ground their Judgment concerning Design or not Design so in Reason they ought to give Verdict But to come to the Treason of Counterfeiting the Great or Privy-Seal seeing there are so many ways for a Cheating Fellow to make use of these Seals to the Cousening of the King and his People why are not all such abuses High-Treason as well as the making of a false Seal La. So they are For Sir Edw. Coke produceth a Record of one that was Drawn and Hang'd for taking the Great Seal from an expir'd Patent and fastning it to a Counterfeit Commission to gather Money But he approveth not the Judgment because it is the Judgment for Petty Treason also because the Jury did not find him Guilty of the Offence laid in the Indictment which was the Counterfeiting of the Great-Seal but found the special matter for which the Offender was Drawn and Hang'd Ph. Seeing this Crime of taking the Great Seal from one VVriting and fastning it to another was not found High Treason by the Jury nor could be found upon special matter to be the other kind of Treason mentioned in the same Statute what ground had either the Jury to find it
could be made after the doer therefore every such killing was called Murder before it could be known whether it could be by Felony or not For a Man may be found dead that kills himself or was Lawfully kill'd by another This name of Murder came to be the more horrid when it was secretly done for that it made every Man to consider of their own danger and him that saw the dead Body to boggle at it as a Horse will do at a dead Horse and to prevent the same they had Laws in force to Amerce the Hundred where it was done in a sum defined by Law to be the Price of his Life For in those dayes the lives of all sorts of Men were valued by Money and the value set down in their Written Laws And therefore Sir Edw. Coke was mistaken in that he thought that killing a Man by misfortune before the Statute of Marlebridge was adjudged Murder and those secret Murders were abominated by the People for that they were lyable to so great a Pecuniary Punishment for suffering the Malefactor to escape But this grievance was by Canutus when he Reign'd soon eased For he made a Law that the Countrey in this Case should not be Charged unless he were an English-man that was so slain but if he were a French-man under which name were comprehended all Forraigners and especially the Normans though the slayer escaped the County was not to be Amerced And this Law though it were very hard and Chargeable when an English-man was so slain for his Friend to prove he was an English-man and also unreasonable to deny the Justice to a stranger yet was it not Repealed till the 14th of King Ed. the 3d. By this you see that Murder is distinguished from Homicide by the Statute-Laws and not by any Common-Law without the Statute and that it is comprehended under the general name of Felony La. And so also is Petit Treason and I think so is High Treason also for in the abovesaid Statute in the 25 Ed. 3d. Concerning Treasons there is this Clause And because that many other like Cases of Treason may happen in time to come which a Man cannot think or declare at the present time it is accorded that if any other Case supposed Treason which is not above specified doth happen before any the Justices the Justices shall tarry without any going to Judgment of the Treason till the Cause be shewed and declared before the King and his Parliament whether it be Treason or other Felony which thereby shews that the King and Parliament thought that Treason was one of the sorts of Felony Ph. And so think I. La. But Sir Edw. Coke denies it to be so at this day for 1 Inst. Sect. 745. at the word Felony he saith That in Antient time this word Felony was of so large an extent as that it included High Treason But afterwards it was resolved that in the Kings Pardon or Charter this word Felony should extend only to Common Felonies And at this day under the word Felony by Law is included Petit Treason Murder Homicide burning of Houses Burglary Robbery Rape c. Chance-medley se defendendo and Petit Larceny Ph. He says it was resolv'd but by whom La. By the Justices of Assize in the time of Hen. 4. as it seems in the Margin Ph. Have Justices of Assize any Power by their Commission to alter the Language of the Land and the received sence of words Or in the Question in what Case Felony shall be said it is referred to the Judges to Determine as in the Question in what Case Treason shall be said it is referred by the Statute of Edw. the 3d. to the Parliament I think not and yet perhaps they may be disobliged to disallow a Pardon of Treason when mentioning all Felonies it nameth not Treason nor specifies it by any description of the Fact La. Another kind of Homicide there is simply called so or by the name of Manslaughter and is not Murder and that is when a Man kills another Man upon suddain Quarrel during the heat of Blood Ph. If two meeting in the Street chance to strive who shall go nearest to the Wall and thereupon Fighting one of them kills the other I believe verily he that first drew his Sword did it of Malice forethought though not long forethought but whether it be Felony or no it may be doubted It is true that the harm done is the same as if it had been done by Felony but the wickedness of the Intention was nothing near so great And supposing it had been done by Felony then 't is manifest by the Statute of Marlebridge that it was very Murder And when a Man for a word or a trifle shall draw his Sword and kill another Man can any Man imagine that there was not some Precedent Malice La. 'T is very likely there was Malice more or less and therefore the Law hath Ordained for it a punishment equal to that of Murder saving that the Offender shall have the Benefit of his Clergy Ph. The Benefit of Clergy comes in upon another account and importeth not any extenuation of the Crime for it is but a Relick of the old usurped Papal priviledge which is now by many Statutes so pared off as to spread but to few Offences and is become a Legal kind of Conveying Mercy not only to the Clergy but also to the Laity La. The work of a Judge you see is very difficult and requires a Man that hath a faculty of well distinguishing of Dissimilitudes of such Cases as Common Judgments think to be the same A small Circumstance may make a great Alteration which a Man that cannot well discern ought not to take upon him the Office of a Judge Ph. You say very well for if Judges were to follow one anothers Judgments in Precedent Cases all the Justice in the World would at length depend upon the Sentence of a few Learned or Unlearned ignorant Men and have nothing at all to do with the Study of Reason La. A Third kind of Homicide is when a Man kills another either by misfortune or in a necessary defence of himself or of the King or of his Laws for such killing is neither Felony nor Crime saving as Sir Edw. Coke says 4. Inst. p. 56. that if the Act that a Man is a doing when he kills another Man be Unlawful then it is Murder As if A. meaneth to steal a Deer in the Park of B. Shooteth at the Deer and by the glance of the Arrow killeth a Boy that is hidden in a Bush this is Murder for that the Act was Unlawful but if the owner of the Park had done the like shooting at his own Deer it had been by Misadventure and no Felony Ph. This is not so distinguished by any Statute but is the Commonly only of Sir Ed. Coke I believe not a word of it If a Boy be Robbing an Apple-tree and falling thence upon a Man that stands under
of the Anabaptists and many other La. What Punishment had Arius Ph. At the first for refusing to Subscribe he was deprived and Banished but afterwards having satisfied the Emperor concerning his future Obedience for the Emperor caused his Confession to be made not for the regard of Truth of Doctrine but for the preserving of the Peace especially among his Christian Souldiers by whose valour he had gotten the Empire and by the same was to preserve it he was received again into Grace but dyed before he could repossess his Benefice But after the time of those Councils the Imperial Law made the Punishment for Heresie to be Capital though the manner of the Death was left to the Praefects in their several Jurisdictions and thus it continued till somewhat after the time of the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa and the Papacy having gotten the upper hand of the Emperor brought in the use of Burning both Hereticks and Apostates and the Popes from time to time made Heresie of many other points of Doctrine as they saw it conduce to the setting up of the Chair above the Throne besides those determined in the Nicene Creed and brought in the use of Burning and according to this Papal-Law there was an Apostate Burnt at Oxford in the time of William the Conqueror for turning Jew But of a Heretick Burnt in England there is no mention made till after the Statute of 2 Hen. 4. Whereby some followers of Wiclif called Lollards were afterwards Burned and that for such Doctrines as by the Church of England ever since the first year of Queen El. have been approved for Godly Doctrines and no doubt were Godly then and so you see how many have been Burnt for Godliness La. 'T was not well done but 't is no wonder we read of no Hereticks before the time of H. 4. For in the Preamble to that Statute it is intimated that before those Lollards there never was any Heresie in England Ph. I think so too for we have been the tamest Nation to the Pope of all the World But what Statutes concerning Heresie have there been made since La. The Statute of 2 H. 5. c. 7. which adds to the Burning the Forfeiture of Lands and Goods and then no more till the 25 H. 8. c. 14. which confirms the two former and giveth some new Rules concerning how they shall be Proceeded with But by the Statute of 1 Ed. 6. cap. 12. All Acts of Parliament formerly made to punish any manner of Doctrine concerning Religion are repeal'd For therein it is ordain'd after divers Acts specified that all and every other Act or Acts of Parliament concerning Doctrine or matters of Religion and all and every Branch Article Sentence and Matter Pains and Forfeitures contained mentioned or any wise declared in the same Acts of Parliament or Statutes shall be from henceforth Repealed utterly void and of none effect So that in the time of King Ed. 6. not only all Punishments of Heresie were taken away but also the Nature of it was changed to what Originally it was a Private Opinion Again in 12 Phil. and Ma. those former Statutes of 2 H. 4. cap. 15. 2 H. 5. Cap. 17. 25. H. 8. cap. 14. are Revived and the Branch of 1 Ed. 6. cap. 12. touching Doctrine though not specially named seemeth to be this that the same Statute confirmeth the Statute of 25 Ed. 3. concerning Treasons Lastly in the first year of Queen Eliz. cap. 1. the aforesaid Statutes of Queen Mary are taken away and thereby the Statute of 1 Ed. cap. 12. Revived so as there was no Statute left for the Punishment of Hereticks But Queen Eliz. by the Advice of her Parliament gave a Commission which was called the High-Commission to certain Persons amongst whom were very many of the Bishops to Declare what should be Heresie for the future but with a Restraint that they should Judge nothing to be Heresie but what had been so declared in the first four General Councils Ph. From this which you have shewed me I think we may proceed to the Examination of the Learned Sir Edw. Coke concerning Heresie In his Chapter of Heresie 3 Inst. p. 40. he himself confesseth that no Statute against Heresie stood then in force when in the 9th year of King James Bartholomew Legat was Burnt for Arianism and that from the Authority of the Act of 2 Hen. 4. cap. 15. and other Acts cited in the Margin it may be gather'd that the Diocesan hath the Jurisdiction of Heresie This I say is not true For as to Acts of Parliament it is manifest that from Acts Repealed that is to say from things that have no being there can be gathered nothing And as to the other Authorities in the Margin Fitzherbert and the Doctor and Student they say no more than what was Law in the time when they writ that is when the Popes Usurped Authority was here obeyed But if they had Written this in the time of King Ed. 6. or Queen Elizabeth Sir Edw. Coke might as well have cited his own Authority as theirs for their Opinions had no more the force of Laws than his Then he cites this Precedent of Legat and another of Hammond in the time of Queen Elizabeth but Precedents prove only what was done and not what was well done VVhat Jurisdiction could the Diocesan then have of Heresie when by the Statute of Ed. 6. cap. 12. then in force there was no Heresie and all Punishment for Opinions forbidden For Heresie is a Doctrine contrary to the Determination of the Church but then the Church had not Determined any thing at all concerning Heresie La. But seeing the High Commissioners had Power to Correct and Amend Heresies they must have Power to cite such as were Accused of Heresie to appear before them or else they could not execute their Commission Ph. If they had first made and published a Declaration of what Articles they made Heresie that when one Man heard another speak against their Declaration he might thereof inform the Commissioners then indeed they had had Power to cite and imprison the Person accus'd but before they had known what should be Heresie how was it possible that one Man should accuse another And before he be accused how can he be cited La. Perhaps it was taken for granted that whatsoever was contrary to any of the 4 first General Councils was to be judged Heresie Ph. That granted yet I see not how one Man might accuse another ' ere the better for those Councils For not one Man of ten thousand had ever read them nor were they ever Published in English that a Man might avoid Offending against them nor perhaps are they extant nor if those that we have Printed in Latin are the very Acts of the Councils which is yet much disputed amongst Divines do I think it fit they were put in the Vulgar Tongues But it is not likely that the makers of the Statutes had any purpose to make Heresie of
Bishops and Right of Advowsans and Presentations belonged to himself and to the Nobility that were the founders of such Bishopricks Abbies and other Benefices And he enacted farther that if any Clerk which he or any of his Subjects should present should be disturbed by any such Provisor that such Provisor or Disturber should be attached by his Body and if Convicted lye in Prison till he were Ransomed at the Kings Will and had satisfied the Party griev'd renouced his Title and sound sureties not to sue for it any farther and that if they could not be found then Exigents should go forth to Outlawrie and the Profits of the Benefice in the mean time be taken into the Kings hands And the same Statute is confirmed in the 27th year of King Ed. the 3d which Statute alloweth to these Provisors six weeks Day to appear but if they appear before they be outlaw'd they shall be received to make Answer but if they render not themselves they shall forfeit all their Lands Goods and Chattels besides that they stand outlaw'd The same Law is confirmed again by 16 Rich. 2d cap. 5. in which is added because these Provisors obtained sometimes from the Pope that such English Bishops as according to the Law were instituted and inducted by the Kings Presentees should be excommunicated that for this also both they and the Receivers and Publishers of such Papal Process and the Procurers should have the same Punishment Ph. Let me see the Statute it self of 27 Ed. 3. La. It lies there before you set down verbatim by Sir Edw. Coke himself both in English and French Ph. 'T is well we are now to consider what it means and whether it be well or ill interpreted by Sir Edw. Coke And first it appeareth by the Preamble which Sir Edw. Coke acknowledgeth to be the best Interpreter of the Statute that this Statute was made against the Incroachments only of the Church of Rome upon the Right of the King and other Patrons to collate Bishopricks and other Benefices within the Realm of England and against the power of the Courts Spiritual to hold Plea of Controversies determinable in any of the Courts of the King or to reverse any Judgment there given as being things that tend to the Disherison of the King and Destruction of the Common-Law of the Realm always used Put the case now that a Man had procur'd the Pope to reverse a Decree in Chancery had he been within the danger of Premunire La. Yes certainly or if the Judgment had been given in the Court of the Lord Admiral or in any other Kings Court whatsoever either of Law or Equity for Courts of Equity are most properly Courts of the Common-Law of England because Equity and Common-Law as Sir Ed. Coke says are all one Ph. Then the word Common-Law is not in this Preamble restrained to such Courts only where the Tryal is by Juries but comprehends all the Kings Temporal Courts if not also the Courts of those Subjects that are Lords of great Mannors La. 'T is very likely yet I think it will not by every Man be granted Ph. The Statute also says That they who draw Men out of the Realm in Plea whereof the Cognizance pertaineth to the Kings Court or of things whereof Judgment is given in the Kings Court are within the Cases of Premunire But what if one Man draw another to Lambeth in Plea whereof Judgment is already given at Westminster Is he by this Clause involv'd in a Premunire La. Yes For though it be not out of the Realm yet it is within the meaning of the Statute because the Popes Court not the Kings Court was then perhaps at Lambeth Ph. But in Sir Edw. Coke's time the Kings Court was at Lambeth and not the Popes La. You know well enough that the Spiritual-Court has no power to hold Pleas of Common-Law Ph. I do so but I know not for what cause any simple Man that mistakes his right Court should be out of the Kings Protection lose his Inheritance and all his Goods Personal and Real and if taken be kept in Prison all his Life This Statute cannot be by Sir Edw. Cokes Torture made to say it Besides such Men are ignorant in what Courts they are to seek their Remedy And it is a Custom confirmed by perpetual usage that such ignorant Men should be guided by their Council at Law It is manifest therefore that the makers of the Statute intended not to prohibit Men from their suing for their Right neither in the Chancery nor in the Admiralty nor in any other Court except the Ecclesiastical Courts which had their Jurisdiction from the Church of Rome Again where the Statute says which do sue in any other Court or defeat a Judgment in the Kings Court what is the meaning of another Court Another Court than what Is it here meant the Kings-Bench or Court of Common-Pleas Does a Premunire lye for every Man that sues in Chancery for that which might be remedied in the Court of Common-Pleas Or can a Premunire lye by this Statute against the Lord Chancellor The Statute lays it only on the Party that sueth not upon the Judge which holdeth the Plea Nor could it be laid neither by this Statute nor by the Statute of 16 Rich. 2. upon the Judges which were then punishable only by the Popes Authority Seeing then the Party Suing has a just excuse upon the Council of his Lawyer and the Temporal Judge and the Lawyer both are out of the Statute the punishment of the Premunire can light upon no body La. But Sir Edw. Coke in this same Chapter bringeth two Precedents to prove that though the Spiritual-Courts in England be now the Kings Courts yet whosoever sueth in them for any thing tryable by the Common-Law shall fall into a Premunire One is that whereas in the 22d of Hen. 8. all the Clergy of England in a Convocation by publick Instrument acknowledged the King to be Supream Head of the Church of England yet after this viz. 24 of H. 8. this Statute was in force Ph. Why not A Convocation of the Clergy could not alter the Right of Supremacie their Courts were still the Popes Courts The other Precedent in the 25th of Hen. 8. of the Bishop of Norwich may have the same Answer for the King was not declared Head of the Church by Act of Parliament till the 26th year of his Reign If he had not mistrusted his own Law he would not have laid hold on so weak a Proof as these Precedents And as to the Sentence of Premunire upon the Bishop of Norwich neither doth this Statute nor that other of R. 2. warrant it he was sentenced for threatning to excommunicate a Man which had sued another before the Mayor But this Statute forbids not that but forbids the bringing in or publishing of Excommunications or other Process from Rome or any other Place Before the 26 Hen. 8. there is no Question but that for a
citing of Aristotle and of Homer and of other Books which are commonly read to Gown-men do in my opinion but weaken his Authority for any Man may do it by a Servant but seeing the whole scene of that time is gone and past let us proceed to somewhat else Wherein doth an Act of Oblivion differ from a Parliament-pardon La. This word Act of Oblivion was never in our Law-Books before the 12 Car. 2. c. 11. and I wish it may never come again but from whence it came you may better know perhaps than I. Ph. The first and only Act of Oblivion that ever passed into a Law in any State that I have read of was that Amnestia or Oblivion of all Quarrels between any of the Citizens of Athens at any time before that Act without all exception of Crime or Person The occasion whereof was this The Lacedemonians having totally subdued the Athenians entred into the City of Athens and ordained that the People should choose thirty Men of their own City to have the Soveraign Power over them These being chosen behav'd themselves so outragiously as caused a Sedition in which the Citizens on both sides were daily slain There was then a discreet Person that propounded to each of the parties this proposition that every Man should return to his own and forget all that was past which proposition was made by consent on both sides into a publick Act which for that cause was called an Oblivion Upon the like disorder hapning in Rome by the Murder of Julius Caesar the like Act was propounded by Cicero and indeed passed but was within few days after broken again by Marcus Antonius In imitation of this Act was made the Act of 12 Car. 2. c. 11. La. By this it seems that the Act of Oblivion made by King Charles was no other than a Parliament-pardon because it containeth a great number of exceptions as the other Parliament-pardons do and the Act of Athens did not Ph. But yet there is a difference between the late Act of Oblivion made here and an ordinary Parliament-pardon For concerning a fault pardoned in Parliament by a general word a suit in Law may arise about this whether the offender be signified by the word or not as whether the pardon of all Felonies be a pardon of Piracy or not For you see by Sir Edw. Coke's reports that notwithstanding a pardon of Felony a Sea Felony when he was Attourney General was not pardoned But by the late Act of Oblivion which pardoned all manner of offences committed in the late Civil War no question could arise concerning Crimes excepted First because no Man can by Law accuse another Man of a Fact which by Law is to be forgotten Secondly because all Crimes may be alledged as proceeding from the Licentiousness of the time and from the silence of the Law occasion'd by the Civil War and consequently unless the offenders Person also were excepted or unless the Crime were committed before the War began are within the Pardon La. Truly I think you say right For if nothing had been pardoned but what was done by occasion of the War the raising of the War it self had not been pardoned Ph. I have done with Crimes and Punishments let us come now to the Laws of Meum and Tuum La. We must then examine the Statutes Ph. We must so what they command and forbid but not dispute of their Justice For the Law of Reason commands that every one observe the Law which he hath assented to and obey the Person to whom he hath promised obedience and fidelity Then let us consider next the Commentaries of Sir Edw. Coke upon Magna Charta and other Statutes Ph. For the understanding of Magna Charta it will be very necessary to run up into Antient times as far as History will give us leave and consider not only the Customs of our Ancestors the Saxons but also the Law of nature the most Antient of all Laws concerning the original of Government and acquisition of Property and concerning Courts of Judicature And first it is evident that Dominion Government and Laws are far more Antient than History or any other writing and that the beginning of all Dominion amongst Men was in Families in which first the Father of the Family by the Law of nature was absolute Lord of his Wife and Children Secondly made what Laws amongst them he pleased Thirdly was Judge of all their Controversies Fourthly was not obliged by any Law of Man to follow any Counsel but his own Fifthly What Land soever the Lord sat down upon and made use of for his own and his Families benefit was his Propriety by the Law of First-Possession in case it was void of Inhabitants before or by the Law of War in case they conquer'd it In this Conquest what Enemies they took and saved were their Servants Also such Men as wanting Possessions of Lands but furnished with Arts necessary for Mans life came to dwell in the Family for Protection became their Subjects and submitted themselves to the Laws of the Family And all this is consonant not only to the Law of nature but also to the practice of Mankind set forth in History Sacred and Praphane La. Do you think it lawful for a Lord that is the Soveraign Ruler of his Family to make War upon another like Soveraign Lord and dispossess him of his Lands Ph. It is Lawful or not Lawful according to the intention of him that does it For First being a Soveraign Ruler he is not subject to any Law of Man and as to the Law of God where the intention is justifiable the action is so also The intention may be Lawful in divers Cases by the right of nature one of those Cases is when he is constrained to it by the necessity of subsisting So the Children of Israel besides that their leaders Moses and Joshua had an immediate command from God to dispossess the Canaanites had also a just pretence to do what they did from the right of nature which they had to preserve their lives being unable otherwise to subsist And as their preservation so also is their security a just pretence of invading those whom they have just cause to fear unless sufficient caution be given to take away their fear which Caution for any thing I can yet conceive is utterly impossible Necessity and Security are the principal justifications before God of beginning War Injuries receiv'd justifie a War defensive but for reparable injuries if Reparation be tendred all invasion upon that Title is Iniquity If you need examples either from Scripture or other History concerning this right of nature in making War you are able enough from your own reading to find them out at your leisure La. Whereas you say that the Lands so won by the Soveraign Lord of a Family are his in propriety you deny methinks all property to the Subjects how much soever any of them hath contributed to the Victory Ph. I do