Vote to chuse Parliament-men but Freeholders or as in old times none but those who served in the Wars in person had Votes in the Withena Gemote or Great Council And yet this was no standing Army no more than those in Greece So likewise neither are these words fairly rendered in the same page 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that in a Popular State The Soveraign Power is in the Sword and those that are possessed of the Arms but are thus to be rendered In this kind of Government i. e. Popular those govern and have greatest Power who bear Arms and fight for the rest which is but reasonable I shall not trouble my self with the rest of those Contradictions and Faults he find◠with Aristotle since I look upon this Treatise of Politicks as the most confused he hath writ onely it seems this Author did but skim over Aristotle when he so confidently asserts That the natural Right of the People to found or elect their own kind of Government is not once disputed by him which whether he asserts or no let these words judge lib. 5. Pol. cap. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which may be thus Englished But of Kingdoms by discent this may be supposed the cause of their dissolution besides those al◠ready mentioned viz. when it happens to many of them who not being endued with the power of a Tyrant but onely with a Kingly Authority become contemned whilst they will unjustly abuse their Subjects for then there is an easie dissolution of the Government for he is not a true King over those that like not his Government but a Tyrant P. 20 21. He finds fault with Aristotle for making the main distinction between right Forms of Government and those that are imperfect or corrupt to consist solely in this That where the profit of the governed is respected there is a right Government but where the profit of the Governours is onely regarded there is a corruption or transgression of Government By this it is supposed by Aristotle that there may be a Government which he calls a Tyranny onely for the benefit of the Governour That this Supposition is false may be proved from Aristotle himself to instance in the point of Tyranny And therefore the Author endeavours to make him contradict himself thus Tyranny saith Aristotle lib. 3. cap. 7. is a Despotical or Masterly Monarchy Now he confesseth l. 3. c. 6. That in truth the Masterly Government is profitable both to the Servant by nature and the Master by nature And he yields a solid reason for it viz. It is not possible if the Servant be destroyed the Mastership can be saved Whence it may be inferred That if the Masterly Government of Tyrants cannot be safe without the preservation of them whom they govern it will follow That a Tyrant cannot govern for his own profit onely And thus his main definition of Tyranny fails as being grounded on an impossible Supposition By his own confession no Example can be shewn of any such Government that ever was in the world as Aristotle describes Tyranny to be for under the worst of Kings though many particular men have unjustly suffered yet the Multitude or People in general have found benefit and profit by the Government If Aristotle were alive I doubt he would say this Author plaid the Sophister with him and did not onely misquote his words but pervert his meaning For first Aristotle does not say in that place he quotes or in any other that I know of That Tyranny is a Despotical or Masterly Monarchy And therefore all he builds upon this Concession is false It is true indeed Aristotle says That the Government of the Master is profitable both to the Servant by nature and the Master by nature that is upon his supposition that they are either so by nature But the Author omits what immediately follows because it would vindicate Aristotle's true meaning for his next words are Nevertheless it i. e. the Masterly power regards chiefly the profit of the Master and of the Servant but by accident but Oecumenical Government or that of a Master over the Wife Children and Servants is for their sakes whom he governs and for the common good of them all Hence it appears plainly that Aristotle when he says that a Tyranny is for the benefit of the Governour alone he does not mean that the Subjects can have no benefit at all by it since it is the Tyrants interest they should live and get Children or else he would quickly want Subjects Thus the Children of Israel under the Tyranny of Pharaoh had Meat Drink and Cloaths and were not so low kept but they got Children apace and yet we find God thought them opprest and heard their cry But Aristotle clears the point when he distinguishes an absolute Masterly power over a Slave from that of a Father of a Family the Master in the former considering onely his own profit and the preservation of the Slave but by accident and so an ill-natured brutish Master takes care of the life of his Slave that works in the Mines or Sugar-works in the Indies not out of any love to the person of the Slave but because he cannot subsist without him So a Grasier or Butcher takes care of his Cattel that they thrive and do well as they call it yet every body knows that they take this care onely for their Carcasses which yield them so much ready money at the Market So that indeed a Tyrant onely considers his own good in the welfare of his Subjects and looks upon them as no better than brute Beasts in which he hath an absolute property to shear or kill as he thinks it most conduces to his own profit without considering to what end he is set over them As the Grand Seignior makes use of the bodies of his poor Christian-slaves for Subjects I cannot call them to fill up Ditches and to blunt the edge of his Enemies Swords But that all Kings are bound to preserve the Lands Goods and Lives of their Subjects the Author himself confesses Patriarcha p. 94. Though not by any municipal Law so much as the natural Law of a Father which binds them to ratifie the Acts of their Forefathers and Predecessors in things necessary for the publick good of their Subjects So then I hope there is some difference between the Government of a Father over his Children and that of an absolute Lord over his Slaves notwithstanding our Author's Quotation out of Aristotle whereby he would make them all one viz. That a Kingdom will be a Fatherly Government Which is true if you take it in the best sence for that affection that Kings like Fathers should have for their Subjects And so it is plain Aristotle intended it by the words immediately foregoing thus For the Society of a Father with his Sons has an appearance of a Kingdom not that it is so indeed But to make an end with Aristotle I will give you one
is but like the advice and direction which the Kings Councel gives the King which no man says is a Law to the King Igrant this distinction provided the Author will likewise admit another that though the King is not obliged by Laws or to any Judges of them as to Superiors or as to the compulsory Power of them Yet in respect of God and his own Conscience he is still obliged to observe them and not to dispence with them in those cases which the Law does not give him a power so to do and since it is true that it is the rewards and punishments annext that give laws their Sanction therefore there are certain rewards which will naturally bless Princes that keep their Laws such as peace of Conscience Security the affections of their People c. and if I call the contrary effects to these natural punishments that are commonly the consequences of the breach of them I think I should not speak absurdly since the Author himself tells us P. 93. Albeit Kings who make the Laws are as King James there teacheth us above Laws yet will they rule their Subjects by the Law and a King governing in a setled Kingdom leaves to be a King degenerates into a Tyrant so soon as he seems to rule it is there printed in the Copy according which is nonsence contrary to his Laws and certainly a Tyrant can never promise himself security either from his own Conscience or from Men but whereas he says the direction of the Law is only like the advice which the Kings Councel gives him which no man says is a Law to him is false for the Kings Councel should never advise him to do that which he cannot whith a safe Conscience perform but the Kings Conscience can never advise him to break those Laws that are the boundaries between his Prerogatives and the Peoples just Rights and therefore though it is true in some cases where the King sees the Law rigorous or doubtful he may mitigate or interpret the Execution thereof by his Judges to whom he hath made over that power in the intervalls of Parliament and though perhaps some particular Statutes may be his Authority be suspended for causes best known to himself and Council Yet this does not extend to Laws of publick concernment and for that I will appeal to the Conscience of any true Son of the Church of England whether he thinks for Example that the Proclamation for indulgence contrary to the Statute made against Conventicles were binding or no Neither is this that follows consistent with what the Author hath said before That although a King do frame all his Actions to be according to the Laws yet he is not bound thereto but at his good will and for good Example or so far forth as the general Law of the safety of the Commonwealth doth naturally bind him For in such sort only positive Laws may may be said to bind the King not by being positive but as they are naturally the best and only means for the preservation of the Common-wealth So that if a King thinks any the firmest and most indispensible Laws that have been made suppose Magna Charta or the Statute de Tallagio non concedendo for example not to be for the safety of the Commonweal it is but his declaring that he will have them no longer observed and the work is done nor will this that follows help it though true that all Kings even Tyrants and Conquerors are bound to preserve the Lands Goods Liberties and lives of all their Subjects not by any Municipal Laws so much as the natural Law of a Father which binds them to ratifie the Acts of their Fore-Fathers and Predecessors in things necessary for the publick Good of the Subjects All which is very well but if this Monarch thus succeeding in the place of the natural Father is the sole Judge of what things are necessary for the common good what if he have a mind to keep these Children for Children and subjects slaves are all one with this Authour as some unnatural Fathers do as cheap as they can or to make the most of them will let them enjoy no more but the scanty necessaries of life and will think fair water brown bread and wooden shooes sufficient for a Farmer and 300 l. or 400 l. per annum enough in Conscience for a Country Gentleman or desiring to be absolute and therefore to have a constant standing Army to raise mony with as some Monarchs do and being resolved that for the future all the just rights and priviledges of his Clergy Nobility and People shall signifie nothing will take all the over-plus of his Childrens Estates eaving them no more then a poor and miserable subsistence he may lawfully do what he will with his own and it is all his upon the first intimation of his pleasure by Edict or Proclamation But perhaps some honest Divine may start up and tell him he will be damned for thus abusing his power or breaking his Coronation Oath what What if this Father of his people shall laugh at him for a fool and think himself too cunning to believe any such thing or what if his Son or Successor be resolved not to run his head any more into the snare of a Coronation Oath but finding himself invested in all the absolute power of his Predecessour without any unjust act of his own since we know Princes seldome loose any thing they have once got will exercise it as he pleases for his own humour or glory and thinks himself not obliged in Conscience to restore any of those rights his Predecessor hath ursuped upon his People I know not what benefit this may be to the Prince but this I am sure of it would very little mend the Subjects condition to be told their former Monarch was damned or that this may follow him when they are now slaves nor is this a mere Chimera since a Neighbouring people over against us lost their liberties by much such a kind of proceeding And therefore this Authour hath found out a very fit interpretation of the Kings Coronation Oath Vide Iuramenta Regis quando coronatur old Stat. ed 1556. for whereas he used to Swear that he will cause equal and upright justice to be administred in all his judgments and to use discretion with mercy and truth according to his power and that the just Laws and customes quas vulgus elegerit I will not translate it shall chuse to be observed to the honour of God Yet our Author will have the King obliged to keep no laws but what he in his discretion Judges to be upright which is to make the Oath signifie just nothing as I have proved already wherein he abominably perverts the sense of this Oath for that which he puts first is really last And the words by which he Swears to observe the Laws and customes granted by King Edward and other his Predecessors are absolute and without
the people may not be easily known though not gathered by Vote or whether it would be various and erroneous in these cases Fr the people though they do not argue so subtilly as our Author does yet in their Sence of Feeling when wrong'd or hurt are seldome mistaken Then our Author is angry that Mr. H. will have an Appeal made to the Consciences of all Mankind that being made that the Fundamental Laws must judg and pronounce Sentence in every mans own Conscience here he would fain learn of Mr. H. or any other for him what a Fundamental Law is or else have but one Law named to him that any Man shall say is a Fundamental Law of the Monarchy Well to do the Authors Friends a pleasure since he is dead himself I will name one that he himself would deny to be one in this Monarchy and that is that the Crown upon the death of the King should descend to the next Heir and so we have one Fundamental Law and I hope there may be more But he says Mr. H. tells us ' that the Common Laws are the Foundation and the Statute Laws superstructive Yet our Author thinks that Mr. H. dares say ' that there is any one branch or part of the Common Law but may be taken away by Act of Parliament for many points of the common-Common-Law de facto have and de jure any point may be taken away How can that be called a Fundamental which hath and may be removed and yet the Statute Laws stand firm and Stable It is contrary to the Nature of a Fundamental for the Building to stand when the Foundation is taken away All which is mere wrangling about the Metaphor of a Foundation and a Superstructure as if such expressions required an absolute Physical Truth as they do in the things from which they are taken It is already granted that all Laws in a limited Government but those of Nature and right Reason are alterable because the Governmen it self is so and in respect of which alone they may be called Fundamental or Foundations of the Government but these being altered it would cease to be the same kind of Government it was before I will not affirm but the people of this Nation may give away their present Rights of not having any Laws made or Taxes imposed upon them without their consent or of not being perpetually kept in Prison or put to death without legal Trial. But these being altered it would cease to be limited and turn to an absolute Monarchy and all Statutes concerning any of these would be so far Superstructives as to signify nothing when the Foundations are taken away and indeed how any Statute Law made by Parliament could signify any thing when the Parliament is gone I know not since all Laws after that would depend upon the sole will of the Monarch His second Reason is ' That the Common-Law is generally acknowledged to be nothing else but common Usage or Custome which by length of time only obtains Authority so that it follows in time after Government but cannot go before it or be the Rule of Government by any Original Radical Constitution Which is not true as the Author hath laid it down for all the parts of the Common-Law do not depend upon meer Custome or Usage taken up after the Government instituted and therefore his consequence that follows from this is false For some parts of the Common-Law of England are without doubt as antient as the Goverment it self Thus though some parts of our Common-Law may have proceeded from some later Customes or particular Judgments and resolutions of the Judges in several Ages yet without doubt Property in Goods and Land and Estates of Inheritance and the manner of their descent are as antient since they came over with our Saxon Ancestors as the Government it self since some of the Laws As that Brethren by the half-Blood should not be Heirs to each other That an Estate should rather Escheat then ascend to the Father upon the death of his could only proceed from the Custome of the antient Saxons For certainly had we not been used to them we should scarce allow them to be reasonable But it is in nothing more visible then in those Tenures which the modern Civilians call Feudat which L. Ca. 3. § 23. Grotius tells us are not to be found but among the Germans and those Nations derived from them as both our Saxons and Angles were Tacit. de Mor. Ger. cap. 40. So likewise that Fundamental Constitution of ordering all publick Affairs in General Councils or Assemblies of the Men of note and those that had a share in the Land de minoribus rebus Principes Consultant de majoribus omnes ita tamen ut ex qnoque quorum penes plebem arbitrium est apud Principes praetractantur In this great Council they tried Offenders in Capital Crimes Id. Cap. 12. Licet apud concilium accusare queque discrimen capitis intendere nor was the power of their Kings or Prince absolute as appears by the passages in the same Author Id. Cap. 7 Nec regibus infinita aut libera potestas c. speaking of the manner of their holding these publick Councils after silence commanded by the Priests Mox Rex Id. Cap. 11. vel Princeps prout aetas cuique prout nobilitas prout decus bellorum prout facundia est audiuntur autoritate suadendi magis quam jubendi And though our first Saxon Kings might have more conferred on them then this yet it is altogether improbable that Hengest and the rest of those Princes who erected an Heptarchy in this Island comeing hither not as Monarchs over Subjects but as Leaders of Voluntiers who went to seek a new Country should be so fond of a Government they never knew as to give these their Gennerals an absolute despetick power over their persons and Estates which they never had in their own Country and by which Liberty they had so long defended it against the utmost effects of the Roman Empire therefore says the same Author Ne Parthi quidem sepius admonuere Id. Cap. 37. quippe Regno Arsacis acrior est Germanorum Libertas The sence of which is The Parthians themselves have not oftner rebuked us for the German-Liberty is harder to be dealt with then the Monarchy of Arsaces Pat. p. 116 117. And as for the Antiquity and usefulness of these great Councils the Author himself hath confessed enough for our purpose though he will not have our Parliament antienter then about ' the time of the Conquest because until those days we cannot hear it was entirely united into one Kingdom but it was either divided into several Kingdoms or Governed by several Laws as when Julius Caesar Landed he found four Kings in Kent The Saxons divided us into seven Kingdoms and when they were united into a Monarchy they had the Danes for their Companions or Masters in the Empire till Edward the
onely was named in the Grant P. 19. The Author proceeds to obviate an Objection that he sees may be made to his Hypothesis That it may seem absurd that Kings now are Fathers of their People since Experience shews the contrary It is true says he all Kings are not the natural Parents of their Subjects yet they all either are or are to be reputed the next Heirs to those first Progenitors who were at first the natural Parents of the whole People and so in their right succeed to the exercise of Supream Jurisdiction and such Heirs are not onely Lords of their own Children but of their Brethren and all others that were Subjects to their Fathers And therefore we finde that God told Cain of his brother Abel His desires shall be toward thee and thou shalt rule over him Accordingly when Jacob bought his brothers Birthright Isaac blessed him thus Be Lord over thy brethren and let the sons of thy mother bow before thee P. 20. As long as the first Fathers of Families lived the name of Patriarch did aptly belong unto them but after a few Descents when the true Fatherhood it self was extinct and onely the right of the Father descended upon the true Heir then the Title of Prince or King was more significant to express the power of him who succeeds onely to the right of Fatherhood which his Ancestors did naturally enjoy By this means it comes to pass that many a Child by succeeding a King hath a right of a Father over many a gray-headed Multitude and hath the Title of Pater Patriae It may be demanded What becomes of the Right of Fatherhood in case the Crown does escheat for want of an Heir whether doth it not then devolve to the People The Answer is It is but the negligence or ignorance of the People to lose the knowledge of the true Heir for an Heir there is always If Adam himself were still living and now ready to die it is certain that there is one man and but one in the world who is next Heir although the knowledge who should be that one man be quite lost P. 21. This ignorance of the People being admitted it doth not by any means follow that for want of Heirs the Supream Power is devolved to the Multitude or that they have power to rule and chuse what Rulers they please No the Kingly power in such cases escheats to the Princes and independent Heads of Families for every Kingdom is resolved into those parts whereof at first it was made By the uniting of great Families or petty Kingdoms we finde the greater Monarchies were at first erected and into such again as into their first matter many times they return again And because the dependancy of ancient Families is oft an obsure and worn-out knowledge there the wisdom of many Princes have thought fit to adopt those for Heads of Families and Princes of Provinces whose Merits Abilities or Fortunes have enabled them or made them fit and capable of such Royal Favours All such prime Heads and Fathers have power to consent in the uniting or conferring of their Fatherly Right of Soveraign Authority on whom they please And he that is so elected claims not his power as a Donative from the People but as being substituted by God from whom he receives his Royal Charter of an Vniversal Father though testified by the Ministry of the Heads of the People P. 22. In all Kingdoms or Commonwealths in the world whether the Prince be the Supreame Father of the People or but the true Heir of such a Father p. 23. or whether he come to the Crown by usurpation of the Nobles or of the People or by any other way whatsoever or whether some few or a multitude govern the Commonwealth yet still the Authority that is in any one or in many or in all these is the onely Right and natural Authority of a Supream Father There is and always shall be continued to the end of the world a natural Right of a Supream Father over a multitude although by the secret Will of God many do at first most unjustly obtain the Exercise of it To confirm this natural Right of Regal Power we finde in the Decalogue that the Law which enjoyns Obedience to Kings is delivered in the Terms of Honour thy Father and thy Mother as if all Power were originally in the Father If Obedience to Parents be due immediately by a natural Law and Subjection to Princes but by the mediation of an humane Ordinance what reason is there that the Laws of Nature should give place to the Laws of Men as we see the power of the Father over his Child gives place and is subordinate to the power of the Magistrate P. 24. If we compare Rights of a Father with those of a King we finde them all one without any difference at all but onely in the latitude or extent of them As the Father over one Family so the King as Father over many Families extends his care to preserve feed clothe instruct and defend the whole Commonwealth His War his Peace his Courts of Justice and all his Acts of Soveraignty tend onely to preserve and distribute to every subordinate and inferiour Father and to their Children their Rights and Priviledges so that all the Duties of a King are summed up in an Vniversal Fatherly Care of his People I have been so just to the Author as to transcribe as much of his first Chapter as tends to prove the original power of Kings as well that you might see the Hypothesis which he builds his Divine Right of Absolute Monarchy in his own words and so be the better able to judge whether I understand and answer him or not as because it contains the substance and strength of all that the Author had to say in defence of it So that I shall now fall to examine whether his Foundations will bear so weighty a Structure as he hath raised upon it His first Argument against the natural Freedom of Mankinde is drawn from Scripture and from Bellarmine's own Concession That Adam was and consequently every other Father ought to be a Prince over his Posterity And as Adam was Lord over his Children so his Children under him had a power over their own Children suberdinately to the first Parent who was Lord Paramount over his Childrens Children to all Generations as being the Grandfather of his People So that neither the Children of Adam or any else can be free from subjection to their Parents and this subjection to Parents being the foundation of all Legal Authority by the Ordination of God himself therefore no man can be born in a state of Freedom or Equality In answer to which I shall not concern my self what Bellarmine or any other have granted but would be glad to know where and how God hath given this Absolute power to Fathers over their Children and by what Law Children are tyed to an Absolute Subjection or Servitude to
rate his power now encreases but that he may be so he threaten to cut their Banks and let in the Sea to drown them and their Country if they will not yeild it up to him may they not if they find they cannot resist him submit themselves to him and make the best terms they can for themselves and are they not then obliged by the Authors own Principles to continue his Subjects and yet here is no actual War or inundation but threats only to force them to this submission So that the Authors Supposition is false that no case can happen but an actual War only which can reduce a People to such terms of extremity as to compell them to an absolute abnunciation of all Soveraignity and so likewise is this consequence also which he assumes from thence then war which causeth that necessity is the prime means of extorting such Soveraignity and not the free gift of the People who cannot otherwise chuse but give away that Power which they cannot keep for they might either leave their Country or bury themselves in it But it seems the Author had forgot his Logick or else he would have remembred to distinguish between Causa sine qua non and Causa efficiens a cause which does not properly give being to a thing and yet without which it could not have been produced Thus a Slave at Argiers though it is the occasion of his servitude his being taken Prisoner yet the true Cause of his becoming a lawful Servant to his taker does not proceed from his conquering him but from his coming to Terms with him that he shall be dismist of his Fetters or Imprisonment upon Condition he will serve faithfully and not run away and all Moralists consider those actions they call mixt as when a Merchant flings his goods over into the Sea to avoid being cast away among the number of the Voluntary ones though they commenced from some kind of force since in this case the Merchant might if he pleased keep his goods if he would venture his life So in many cases may a Conquered People if they have never neither by themselves or their representatives owned the Conquerer But as much as the Author quarrells at the word usufructuary Right in Grotius as too base to express the Right of Kings and as derogatory to the dignity of Supreme Majesty yet the the French are not so scruplous but in the absolutest Monarchy of Europe plainly declare that their King hath but an usufructuary right to his Kingdom and the Territories belonging thereunto or that he can any way charge them with his debts or alienate or dispose of them without the consent of the States of France See Mezeray in the reign of this King 1527. and was so solâ—mnly declared by that great Assemby des notables called by K. Francis the First to give their Judgment of the Articles of Peace lately made with the Emperour Charles V. at Madrid their sense was that Burgundy which by those Articles was to be delivered up was an inseparable Member of the Crown of which he was but the usufructuary and so could not dispose of the one any more than of the other nor was this any new opinion but as old as St. Lewis who being desired by the Emperour Frederic III. to restore the King of England his just Rights To which the said King replyed whose words I will faithfully translate as they are in Matthew Paris p. 765. Anno Dom. 1249. By the holy Cross with which I am signed I would willingly do it if my Counsel i. e. the Estates would permit it because I love the King of England as my Cosen but it were hard at this very instant of my Pilgrimage viz. for the holy land to disturb the whole body of my Kingdom by contradicting the Counsels of my Mother and all my Nobles although the Intercessors are very dear to me neither is this to make a Kingdom all one with a Ferm as the Author words it since in the civil Law it signifies not only one that barely receives the rents or profits but likewise enjoys all other Prerogatives and advantages that may accrew to him as the true owner though he have not power to sell or give it away Nor I suppose will any French or English Subject unless such bigotted ones as the Author acknowledge any Forraign Prince or other Person can obtain an absolute Dominion over them by Conquest I am sure they were not of that opinion between two hundred and three hundred years agoe when the King of England brought a plausible Title into France and had it backt by almost an entire Conquest of the whole Kingdom and a formal setlement and acknowledgment from Charles VI. then King and the greatest part of the Nobility and Clergy of France at Paris and yet after all this the French had so little Conscience as to proclame Charles the Dauphin King of France and to drive the English out of the Country and renounce their allegiance which they had sworn to our Kings Henry V. and VI. and yet the Author will have it to be but a naked presumption in Grotius to suppose The Primary will of the People to have been ever necessary P. 69. to bestow Supreme power in succession But if the Author will not be content that Kings shall have any less than absolute Propriety in the Crown let us see the consequences of this Doctrine For the Crown must be of England in the nature of an absolute Fee Simple and is consequently chargeable by any act or alienable by the Testament of the King in being So that then King John had Power to make this Kingdom feudatary and tributory to the Pope and so the Pope hath still a good Title to it And since Religion with these Gentlemen diminishes nothing from the right and absoluteness of Monarchy the same King might have made over his Kingdom to the Emperor of Moroco as the Historians of those times relate he would and so the Sarracen Prince might have entred upon the non-performance of the Conditions and have turned out his Vassal and been King here himself which opinion how contrary it was to the notions which Kings themselves had of the right to dispose of their Kingdoms let any man consult Matthew Paris and he will see there what Phillip Agustus amongst other things tells Wallo the Popes Legate Anno 1216. P. 280. that no King could give away his Kingdom without the consent of his Barons who are obliged to defend it and all the Nobility there present began to cry out at once that they would assert this Priviledge till death That no King or Brince could by his sole Will give away his Kingdom or make it tributary by which the Nobles of the Kingdom might become Slaves Nor did the English Nobility think otherwise since this was one of the causes of their taking Arms against King John Matt. Paris 1245. p. 659. 666. and afterwards in his
although it look fine yet examined to the bottom signifies little for it is not true that every the least transgression of the bounds of Law is a subversion of the Government it self since if done perhaps only to one or a few persons it does not follow that therefore it must be a leading case and so bring on a prescription against publick Liberty in all cases Neither does the Subjects bearing with it not contribute otherwise then accidentally to this breach of Liberty Since he is obliged to bear it not because it is just but because he either may hope to have redress by the ordinary course of Law or else by petitioning the Assembly of Estates when they meet who are partly ordained on purpose to remonstrate the Grievances of Subjects to their Prince and thereupon to have them redressed Nor is this limited Monarch as the Author would infer less obliged to govern according to Law in smaller or private matters then in great and publick ones Only in many smaller matters Princes or their Officers may through ignorance or inadvertency sometimes transgress the true bounds of Law which they would not do perhaps if they were better informed And so likewise if the Subject bear it it is not from the Legality of the Act but from this great Maxime in Law and Reason that a mischief to some private men is better than an inconvenience in giving every private person power that thinks himself injured by the Prince or his Officers to be his own Judg and right himself by force since that were contrary to the great duty of every good Subject of endeavouring to preserve the common peace and happiness of his Country which ought to be preferred before any private mans Interest So on the other side if the oppression or breach of Laws be general and extend to all the People alike if the reason of the case alter why may not the practicedo so too ' But Mr. H. gives us another remedy in this case that if the Monarchs Act of Exorbitancy or Transgression be mortal and such as suffered dissolves the Frame of the Government and publick Liberty then the illegality is to be laid open and redressment sought by Petition Which is true for an Appeal to the Law from the violence of subordinate Ministers is really a Petition for Justice to the King himself who is by the Law supposed present in the persons of his Judges that represent him and this the Author himself in a better humour does confess in his Patriarcha P. 93. The people have the Law as a familiar interpreter of the Kings pleasure which being published throughout the Kingdom doth represent the presence and Majesty of the King also the Judges and Magistrates are restrained by the common Rules of Law from using their own Liberty to the injury of others since they are to judg according to the Laws and not to follow their own Opinions And because it might so happen that the King may be sometimes surprised or importuned to write Orders or Letters to the Judges to direct them to act contrary to the Law The King himself in Parliament hath declared See the Oath of the Justices 18. E. 3. what Oath these Justices shall take when they are admitted into their Office where among other things they swear thus And that ye deny no man common right by the Kings Letters nor none other mans nor for none other cause and in case such Letters do come to you contrary to the Law that ye do nothing by such Letters but certifie the King thereof and proceed to execute the Law notwithstanding the same Letters and concludes thus And in case ye be from henceforth found in default in any of the points aforesaid ye shall be at the Kings will of Body Lands or Goods thereof to be done as shall please him as God help you c. And the Lord Chief-Justice Anderson and his Fellow-Justices in the Common-Pleas who upon so great a point as Cavendishes Case was 35 El. having consulted with all the Judges of England delivered their Opinions solemnly in writing that the Queen was obliged by her Coronation-Oath to keep the Laws and if they should not likewise observe them they were forsworne Anderson p. 154 155. Which Will of the Kings is supposed to be as well declared by the House of Peers his supreme Court of Justice as by any other way See the Judgment upon Tresillian and the rest of his Brethren 21 Rich. 2. and the Impeachment of the House of Commons against the Judges that gave their Opinions contrary to Law in the case of Ship-money Vide the subsequent Act of Parliament 17 Car. 1. Chap. 14. declaring that upon the Tax called Shipmoney and the Judgment Entr. 1. H. 7. 4. b. the judicial opinions of the said Justices and Barons were and are contrary to the Laws and Statutes of this Realm and the Liberty of the Subjects c. which if it be truely observed there can never be any fear of a Civil War or popular Commotion since our Law supposes the King can do no wrong that is in his own person And therefore Sir John Markham when Chief Justice told King Edward the 4th That the King cannot arrest any Man himself for suspition of Treason or Fellony as other of his Lieges may for if it be a wrong to the party grieved he has no remedy Therefore if any Act or thing be done to the Subject contrary to the Law the Judges and Ministers of Justice are to be questioned and punished if the Laws are violated and no reflection made upon the King who is still supposed to do his Subjects Right Si factam fuerit injustum says Bracton per inde non fuerit factum Regis And thus much will serve for a further Answer to the Authors Query before mentioned Whether it be a sin for a Subject to disobey the King if he command any thing contrary to his Laws since all the Subjects both great and small are supposed to know what the Rights and Priviledges of the Subject are as well as what are the Prerogatives of the Crown nor are these reserved Cases so many or so difficult as the Anthor would make us believe but that they may be easily understood without Appealing to any other Judg then the Conscience of every honest man And though the King may for our common defence in time of War make Bulwarks upon another mans Land or command a House to be pull'd down if the next be on Fire or the Suburbs of a City to be demolished in time of War to make it serviceable though men may justify their obedience in such Cases yet it were folly and madness from thence to argue that the King were as much to be obeyed if he commanded us to pull down a whole Town for his Diversion or to take away all mens Lands or Goods at his Pleasure Since if he should be so weak as to command it it were his unhappiness
that he had no more understanding But it would be our Crime and we alone were punishable if we should obey such a Command and it is only upon this supposition whether the sufficiency of the Protection of our Laws and the integrity of the Judges declared in the 14th of his now Majesties Reign by the Act concerning the Militia be full that it is a Traiterous Position that Arms may be taken by his Majesties Authority against his Person or against those Commissioned by him in persuance of Military Commissions Because they suppose the King will not make use of the Militia for the destruction but the preservation of the Subjects just Rights and because all Officers of the Army or Militia are at their Peril to take notice whether their Orders are according to Law or not For they put it thus though to take free Quarter or to hang a man by Martial-Law in time of War be lawful yet to do so in time of Peace though in the Kings Name is Robbery and Murder And of this Opinion is that antient Book called the Mirror of Justices Chap. 1. Sect. 10. De Larcine En cest Peche viz. Robbery chiont tonts ceux que pernont le' autrun per l' Authorite del Roy en le' autre Grand Seigneur sans le gree de ceux aux queux les biens sont Into this Crime viz. Robbery all those do fall who take the Goods of another by the Authority of the King or any other great Lord without their Consent ' Nor I dare fay will any honest well meaning Subject be discontented if in case of extream necessity or some sudden danger the King should somewhat exceed his Prerogative for the defence of the Kingdom further then the Law will allow Since in matters of private concern a Man will not be angry with his Agent or Factor whom he hatâ—â—mpowered to look after his Business in another Countrey if the Agent perceiving the person for whom he is intrusted does not understand how his concerns in that place stand and that the Affair will not permit him to send again for farther Orders if he act contrary to his first Instructions since if he did not his Friends or Masters business would be lost Much more in the case of a King who besides the peoples concerns with which he is intrusted hath likewise his own Crown and Dignity at Stake So likewise a King will easily pardon a Subject who upon a sudden Insurrection or Invasion raises Forces and marches against the Enemy without staying for a Commission and when a Prince hath so well satisfied his Subjects that he never intends to make use of this Prerogative but for the good and preservation of his people he may do almost what he pleases and no body will be concerned And this made Queen Elizabeth meet with that great Affection and Confidence that she did throughout her whole Reign for though she sometimes exercised as high Acts of Prerogative as some of her Predecessors yet she had the good luck to have scarce any of them questioned in Parliament because the whole Nation was satisfied she acted for the best and sought no other end but the publick good and safety of the Kingdom Which had she permitted Spain to have swallowed up France and the Low-Countries it would have been a hard task to perswade them But Mr. H. proceeds in the same Paragraph and supposes that redressment by Petition failing that is that the Judges either do not or will not act according to their Oathes then if the Exorbitancy ' or transgression be mortal to the Government prevention by resistance ought to be and if it be apparent and appeal be made to the Consciences of Mankind then the Fundamental Laws of that Monarchy must judg and pronounce sentence in every mans Conscience and every man so far as concerns him must follow the Evidence of Truth in his own Sense to oppose or not oppose according as he can in Conscience acquit or Condemn the Act of the Governour or Monarch This our Author finds fault with ' First concerning the laying open of illegal Commands he will have Mr. H's meaning to be that each private Man in his peculiar case should make a publick Remonstrance to the World of the illegal Acts of the Monarch and then if upon his Petition he cannot be relieved according to his Desire he ought to make Resistance Whereupon the Author would know who can be Judg whether the illegality be made sufficiently apparent It is a main point since every man is prone to flatter himself in his own cause and to think it good and that the wrong or injustice he suffers is apparent when moderate and indifferent men can discover no such thing and in this case the Judgment of the common people cannot be gathered or known by any possible means or if it could it were like to be various and erronious In which Annimadversion of our Author he first lays that to Mr. H's Charge which he does no where affirm that every particular Subject when injured should make a publick remonstrance to the people but only lay it open to the Monarch or his Judges that represent him by Petition And sure there is a great deal of difference between a Petition and a Remonstrance He does not say that every single Subject failing of Redress by Petition ought to make resistance in his own case for he before supposes the Exorbitant Act or Transgression not to be Mortal such as suffered dissolves the Frame of the Government and publick Liberty And that in such lighter cases for the publick Peace we ought to submit and make no resistance at all but de jure cedere which can never fall out as long as this Transgression or Exorbitance extends it self only to some particular men 2. Our Author will have no particular man to be Judg in his own Cause I grant it if by Judg he means Execution too by publick resistance Otherwise a mans passing his judgment or declaring it that he thinks himself injured suppose by a Decree in Chancery or Act of Parliament does not disturb the Goverment or publick Peace But he may if he please bring his Appeal or a new Bill in Parliament and have the unjust Decree or Act reversed which he can never do if he did believe he ought not to make the injustice or illegality of this Act or Decree apparent to those that are to give him redress but if this Exorbitant Act or Transgression be general and presses upon all alike I deny that the Judgment of the common people cannot be gathered or known by any possible means or if it could it were like to be various and erroneous For suppose the illegal Act were so publickly declared that for the future all Taxes should be raised without consent of Parliament or that all menshould be tried for their Lives without Juries I would fain know whether the Judgment not only of the Commonalty but of all
pleases because I have obliged my self to it by compact and I am obliged to follow this Mans will because he can enjoyn me thus by his supreme Authority But supreme and absolute are not one and the same thing for that denotes the absense of a Superiour or an Equal in the same order or degree but this a faculty of exerciseing any right by a Man 's own Judgment and Will but what if there be added a Commissary clause that if he shall do otherwise he shall forfeit his Kingdom as the Arogonians of Old after the King had sworn to their Priviledges did promise him Obedience in this manner Vid Hotomani Frarcogallia C. 12. We who are of as great Power as thou do Create thee our King and Lord on this condition that thou observe our Laws and Priviledges if otherwise not Here it is certain that an absolute King cannot be He to whom the Kingdom is thus committed under a Commissary Clause or Condition but that this King may have for all this a regal Power though limited I see no reason to the contrary for although we grant a Temporary Authority cannot be acknowledged for Supreme because it depends upon a potestative condition and which can never be in the Princes power Yet a King of this sort above-mention'd is not therefore subject to the power of the People with whom the cognizance is whether he keep his Oath or not for besides that such a Commissary Clause is wont to comprehend only such plain things which are evident to any Mans sences and so are not liable to dispute So that this power of taking cognizance does not at all suppose any Jurisdiction by which the Actions of the King as a Subject may be judged but is nothing else than a bare Declaration whereby any Man takes notice that his manifest right is violated by another See Grotius Lib. 1. Cap. 3. § 16. And Baecler upon him who are both of the same Opinion Grotius indeed in the same place speaks more obscurely when he says That the Obligation arising from the promises of Kings does either fall upon the exercise of the act or also directly upon the very power of it if he act contrary to promises of the former sort the act may be called unjust and yet be valid if against those of the latter it is also void as if he should have said Sometimes a King promises not to use part of his Supreme Authority but after acertain manner and sometimes he plainly renounces some part thereof concerning which there are two things to be observed first that also some acts may be void which are performed contrary to an Obligation of the former sorts as for example if a King swear not to impose any Taxes without the consent of the Estates I suppose that such Taxes which the King shall Levy by his own will alone to bevoid Secondly That in the latter form the parts of the supreme power are divided But that the Nature of limited Kingdoms may more thoroughly be understood it is to be observed that the affairs which occur in Governning a Common-wealth are of two kinds for of some of them it may be agreed beforehand because whenever they happen they are still but of the same Nature but of others a certain Judgment cannot be made but at the time present whether they are beneficial to the Publick or not for that those circumstances which accompany them cannot be forseen Yet concerning both that People may provide that he to whom they have commited this limited Kingdom should not depart from the Common good in the former whilst it prescribes perpetual Laws or Conditions which the King should be obliged to observe in the latter whilst he is obliged to consult the assembly of his People or Nobility Thus the People being satisfied of the truth of their Religion and what sort of Ecclesiastical Government or Ceremonies do best suit their Genius so it is in Sweden may condition with the King upon his Inauguration that he shall not change any thing in Religious matters by his sole Authority So every Body being sensible how often Justice would be injured if Sentence should always be given by the sole Judgment of the Prince ex aequo hono without any written or known Laws and that Passion VI. Tacit An. L. 13. 4. 2. Interest or unskilfulness would have too great a sway for avoiding this inconvenience the people may oblige their King that either he shall compose a Body of just Laws or observe those that are already extant and also that Judgment be given according to those Laws in certain Courts or Colledges of Justice and that none but the most weighty Causes should come before the King by way of Appeal This is likewise the Law of Sweden So likewise since it is well known how easily Riches obtained by the Labour of others may be squandered away by Luxury or Ambition therefore the Subjects Goods should not lie at their Princes mercy to sustain their Lusts Some Nations have wisely assigned a certain Revenue to their Prince such as they supposed necessary for the constant Charges of the Common-wealth but if greater expences were necessary they would have those referred to the Assembly of Estates And since also some Kings are more desirous than they ought to be of Military Glory and running themselves into unnecessary Wars may put themselves and their Kingdoms in hazard therefore some of them have been so cautious that in the conferring the regal Dignity they have imposed this necessity upon their Kings that if they would make offensive Wars upon their Neighbours they should first advise with their great Council and so likewise it might be ordained concerning other matters which the People judged necessary for the Common-wealth lest that if an absolute power of ordering those things were left to the Prince the common good of the People would perhaps be less considered And since the people would not leave to this limited King an absolute power in those Acts which are thus excepted but that an Assembly either of the whole people or of those that represent them divided into their several Orders it is further to be observed that the power of this Council or Assembly is not alike every where For in some places the King himself though every where absolute may have appointed a Council or Senate without whose approbation he will not have his decrees to be valid Which Senate without doubt will only have the Authority of Councellors and though they may question the Kings Grants or Decrees and reject those which they judg inconvenient for the Common-wealth yet they do not this by any inherent Right but by a power granted them from the King himself Who would this way prevent his decreeing any thing through hast imprudence or the perswasion of Flatterers that might prove hurtful to his State to which may be referred what Plutarch mentions in his Apothegms ' That the Aegyptian Kings
observe a Law Note the Antiquity of of this excellent Law whereby they oblige their Judges by Oath that if the King require an unjust Sentence from them they should refuse him And in the same place it is noted that Antigonus 3. writ to his Cities that if by his Letter he should command anything contrary to his Laws they should not obey it but should think he failed thorough ignorance or misinformation and oftentimes importunate Requests are cluded this way whilst the Prince seems for quietness sake content to grant what he knows will be made void by this Senate or Court of Parliament As it hath been often in France yet when the King is resolved that his Will shall hold good and looks upon the contrary Reasons of this Parliament as not weighty enough to convince him it cannot then any longer contradict the Kings Will for it is not presumed that the King by constituting such a Court would irrevocably abdicate his Right of absolute power So that this Senate or Parliament hath indeed but a Derivative power from the King to be limited as he himself shall please although perhaps he will not exert this power but upon weighty considerations nor does this Court make the power of the King less than absolute since it only gives him occasion to review his own Acts and as it were Appeals from himself when surprised with Passions Prejudices or misinformation to himself in a more indifferent and considerate Temper The like may be said of the Assembly of Estates if they meet only for this purpose that they should be the Kings greatest Council by which the Requests and complaints of his People which often times are concealed in his private Council may come to the Kings ears who is then left free to Enact what he thinks expedient Vid. Gro. Li. 1. c. 3. § 10. But a Kingdom is truely limited when the Subjects at first conferred it on the King on this condition that he should assemble the Estates concerning some Acts without whose consent this Decree should not be valid yet it ought to be in the Kings power to call and dissolve this Assembly and to propose the business to be dispatcht therein unless we should go about to set up an irregular Common-wealth and leave the King no more than an empty Title but if these States being so convocated do of their own accord Propose those things which they conceive conducing to the good and safety of the Kingdom yet the Decrees or Acts constituted concerning them take their force from the Kings passing them Yet such an assembly of Estates do differ from Counsellors properly taken in this that although both of them can only move the King by reason only yet the King may very well reject the Reasons of these latter but not of the former neither ought the King to think himself contemned if these Estates do not consent to some things of his proposing For as he promised at first to have always before his Eyes the good of the Common-wealth of which a great many choice men are supposed to Judg more certainly than one A King may most commonly blame his own imprudence Passions or ill Fortune if the States happen to differ from him from whence it likewise appears that their fear is vain who think that by this means it is at the disposal of the Estates whether the Common-wealth shall be safe or not For it can scarcely be supposed that the King should be so negligent as to omit laying open to his Estates the necessities of the Kingdom or that the Estates being fully satisfied of them will ever go about to betray their own safety But this is certain since those who have conferred the limited power cannot be presumed either to intend to destroy or dissolve the Common-wealth or by their confederacy to order things so that the end of all Common-wealths cannot be obtained in it therefore there ought to be that favourable interpretation made of those Conventions that they really desire the common safety and would by no means do any thing contrary thereunto so likewise in making this compact that whatsoever they have so agreed to they are still to be supposed to have that intention that nothing should be done by reason of those conditions or parts which should prejudice the common safety and publick utility or whereby the Convulsion or Dissolution of the Common-wealth might follow But if such a chance should happen it would be most convenient that if the affair will allow of delay it should be proposed in the Assembly of Estates but where this cannot be done it may be the Kings Duty dexterously to correct those complaints that may break out to the destruction of the Common-wealth which also is of the the same force in respect of publick Laws Pint. in the Life of Agesilaus which the safety of the people and the supream Law commands sometimes to be silent As Agesilaus commanded the Laws of Licurgus to sleep for one day that those might return without ignominy that had fled at the Battel of Levetra However Mr. Hobs will allow no distinction between limited power and absolute but will have all supreme power to be absolute when it is to be observed that in all those assertions which are too rudely laid down by him there is a restriction to be added from the and of all Common-wealths as in what he lays down in his de Cive cap. 5. § 6. that he to whom in a Common-wealth there belongs the right of punishing can by right compel all to all things he pleases or as he expresses this limitation in the same place which are necessary for the common peace and safety and Cap. 6. § 13. when by the right of the supreme Governour he says there is connected so great an obedience of all the Subjects as is requisite for the Government of the Common-wealth so when in the place aforegoing he saith who ever hath so subjected his own will 'to that of the Prince that he may do whatever he pleases without punishment as also make Laws Judg differences punish whom he pleases use the strength power of all men according to his own will perform all these things by the highest right he hath then granted him the greatest power which can be granted But it is now to be considered by what intention or on what grounds men were moved to institute Common-wealths from whence it is clear that no body is understood to have conferred more power by his Will upon the Monarch then a reasonable man can judg necessary to that end and that although the ordering what may conduce to this end in this or that occasion does not remain in those that have transferred their power but in him on whom that power is transferred therefore the supream Ruler can compel the Subjects to all those things which are really condusing to the good of the Common-wealth but he ought not to go about to compel them to
those things that are contrary to the safety of the Common-wealth or against the Laws of Nature And if he endeavours any such thing without doubt he transgresses the bounds of his power Let us also consider the Arguments by which the same Author in his De Cive Cap. 6 § 17. endeavours to prove that all limitation of Soveraign power is absolutely vain he says that assembly which prescribed the Laws to the future King must have had absolute power either habitually or vertually If the Assembly remains constantly or adjourns their Meeting from Time to Time to a certain day and place their power will be perpetual and so the King will not have the Supream power but will be only a bare Magistrate Which we grant to be true if that Assembly can meet by its own Right and Decree of any Affairs of the Common-wealth and that the King be liable to give them an Account of his Actions But if it absolutely dissolve it self unless the Commonwealth be likewise dissolved there must in like manner a power be left somewhere of punishing those that transgress the Laws which without absolute power cannot be performed Which is false as also the Argument by which he would prove it for he who hath granted him by Right so much power that he can compel any of the Subjects by punishments hath so great power that greater cannot be conferred by them But for all this whoever will but consider the end of all Common-wealths and that those Subjects by the submission of their Wills and powers did not immediately become senceless Machines so that since they could grant the use of their united Forces to another upon condition and are able to judg whether this condition be performâ—d or not so they can likewise withdraw their Forces again upon the breach of the condition as likewise this is apparently false that there is no better provision against the abuse of Authority when it is granted limited then when it is left absolute for it is not who that he who hath power enough to defend all Men. which all that are not Fools will easily grant their Prince as also power enough to destroy them The Commands of a General which are sufficient to make the Souldiers stout to venture their Lives against an Enemy yet would be found of no force if he should command them to draw their Swords against each other So that prudent and worthy Princes though absolute will comply with the Genins of their Subjects and â—…t-times will be sparing to urge them too far though for their own advantage when they cannot be compelled to their Duty without some hazard to the Common-wealth But those Subjects are not less discreet who when they are satisfied what is not expedient for their Common-wealth have provided by Fundamental Laws that they should not be compelled to it by their Princes power So far speaks the judicious Mr. Pusendorf upon this Subject which though somewhat prolix I have thought fit to translate verbation because I would not be thought by going about to contract it to put my own sence upon his words and besides I know no man that hath writ more clearly of this Subject in avoiding on one side an absolute despotick Monarchy without falling into that Solacism in Politicks the division of the supreme power which he supposes truly inconsistant with Monarchy So that if the Reader is not satisfied with what I have here writ upon this Subject I am sorry his understanding and mine are not framed alike nor shall be angry with him if he like an absolute Monarchy better then that we live under Provided he will never Act any thing to produce publick disturbances or to introduce it either by force or fraud in this Kingdom Yet shall wish him no greater Prerogative then that of enjoying his own opinion without imposing it upon others who are not yet weary of their Estates and Liberties which since the People of this Nation are not yet weary of The World is wide enough and there are Countries where this which they admire as the primitive Government of the World and that which they perhaps Reverence as the Primitive Religion is practised in its full splendor and indeed are most suitable to each other All the hurt I wish those Gentlemen that they were all setled in any of them even which they like best Whilst all plain hearted English-men notwithstanding such subtile discourses as thofe of our Author are resolved to return the same Answer to them as the Temporal Lords did to the Bishops long since upon another occasion Nolumus Leges Angliae mutari of which I hope there is as little fear as there is or ever will be just occasion for it And so I shall quit my hands of this ungrateful task without troubling my self with his Discourse of Witches Since his other writings sufficiently assure us that whatever he was in other Learning he was no Witch in Politicks though he had Read Aristotle might perhaps be better read in the Fathers and Schoolmen or Civil-Law than in the Laws of Nature or those of his own Countrey FINIS ERRATA PReface Page 2. l. 14. dele not l. 18. hy r. by p. 5. r. despise observe p. 8. l. 32. compore r. compare the p. 15. l. 30. of Fathers r. of a Father l. 31. more true r. more certain l. 36. to r. thereto l. 37. dele without the help and assistance of others p. 24. l. 24. should make r. should have l. 26. in r. or in p. 29. l. 16. dele fourth p. 32. l. 33. d. not p. 37. l. 33. for excellent Pufendorf r. Mr. Pufendorf a late judicious Writer p. 40. l. 17 d. often p. 42. l 20. d. of p. 43. l. 17. ought quit r. ought to puit p. 44. l. 10. for a priviledg r. a liberty l. 21. and if r. for if l. ead have such r. have only such l. 31. fatherly r. or fatherly p. 37. 57. l. 28. puzzle r. distract p. 67. l. 14. require r. acquire l. 32. as I r. and p. 70. l. 13. d. perhaps p. 72. l. 25. d. goods p. 74. l. 5. or at their own dispose include within a Parenthesis p. 77. l. 8. upon r. upon them p. 83. l. 8. on r. than l. 31. r. without any stop after legat l. 32. owe his r. owe its p. 86. l. 32. the r. those l. 35. change r. charge p. 87. l. 29. it is r. they are p. 88. l. 20. his r. this p. 89. l. 6. consting r. consisting p. 90. l. 26. r. representative and d. body p. 92. l. 34. many r. so many p. 93. l. 7. but of r. but part of l. 13. d. from p. 95. l. 16. for an r. but an l. 24. d. hatred p. 99. l. 7. both of d. both p. 102. l. 3. at mans r. a mans p. 107. l. 20. Laws d. s ead l. 1. d. Custome p. 112. l. 32. r. misuse him p. 113. l. 25. most r. many p. 117. l. 30. all