may quickly discern The main Plea for Forms of Government in the Church is their necessity in order to its Peace and Order and yet nothing hath produced more disorder and confusion then our Disputes about it have done And our sad experience still tells us that after all our Debates and the Evidences brought on either side men yet continue under very different apprehensions concerning it But if we more strictly enquire into the causes of the great Distances and Animosities which have risen upon this Controversie we shall find it hath not been so much the difference of Judgements concerning the Primitive Form of Government which hath divided men so much from one another as the prevalency of Faction and Interest in those whose Revenues have come from the Rents of the Church and among others of greater Integrity it hath been the Principle or Hypothesis which men are apt to take for granted without proving it viz. that it is in no case lawful to vary from that Form which by obscure and uncertain conjectures they conceive to have been the Primitive Practice For hereby men look upon themselves as obliged by an unalterable Law to endeavour the Establishment of that Idea of Government which oft-times Affection and Interest more then Reason and Judgement hath formed within them and so likewise bound to over throw any other Form not suitable to those Correspondencies which they are already engaged to maintain If this then were the Cause of the Wounds and Breaches this day among us the most successful Weapon-salve to heal them will be to anoint the Sword which hath given the Wound by a seasonable inquiry into the Nature and Obligation of particular Forms of Government in the Church The main Subject then of our present Debate will be Whether any one particular Form of Church Government be setled upon an unalterable Divine Right by virtue whereof all Churches are bound perpetually to observe that Individual Form or whether it be left to the Prudence of every particular Church to agree upon that Form of Government which it judgeth most conducible within its self to attain the end of Government the Peace Order Tranquillity and Settlement of the Church If this latter be made fully appear it is then evident that however mens judgements may differ concerning the Primitive Form of Government there is yet a sure ground for men to proceed on in order to the Churches Peace Which one Consideration will be motive sufficient to justifie an attempt of this Nature it being a Design of so great Importance as the recovery of an advantagious piece of ground whereon Different Parties may with safety not only treat but agree in order to a speedy Accommodation We come therefore closely to the business in hand and for the better clearing of our passage we shall first discuss the Nature of a Divine Right and shew whereon an unalterable Divine Right must be founded and then proceed to shew how far any Form of Government in the Church is setled upon such a Right Right in the general is a relative thing and the signification and import of it must be taken from the respect it bears to the Law which gives it For although in common acception it be often understood to be the same with the Law its self as it is the rule of actions in which sense Ius naturae gentium civile is taken for the several Laws of Nature Nations and particular States yet I say Ius and so Right is properly something accruing to a person by virtue of that Law which is made and so jus naturae is that right which every man is invested in by the Law of Nature which is properly jus personae and is by some call'd jus activum which is defined by Grotius to be Qualitas moralis personae competens ad aliquid juste habendum aut agendum by Lessius to be Potestas Legitima ad rem aliquam obtinendam c. So that by these descriptions Right is that Power which a man hath by Law to do have or obtain any thing But the most full description of it is given by Martinius that it is adhaerens personae necessitas vel potestas recta ad aliquid agendum omittendum aut permittendum that whereby any person lies under a necessity of doing omitting or suffering a thing to be or else hath a lawful authority of doing c. For we are to consider that there is a two-fold Right either such whereby a man hath Liberty and Freedom by the Law to do any thing or such whereby it becomes a mans necessary duty to do any thing The opening of the difference of these two and the different influences they have upon persons and things is very useful to our present purpose Ius then is first that which is justum so Isidore Ius dictum quia justum est So what ever is just men have right to do it Now a thing may be said to be just either more generally as it signifies any thing which is lawful or in a more restrained sense when it implies something that is equal and due to another So Aristotle distributes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The former sense of it is here only pertinent as it implies any thing which may be done according to Law that is done jure because a man hath right to do it In order to this we are to observe that an express Positive Command is not necessary to make a thing lawful but a non-prohibition by a Law is sufficient for that For it being the Nature of Laws to bound up mens Rights what is not forbidden by the Law is thereby supposed to be left in mens power still to do it So that it is to little purpose for men to seek for Positive Commands for every particular action to make it lawful it sufficeth to make any action lawful if there be no Bar made by any direct or consequential prohibition unless it be in such things whose lawfulness and goodness depend upon a meer Positive Command For in those things which are therefore only good because commanded a Command is necessary to make them lawful as in immediate positive acts of Worship towards God in which nothing is lawful any further then it is founded upon a Divine Command I speak not of Circumstances belonging to the Acts of Worship but whatever is looked upon as a part of Divine Worship if it be not commanded by God himself it is no ways acceptable to him and therefore not lawful So our Saviour cites that out of the Prophet In vain do they worship me teaching for Doctrines the commandments of men which the Chaldee Paraphrast and Syriack version render thus Reverentia quam mihi exhibent est ex praecepto documento humano plainly imputing the reason of Gods rejecting their worship to the want of a Divine Command for what they did And therefore Tertullian condemns all those things to be
sufficient for Communion with a Church which are sufficient for eternal salvation And certainly those things are sufficient for that which are laid down as the necessary duties of Christianity by our Lord and Saviour in his Word What ground can there be why Christians should not stand upon the same terms now which they did in the time of Christ and his Apostles Was not Religion sufficiently guarded and fenced in them Was there ever more true and cordial Reverence in the Worship of God What Charter hath Christ given the Church to bind men up to more then himself hath done or to exclude those from her Society who may be admitted into Heaven Will Christ ever thank men at the great day for keeping such out from Communion with his Church whom he will vouchsafe not onely Crowns of Glory to but it may be aureolae too if there be any such things there The grand Commission the Apostles were sent out with was onely to teach what Christ had commanded them Not the least intimation of any Power given them to impose or require any thing beyond what himself had spoken to them or they were directed to by the immediate guidance of the Spirit of God It is not Whether the things commanded and required be lawfull or no It is not Whether indifferencies may be determined or no It is not How far Christians are bound to submit to a restraint of their Christian liberty which I now inquire after of those things in the Treatise its self but Whether they do consult for the Churches peace and unity who suspend it upon such things How far either the example of our Saviour or his Apostles doth warrant such rigorous impositions We never read the Apostles making Lawes but of things supposed necessary When the Councel of Apostles met at Ierusalem for deciding a Case that disturbed the Churches peace we see they would lay no other burden 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 besides these necessary things Acts 15. 29. It was not enough with them that the things would be necessary when they had required them but they looked on an antecedent necessity either absolute or for the present state which was the onely ground of their imposing those commands upon the Gentile-Christians There were after this great diversities of practice and varieties of Observations among Christians but the Holy Ghost never thought those things fit to be made matters of Lawes to which all parties should conform All that the Apostles required as to these was mutuall forbearance and condescension towards each other in them The Apostles valued not indifferencies at all and those things it is evident they accounted such which whether men did them or not was not of concernment to Salvation And what reason is there why men should be so strictly tied up to such things which they may do or let alone and yet be very good Christians still Without all Controversie the main in-let of all the Distractions Confusions and Divisions of the Christian World hath been by adding other conditions of Church-Communion then Christ hath done Had the Church of Rome never taken upon her to add to the Rule of Faith nor imposed Idolatrous and superstitious practises all the injury she had done her self had been to have avoyded that fearful Schisme which she hath caused throughout the Christian World Would there ever be the less peace and unity in a Church if a diversity were allowed as to practices supposed indifferent yea there would be so much more as there was a mutual forbearance and condiscension as to such things The Unity of the Church is an Unity of love and affection and not a bare uniformity of practice or opinion This latter is extreamly desireable in a Church but as long as there are several ranks and sizes of men in it very hardly attainable because of the different perswasions of mens minds as to the lawfulness of the things required and it is no commendation for a Christian to have only the civility of Procrustes to commensurate all other men to the bed of his own humour and opinion There is nothing the Primitive Church deserves greater imitation by us in then in that admirable temper moderation and condescension which was used in it towards all the members of it It was never thought worth the while to make any standing Laws for Rites and Customs that had no other Original but Tradition much less to suspend men her his communion for not observing them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Sozomen tells us They judged it and that very justly a foolish and frivolous thing for those that agree in the weighty matters of Religion to separate from one anothers communion for the sake of some petty Customs and Observations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For Churches agreeing in the same Faith often differ in their Rites and Customes And that not only in different Churches but in different places belonging to the same Church for as he tells us many Cities and Villages in Egypt not onely differed from the Customes of the Mother-Church of Alexandria but from all other Churches besides in their publick Assemblies on the Evenings of the Sabbath and receiving the Eucharist after dinner This admirable temper in the Primitive Church might be largely cleared from that liberty they allowed freely to dissenters from them in matters of practice and opinion as might be cleared from Cyprian Austine Ierome and others but that would exceed the bounds of a Preface The first who brake this Order in the Church were the Arrians Donatists and Circumcellians while the true Church was still known by his pristine Moderation and sweetness of deportment towards all its members The same we hope may remain as the most infallible evidence of the conformity of our Church of England to the Primitive not so much in using the same rites that were in use then as in not imposing them but leaving men to be won by the observing the true decency and order of Churches whereby those who act upon a true Principle of Christian ingenuity may be sooner drawn to a complyance in all lawfull things then by force and rigorous impositions which make men suspect the weight of the thing it self when such force is used to make it enter In the mean time what cause have we to rejoyce that Almighty God hath been pleased to restore us a Prince of that excellent Prudence and Moderation who hath so lately given assurance to the World of his great indulgence towards all that have any pretence from Conscience to differ with their Brethren The onely thing then seeming to retard our peace is the Controversie about Church-Government an unhappy Controversie to us in England if ever there were any in the World And the more unhappy in that our contentions about it have been so great and yet so few of the multitudes engaged in it that have truly understood the matter they have so eagerly contended about For the state of the controversie as it concerns
them in particular but to the Magistrate in general So that in things left lawfull and undetermin'd by the Word where there ariseth no obligation from the matter it must arise from our subjection and relation to the Magistrate and what is the ground of obedience is the cause of the obligation Secondly He hath only the power of obligations who hath the power of making Sanctions to those Laws By Sanctions I mean here in the sense of the civil Law eas legum partes quibus poenas constituimus adversus eos qui contra leges fecerint those parts of the Law which determine the punishments of the violaters of it Now it is evident that he only hath power to oblige who hath power to punish upon disobedience And it is as evident that none hath power to punish but the civill Magistrate I speak of legall penalties which are annexed to such Laws as concern the Church Now there being no coercive or coactive power belonging to the Church as such all the force of such Laws as respect the outward Polity of the Church must be derived from the civill Magistrate Thirdly He who can null and declare all other obligations void done without his power hath the only power to oblige For whatsoever destroys a former obligation must of necessity imply a power to oblige because I am bound to obey him in the abstaining from that I was formerly obliged to But this power belongs to the Magistrate For suppose in some indifferent Rites and Ceremonies the Church representative that is the Governors of it pro tempore do prescribe them to be observed by all the Supreme power fâ—rbids the doing of those things if this doth not null the former supposed obligation I must inevitably run upon these absurdities First that there are two supreme powers in a Nation at the same time Secondly that a man may lie under two different Obligations as to the same thing he is bound to do it by one power and not to do it by the other Thirdly the same action may be a duty and a sin a duty in obeying the one power a sin in disobeying the other Therefore there can be but one power to oblige which is that of the Supreme Magistrate Having thus far asserted the Magistrates due power and Authority as to matters of Religion we proceed to examine the extent of this power in determining things left at liberty by the Word of God in order to the Peace and Government of the Church For our clear and distinct proceeding I shall ascend by these three steps First to shew that there are some things left undetermined by the Word Secondly that these things are capable of positive Determinations and Restraint Thirdly that there are some bounds and limits to be observed in the stating and determining these things First That there are some things left undetermined by the Word By Determining here I do not mean determining whether things be lawful or no for so there is no Ritâ— or Ceremony whatsoever but is determined by the Scripture in that sense or may be gathered from the application of particular actions to the general Rules of Scripture but by Determining I mean whether all things concerning the Churches Polity and Order be determined as Duties or no viz. that this we are bound to observe and the other not As for instance what time manner method gesture habit be used in preaching the Word whether Baptism must be by dipping or sprinkling at what day time place the Child shall be baptized and other things of a like Nature with these Those who assert any of these as duties must produce necessarily the Command making them to be so For Duty and Command have a necessary respect and relation to one another If no Command be brought it necessarily follows that they are left at liberty So as to the Lords Supper Calvin saith whether the Communicants take the Bread themselves or receive it being given them whether they should give the Cup into the hands of the Deacon or to their next Neighbour whether the Bread be leavened or not the Wine red or white nihil refert it matters not Haec indifferentia sunt in Ecclesiae libertate posita they are matters of indifferency and are left to the Churches liberty But this matter of Indifferency is not yet so clear as it is generally thought to be we shall therefore bare the ground a little by some necessary distinctions to see where the root of indifferency lies Which we shall the rather do because it is strongly asserted by an Honourable person that there is no Indifferency in the things themselves which are still either unlawful or necessary if lawful at this time in these circumstances but all indifferency lies in the darkness and shortness of our understandings which may make some things seem so to us But that Honourable person clearly runs upon a double mistake First that Indifferency is a medium participationis of both extremes and not only negationis viz. that as intermediate colours partake both of black and white and yet are neither so in morality between good and bad there is an intermediate entity which is neither but indifferent to either Whereas the Nature of Indifferency lies not in any thing intermediate between good and bad but in some thing undetermined by Divine Laws as to the necessity of it so that if we speak as to the extremes of it it is something lying between a necessary duty and an intrinsecal evil The other mistake is that throughout that Discourse he takes Indifferency as Circumstantiated in Individual actions and as the morality of the action is determined by its Circumstances whereas the proper notion of Indifferency lies in the Nature of the action considered in its self abstractly and so these things are implyed in an indifferent action First absolute undetermination as to the general nature of the act by a Divine Law that God hath left it free for men to do it or no. Secondly that one part hath not more propension to the Rule then the other for if the doing of it comes nearer to the rule then the omission or on the contrary this action is not wholly indifferent Thirdly that neither part hath any repugnancy to the Rule for that which hath so is so far from being indifferent that it becomes unlawful So that an indifferent action is therein like the Iron accosted by two Loadstones on either side of equal virtue and so hovers in medio inclining to neither but supposing any degree of virtue added to the one above the other it then inclines towards it or as the Magnetical Needle about the Azores keeps its self directly parallel to the Axis of the world without variation because it is supposed then to be at an equal distance from the two Great Magnets the Continents of Europe and America But no sooner is it removed from thence but it hath its variations So indifferency taken in