And whoever coined it which I take it was Hugo de S. Victore few of our Divines but have used it that have dealt in any Controversie which gave an occasion for it And why should Mr. H. charge them with a concealment of a good meaning which they have so often discovered If Mr. H. only dislkes the terms I should not contend with him for I can give him their sense in others from the learned Davenant The will of God termed voluntas simplicis complacentiae i. e. the will of simple complacency which is the same with vol. signi and that which is termed voluntas absoluta or essicax i. e. an absolute or efficacious will which is the same with vol. beneplaciti may well stand together God wills that all men believe and be saved with the will of complacence God wills and decrees to permit that some continue in unbelief and be not saved but perish with the Absolute will The former will in effect is but a conditional will As if the Apostle had said God will have all men to be saved if all men shall believe in Christ and to believe in Christ is an act so well pleasing and so agreeable unto Gods will that wheresoever it is found it shall be rewarded But notwithstanding the extent of this will unto all men there is in God an absolute will of permitting some to continue in their unbelief and so perish Dav. ag Hoard p. 220. But it must be observed that whereas the most learned Bishop seems to attribute a Conditional will to God above he afterwards explains himself Meer or purely conditional Decrees agree not with the perfection of the Divine Nature The speeches therefore cited out of Scripture He that believes shall be saved c. do not imply a Conditional Will in God suspended for any moment of time and then post purificatam conditionem i. e. after the Condition performed becoming an absolute and effectual will c. But these conditional Decrees are grounded on some absolute revealed Decree of God to the Performance whereof he hath tied himself For example it is an absolute Decree of the Divine Will published in the Gospel that whosoever believeth c. shall be saved From hence is derived that mixt conditional Decree If Cain Judas or any other believe they shall be saved Now such mixt conditional Decrees carry no contradiction to the absolute c. who seeth not these Propositions may well stand together I will that if Judas repent and believe he shall have remission and salvation I will not to give to Judas the gift of repentance of faith and of eternal life Id. p. 225 226 227. I have said enough to obviate M. H's exagitation of the terms Vol. signi beneplaciti which are not worth the trouble of transcribing 6. But M. H. adds And of these faults the application of the distinction of Gods secret and revealed Will unto this case though it be useful in many is as guilty Let. p. 108. Rep. 1. As to this I say as the aforesaid Bishop Davenant of M. Hoard Mr. H. should first have rightly set it down and then have tried his strength in confuting it and I shall add his explication of it We say that there is in God a true will revealed in the Gospel of saving all men that shall believe and a true will liking embracing rewarding faith holiness perseverance in all men whomsoever without distinction of persons And this is the Will call'd Voluntas simplicis complacentiae or signi which neither decreeth nor determineth any thing infallibly concerning the being or not being of such good acts in this or that singular person This Will we know and therefore we call it his revealed will There is also in God a secret will of bringing some men to faith perseverance and the Kingdom of heaven and of not bringing others to any of these this Will we know not and therefore we call it the secret Will Dav. ag Hoard p. 221 only 't is to be noted that when the Reverend Bishop says This secret will of God we know not it must be understood with reference to the particular persons whom God intends to work faith c. in for we know in general that there are some persons whom God will be thus good unto I add this to prevent a Cavil which may seem very acute to them that use it If God's will of good pleasure or absolute will be secret how come we to know it or if it be revealed how is it secret And then the members of the distinction are confounded as Mr. H. objects p. 107. who should have done well to have told us in what cases it is useful though not in the present case For I dare offer my self to disprove the use of it in any case upon the same grounds that Mr. H. can the use of it in this Rep. 2. And yet when Mr. H. hath so solemnly declared his dislike of our distinction he owns it himself but in other words which are the explication of our terms And whereas it may be thought to follow hence that hereby we ascribe to God a liableness to frustration and disappointment that is without pretence The resolve of the Divine will in this matter viz. the holiness and salvation of all men being not concerning the event what man shall do but concerning his duty what he should and concerning the connexion between his duty and his happiness Let. p. 112. Now to leave Mr. H. inexcusable for the impertinency of his exception against our Distinction let us see how Dr Twisse a man that much used this distinction and therefore blamed by Mr. H. explains it There is no contradiction says he between these two wills Divine For Voluntas signi is improperly called a Will for it signifies only mans duty or what he should do as what will be pleasing to God if it be done But Voluntas beneplaciti is properly and simply a will viz. whereby is decreed whatsoever shall come to pass by Gods either efficiency or permission Twisse Vind. Gr. l. 1. p. 1. § 12. p. 140. It is evident to any intelligent Collator that M H's and Dr. Twisse's sense is the same and so Mr H. hath blamed himself in blaming Twisse 7. And if it should be insisted that in asserting God to will what by his Laws he hath made become mans duty even where it is not done we shall herein ascribe to him at least an ineffectual and imperfect will as that which doth not bring to pass the thing willed It is answer'd that Imperfection were with no pretence imputable to the Divine will meerly for not effecting every thing whereto it may have a real propension Let. p. 115 116. Reply We had need tread warily here for our way is strewed with Daggers I mean with terms repugnant to each other 1. If God be understood but to will mans duty not the event his obedience to it there 's no colour for the Objection
such addition For there can be no reason against Gods production of what is good in any action unless it be what Mr. Howe objects the accidental adherence of evil thereunto which if it be of any moment militates as much against immediate concurrence as hath been shown but now That passage of Austins opportunely offers its service to us as to the force of Mr. Gale's Argument Deus boni tantummodo causa est c. i. e. God is only the cause of good therefore he is not the Anthor of evil because he is the Author of all things that are which are so far good as they are 'T is indeed Mr. Gale's Argument in other terms Answ 3. Mr. Howe pretends Mr. Gale might better argue from his premises The necessity of his producing every hour a new world in which there would be a great deal more of positive entity and natural goodness Postsc p. 36. Reply This is too great a scorn to be cast upon so learned a man as Mr. Gale is well known to be For there is no medium that can with the least probability be judged likely to be able to tack Mr. Gales Antecedent and Mr. Howe 's consequent together To be sure not that which he suggests for that is false and unworthy of a Philosopher at least if these maximes be true substantia non recipit magis minus ens bonum convertibile though 't is easie to conceive there would be more positive Beings in number upon Mr. Howe 's supposition yet 't is hard to conceive there would be a great deal more of positive entity and so of natural goodness in the new world than is already in the old one Answ 4. The natural goodness that is in the Entity of an action is no such invitation to the Holy God by determinative influence to produce it as that he should offer violence to his own nature and stain the justice and honour of his government by making it to be done and then punish it being done p. 36. Reply 1. The natural goodness of an action hath invitation enough in it to induce God to produce it both because it is good and because it cannot be done without him 2. By Mr. Howe 's own concession something or other does induce God to produce it by giving and conserving the powers and immediate concurrence to the act of those powers 3. It remains upon Mr. Howe to prove that the producing of an action by determinative influence is more liable to those absurdities he names than the producing it any other way except what Durandus pitches upon which if he will also own then I know what I have to rejoyn In the interim I am ashamed he should clog his Reader with crambe bis cocta coleworts twice sod I mean an odious consequence imposed upon predeterminative influence that it offers violence to Gods nature and stains the justice and honour of his Government which we shall deny till he hath proved that by it God makes an action to be done i. e. in his sense necessitates it to be done and then punishes it being done which last clause is very absurd in its connexion for it supposes a contradiction viz. that the action is naturally good and yet that God punishes the natural goodness in it Arg. 5. which is Mr. Gale's third and last The denial of Predetermination even of sinful actions as such cuts off the most illustrious part of divine providence in governing the lower world Postsc p. 33. Answ I am ashamed to answer it Name any act of providence I hereby deny if you can ibid. So Mr. Howe Reply 1. This act of providence thereby you deny which in words you own to limit and moderate sinful actions Postsc p. 45. This will appear by considering what influence your mediate or immediate concurrence for you do so fluctuate that I know not which of the two you will abide by can have upon this effect The mediate can have none for that is nothing else but a conservation of the being with its powers and faculties and so but abusively called concurrence or concourse and so does but keep the powers indeterminate not determine nor limit their acts nor yet can immediate limit any action because as such it is neither before nor after the creatures action but with it The withdrawing of concourse immediate may hinder I grant the creatures action but whether God does ever withdraw it or no Strangius L. 1. c. 11. p. 65. doubts and so may you perhaps upon his ground Let us for the exemplification of this limitation consider it with respect to those things which it is conversant about 1. As to the objects of its acts as that Absaloms Adultery with Davids wifes rather than any other women This is plain by comparing 2 Sam. 12.11 with Chap. 16.22 In the former place the words are Thus saith the Lord Behold I will raise up evil against thee out of thine own house and I will take thy wives before thine eyes and give them unto thy neighbour and he shall lye with thy wives in the sight of the Sun In the latter place the event answers the threat And Absalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the sight of all Israel 2. As to the time when or how long the sinful acts shall be exercised about their objects When Gen. 45.5 God did send me before you to preserve life says Joseph to his Brethren whereas they might not have sold him till the famine came How long That is intimated in Psal 125.3 The rod of the wicked shall not rest upon the lot of the Righteous 3. As to the event or issue of the actions That an oppressour shall impoverish not utterly undo him he does oppress that he who strikes his neighbour with an intent to kill him shall yet but wound him 4. As to the decree of the act Psal 76.10 Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee the remainder of wrath thou shalt restrain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cinges ligabis which I understand of binding up the faculty that it put not forth its utmost force in the act issuing from it as when a man is but in a pet as we say not outragiously angry Thus God makes as great a difference between the same man and himself as a Rider does when he uses a strait rein or lays the bridle on his Horses neck 2. The over-ruling and disposing of a sinful action to good against the design and inclination of the sinful Agent Postsc p. 45. n. 10. is an act of Providence which Mr Howe denies in the denial of Predetermination For immediate concurrence is all that Mr. Howe allows of which being but Gods action with the creature and not existent before nor after it cannot therefore direct the action to any end And particularly in punishing one sin with another As in the instance of Absalom his Adultery with his Fathers Concubines was a punishment of Davids Adultery with Vriah's Wife In this
his leg the instrument of motion The Sun by his warmth makes the dunghill stink of which stink that that warmth is not the cause appears in that the very same influence draws forth a fragrant savour from a bed of Roses That the dunghill smells is from the Suns drawing forth the vapourâ— but that it smells ill is from the condition of the matter The upper-wheel of a Clock though by its motion it draws along with it an under-wheel that is irregular in its motion yet it is not the cause of that irregularity When a dexterous Pen-man writes upon sinking paper he makes pothooks as we say of children that begin to learn the art of writing blots rather than letters which yet is not his fault but the Papers Twisse Vind. Gr. l. 2. p. 1 a. p. 26. Reply 4. There must needs be a separation and therefore 't is possible to be between actions and the evil of them upon Mr. Howe 's own Hypothesis viz. That God does predetermine to all good actions which in the present state are but imperfectly good Here he must distinguish between the efficiency of God and man as to the same action and ascribe the action and grace of it to God and the evil that adheres to that action to man unless he will ascribe all to God Absit blasphemia verbo If Mr. Howe can extricate himself and not us with the same Answer or rather if he can excogitate any other Answer than by this exsibilated distinction erit mihi magnus Apollo and without an Irony sapientum octavus Reply 2. To the connexion I Answer That it infolds a twofold contradiction 1. For it supposes some actions to be intrinsecally evil and yet by our Hypothesis to be determined i. e. compell'd if Mr. Howe may be admitted our Interpreter whereas that is not sin which is not spontaneous neither is that spontaneous which is necessary i. e. violent or compell'd For violence is a Physical action upon the Patient in which sort of actions vertue or vice hath no place for the will is the principle of moral actions So the learned Camero de Scand p. 98. where note that I presume Camero denies not original sin imputed to be suo modo i. e. in its kind voluntary and so truly sin according to St. Austins sentiments nos omnes eramus ille unus homo i.e. we were all that one man Adam and so sinned in him This to prevent any misapprehension 2. It supposes sin to have an efficient cause whereas 't is a known Rule in Divinity Peccatum qua tale essentialiter est effectus moralis non habet causam Physicam i. e. Sin as such and essentially is a moral effect and hath no Physical cause Reply 3. Having given an Answer to Mr. Howe 's Antecedent and Connexion we shall now proceed to raze the foundation of his Hypothesis by proving that there are no actions of free agents evil in themselves or that no moral evil is positive but only privative which latter are the common terms of Philosophers and Divines in enquiring into the nature of moral evil And I shall borrow one Argument which will be instead of all from the most learned Dr. Barlow the now Renowned Bishop of Lincoln Arg. Every real and positive Being is from God the author and first cause of all Being But moral evil formally taken is not from God the author and first cause of all Being Ergo moral evil formally taken is not a real and positive Being The Minor is evident and acknowledged by the very Heathens in the appellation of Optimus the Best which they apply to their Jupiter together with Maximus the Greatest And will no doubt be owned by Mr. Howe who eo nomine for that very reason rejects Predestination of evil actions because in his apprehension it makes God the author of moral evil The Major let us hear the learned Bishop prove and the rather because it will much confirm our first Argument for Predetermination of all actions as such Proof Because it is impossible that there should be any finite and created Being which does not depend and hath its Being from an infinite and uncreated Being viz. God for it must needs be if there be any Being not caused by God that that Being be independent upon God as the first cause and consequently God shall not be the first cause in respect of that Being whence follow many absurdities c. whereof I shall only take the sum as himself hath given it us with an application to moral evil If moral evil i.e. any sin or breach of Divine Law be a real Being then 1. God shall not be the cause of that Being for of so deformed a birth divine goodness cannot be the Parent 2. This granted it will follow 1. That there is a secondary Being and a Being by participation such as every finite Being is supposed to be which does not partake of or receive its being from the first Being 2. That there is a finite Being independent upon God both as to production and conservation All which things we know and believe are contrary not only to Philosophy but Divinity Thus far the most acute Philosopher and Divine Exercit. metaph 2 a. de natura mali ad calcem Scheib met p. 32 33. Let us take notice of the instances of those sins which are supposed to be evil in themselves or positive Obj. 1. Sins of commission which are evil ex genere objecto whereof two are specially insisted on Adams eating of the forbidden fruit and by Mr. Howe the hatred of God are in themselves evil Answ 1. In general If all sins subsist in some actual motion of the soul body or both and this motion abstractively considered be the material part of every actual sin and hath God for the prime cause in whom we live and move and have our being then no sin can be assigned wherein this material part may not be found So the Learned Davevant sometime Bishop of Sarisbury Animadv on Hoard p. 174 175. Answ 2. As to the instances The first in eating the forbidden fruit the material part of the sin in regard of the Soul was the appetition thereof in regard of the body the mastication chewing and manducation eating and other bodily acts Separate these from the formal part which is modus appetendi the manner of desiring and containeth a repugnancy to Gods command and God was the prime author thereof The act of desiring and eating must of necessity be reduced to God without whom there neither is nor can be any motion of body or soul but the disorderly manner of desiring and eating contrary to the Law of God this is reducible as being a defect only to the defective will of man Davenant ibid. p. 175. As to the second instance hatred of God That the act terminated upon that object in complexo is evil and cannot be otherwise we deny not but then that is true of acts and undue
ends as Hospitality out of vain-glory of acts and undue circumstances as walking in the Fields when we should be at Church as of acts and undue objects whereof this is an instance And so all sinful actions are evil as to their substance which Mr. Howe hath not affirmed That hatred of God is not evil in it self because the act invaried the object but changed that act which was evil is become morally good So our Learned Bishop of Lincoln again Exerc. met p. 41. which he illustrates and proves by the instance of Adultery where the act being the same for the substance is altered in its moral respect by making the woman with whom I committed Adultery my wife Id. ibid. Which instance of our Learned Bishop is plain in the case of David and Bathsheba whose society together was unlawful before but lawful after their marriage They that desire further satisfaction in this point may do well to have recourse to a learned Discourse in our native Language of Mr. H. Hickman of the positivity of sin Obj. 2. One sin is the cause of another as original sin inherent as that stands opposed to original sin imputed is the cause of actual sins therefore sin is not meerly privative Sol. The privation which is in the natural propension of the will to sin in which natural propension original sin consiste is not the real efficient of evil actions but the will in regard of that propension is the real and true cause of evil actions So Baron wet § 5. n. 30. 33. Obj. 3. Our Divines do make a positive part in original sin Sol. Yet they hold sin to be only Privative But then it will be demanded how their assertions will agree together I Answer In inherent sin there is said to be a positive and a negative Quality This latter Divines call a want of original righteousness or not to be able to do good The former they call a pravity of nature or to be able to do evil only which is called Positive Legice because 't is expressed affirmatively whereas the latter is expressed negatively so Maccov op Post p. 83. r. fuse de hac re disserentem Gisb Voet. Disp Theol. p. 1. p. 1084 Arg. 2. If God hath a prede erminative concurrence to the most wicked actions it is then no way explicable how the influence and concurrence the holy God hath to the worst of actions is to be distinguished from that which he affords to the best wherein such inherently evil actions are less to be imputed to him who forbids them than to the malicious Tempter who prompts to them or to the actor that doth them or wherein not a great deal more Let. p. 32 33. which Argument Mr. Howe gives us more concisely afterward That God hath as much influence and concurrence to the worst actions as to the best as much or more than the sinner or the Tempter Postsc p. 25. viz. according to our Doctrine Answ 1. If our learned Adversary understands the antecedent as we do whom he opposes of the materiale of wicked actions we grant his consequence for we cannot yet see the inconvenience of owning that there is an universal or indifferent influence upon the actions of free Agents as such abstracted from their morality The actions of the understanding and will Physically considered are neither holy nor sinful those denominations being taken from the relation of the actions to the Law prescribed as a compliance with or deviation from it and therefore in linea Physica Gods influence and concurrence is the same when they are the substrate matter of moral evil and moral good 2. If he intends the formale or rather the most wicked actions in concreto we disown the antecedent as none of ours and complain of his disingenuity in pinning such an assertion upon our sleeve 3. Yet however for his satisfaction I shall let him know That besides the influence upon good and bad actions in what degree soever which we acknowledg common to both there are divers differences of the influence we own for distinguishing of good actions from bad 1. That as to good actions God does in genere physico re create those internal habits which he did concreate in the state of innocency with the several faculties in which they were respectively seated as knowledg in the understanding a rectitude of the will consisting in a compliance with the last dictates of the practical understanding that they might be actus primi or principles of the actus secundi or operations of the faculties in vertue of those habits which faculties he influences to reduce them to act by that influence which we call Predetermination But as to evil actions God insuses no evil neither indeed can he besides the repugnancy such an action would carry to his holiness because though sin be sometimes conceived by us per modum habitus positivi under the notion of a positive habit yet it is not properly so and so is not capable of production by that immediate efficiency which we call infusion as hath been in part demonstrated before 2. As to good actions God does in the Predetermination to them so excite to the action as that withal he adds new strength to the habits given whence those acts immediately proceed which he does not neither as to evil actions 3. We have a third difference from Mr. H's own concession The ordinary appointed way for the communication of this determinative influence is by our intervening consideration of the inducements which God represents to us in his Word viz. The Precepts Promises and Comminations which are th moral instruments of his Government Postsc p. 40. The meaning of which words is that God is not only a Physical but also a moral cause of good actions whereas 't is our sentiment that God is only a Physical cause of the actions to which sin inheres but not a moral cause of the sin adhering to them And if I do not too much trust my own judgment this observation is not contemptible for the evincing of it that the indifferency of the will to chuse or refuse the Object proposed by the understanding is not so natural to the will but that it may be inclined by an inherent quality to chuse or refuse one object rather than another As for the comparison which he makes between God the sinner and the Tempter upon our grounds and gives God the precedency of them both in his influence upon wicked actions 't is an odious and horrible calumny not backed with any proof as he intends it of such actions in the concrete i. e. as including with the action the sinfulness of it too Reply To it I reply That a short Horse is soon curried This slight objection is easily answered 1. Either Mr. Howe means as much physical influence or moral If the former we say God and the sinner have both a physical influence upon the action that is evil but the Tempter none at all and
that as to the evil of it their physical influence is alike i. e. they have none at all for sin not being a physical effect cannot have a physical cause If the latter besides that that influence is not in the Question the Sinner and the Tempter have influence and concurrence to wicked actions and God not at all for neither by Commands Counsels Threats nor Promises does he induce men to sin 2. Were it so yet the immediate concurrence which he acknowledges to all actions and so to sinful actions in conjunction with the notion he entertains with self-applause of the inseparableness of the evil of some actions from the actions themselves makes himself obnoxious to the same charge of making Gods concurrence with sinful actions to be as much or more than the Sinners or the Tempters Arg. 3. Lastly he charges the Predetermination of sinful actions with irreconcilableness with Gods wisdom and sincerity c. Postsc p. 25. by which c. I presume he intends in his Counsels Exhortations and what-ever means he uses to prevent them which are the expressions he uses in the Title-Page of his Letter in reference to Prescience Reply As to both of these perfections of God I am not aware of any thing well said by Mr. Howe for the reconcileableness of Gods Prescience with them which may not by a just proportion be applied to Gods Predetermination For the evincing whereof we will cast his Discourse into Paragraphs 1. To speak particularly of Gods wisdom 1. That there should be a direct and explicit contradiction between fore-knowing and dehorting we may at first sight perceive the terms cannot admit Let. p. 51. Reply The same may be said of Predetermining and dehorting though not simply as to the terms yet as to the things signified by them for the elicite acts of the will being the Object of Predetermination contested for we may at first sight perceive it cannot be compell'd and so as to the event infers but a necessity of infallibility as to the sinners doing what he is dehorted from which also Prescience does 2. Mr. Howe goes on Let it be supposed only that the blessed God hath belonging to his nature universal Prescience we will surely upon that supposition acknowledg it to belong to him as a perfection And were it reasonable to affirm that by a perfection he is disabled for Government or wer it a good consequence he foreknows all things he is therefore unfit to govern the world Let. p. 54. Reply And why may not we as well argue thus Let it be but supposed only that universal Predetermination belongs to Gods nature we will upon that supposition acknowledg it a perfection And were it reasonable to affirm that by a perfection that he not only conserves the powers of his creatures but reduces them to act he is disabled for government or were it a good consequence He is the first cause not only of all beings but of all actions as such therefore he is unfit to govern the world And I will add nay surely but the more fit in the present state of mankind not to intermeddle now with Angels because all the actions of men being either in whole or in part sinful he would have nothing to govern if he had not the government of all their actions and govern them he could not nor limit them nor turn them to good if he did not Predetermine them as hath been I trust clearly evinced 3. Would the supposition of such foreknowledg in God make that cease to be mans duty which had otherwise been so Let. p. 54. for what influence can foreknowledg have to alter or affect any way either the nature of the thing foreknown or the Temper of the person that shall do it any more than the present knowledg of the same thing now in doing p. 55. Reply And can Predetermination make that cease to be mans duty which otherwise had been so seeing that it alters not the nature of the thing the will of man nor the Temper of the person Predetermin'd but as it finds the will free so it leaves it and as it finds the person disposed by habitual inclinations so works upon him which is confirmed by that grave observation of his which we embrace as our cordial friend and confederate It were very unreasonable to imagine that God cannot in any case extraordinarily oversway the inclinations and determine the will of such a creture as over whom Gods general course of Government is by moral instruments viz. Man in a way agreeable enough to its nature Let. p. 141. Only we extend it further That supposing what hath been before proved that Predetermination includes a Perfection God can in all cases determine the will without forcing it to actions to which it hath a renitency for that were to alter the nature of the will and the temper of the person whose will it is And I add what influence can fore-determining have to alter the nature of the thing or person fore-determined more than immediate concurrence to the same action of the same person now in doing 4. But if what was otherwise mans duty be still his duty what can make it unfit that it be made known and declared to him to be so and how is that otherwise to be done than by these disputed means yea for this is the case what can make it less fit than that God should quit the right of his Government to his revolted creatures upon no other reason than only that he foresees they have a mind to invade it Let. p. 56. Reply All this Argumentation fits our Predetermination as well as Prescience wherein Mr. Howe and we agree what can make it unfit that God should acquaint man with his duty by proper means seeing Predetermination supposes such a foreknowledg as Mr. Howe supposes antecedent to Gods decree of the creatures having a mind to invade Gods right of Government if put under such and such circumstances or rather because we understand not any foreknowledg but of Possibilium things possible not Futurorum of things future antecedent to Gods decree seeing Gods determination of the Creatures will to invade his right without which he could not will so to do leaves the Creatures will as truly free from Co-action as if it exerted all its elicite acts only by a power derived from God and preserved apt and habile for action 4. But it may now be said All this reasoning says Mr. Howe tends but to establish this assertion that notwithstanding God did foreknow mans sin it is however necessary he forewarn him of it but it answers not the objected difficulty viz. How reasonably any such means are used for an unattainable end as it manifests the end mans obedience cannot be attained when it is foreknown he will not obey Let. p. 57. To this difficulty Mr. Howe answers That there is this noble and important end which Gods Edicts aim at viz. the Dignity and Decorum of his Government it self