because he is infallible Infallibility then is the proper ground of Implicit Faith and accordingly the Church of Rome assuming to her self the Character of Infallible does upon that Supposition rightly require it I say upon that supposition for she is right enough in her Consequence supposing her Principle to be true But the truth of it is that is Most Extravagant and such as carries in it such matchless Arrogance and Presumption as befits only him who as God sitteth in the temple of God shewing himself that he is God For God only is Infallible and therefore he only has right to require Implicit Faith And to him indeed it is due from every one of his Creatures in the highest Measure imaginable as is also Implicit Obedience upon the same Ground Of both which we have a signal Example in Abraham who when he was call'd by God to go out into a place which he should after receive for an Inheritance is said by Faith to have Obey'd and to have gone out not knowing whither he went 26. But now what can be more dark and inevident than this Implicit Faith It s Formal Reason indeed is sufficiently clear and it resolves at last into a Ground highly Rational and so may be said in that respect to be the highest Reason For certainly nothing can be more Reasonable than to believe whatever God who is Infallible reveals There is therefore no Darkness on this Side Nay even the Light it self does not shine more Clear But as for the Matter of it if I may call it so where nothing distinctly is believ'd that is sure as dark and obscure as can well be conceiv'd so dark as even to be Invisible For a Man to believe at large without any restriction or limitation whatever God shall propose to him let it be what it will not Knowing what that is like Abraham's going not knowing whither he went is such a dark and obscure act of Faith as has nothing clear in it but the Humility and Devotion of him who so believes This is a Faith Worthy of God as well as peculiar to him and 't is the great inevidence and obscurity of it that makes it so For so far is the Matter of it from having any Evidence in it that it is not so much as Evident what the Matter of it is Here then is the very Blackness of Darkness and he that has this infolded Faith as every true Believer has and can thus trust God in the Dark where he sees nothing but only the general Reason of his so doing is not likely in any of the more explicit instances of it to plead the inevidence of the Article to excuse his Infidelity or to deny his Faith to an otherwise sufficiently clear Revelation merely because it is above his shallow Reason 27. Upon what has been hitherto discours'd it will not be difficult to give in few words a Satisfactory Resolution of a Celebrated Question which among the Schoolmen has made a great many and that is whether Faith belongs to the Vnderstanding or to the Will It is plain by the Measures already laid down that it belongs to the Latter For Faith as all acknowledge is an Assent and Assent is a Species of Judgement and Judgement as has been shewn already is an act of the Will not of the Understanding whose only Operation is Perception and consequently Faith is an act of the Will consenting to imbracing acquiescing and reposing it self in what the Understanding represents as proposed and reveal'd by God And indeed unless Judgment and consequently Faith did belong to the Will as their proper and immediate Principle 't is impossible to Conceive how a Man should be blame-worthy for any of his Opinions or how he should stand accountable either for Error on the one hand or for Infidelity and Heresy on the other For if Faith be an act of the Understanding then since the only Operation of the Understanding is Perception the greatest Fault of an Infidel or a Heretic will be Non-Perception which indeed is not Error but Ignorance whereas Infidelity and Heresie are always supposed to include Error and to be also the worst of Errors And this Non-perception is only a Negation and such as resolves into want of Parts which is not a Moral but a Natural defect whereas Infidelity and Heresie as indeed all that is Faulty are understood to be Privations and Defects of a Moral Nature But then to make them so they must be voluntary nothing being faulty but what is so that is again they must be Wilful that is they must be acts of the Will and Consequently Faith which is the Habit whereof those Sins are Privations must also belong to the same Principle or else in short there would be neither Vertue in having it nor Vice in being without it And accordingly our Saviour in upbraiding the Iews with Infidelity does all along not only by Confequence but directly and expresly Charge it upon their Wills Ye will not come to me that ye may have Life 28. And thus I have gone thorough what I intended and what indeed is of greatest Consideration upon this Subject of Faith In the account of which if I differ from any Authors of the better Character that have either professedly or occasionally written upon it particularly Baronius and Dr. Pearson 't is not that I love to lay aside great Authorities or affect to be by my self but because I follow the best Light of my Understanding write with Freedom and Ingenuity what I think and endeavour to represent things as they are without having regard to Authority any further than I think it joyn'd with Truth and Reason Which shall also be my Rule in what remains of this Treatise In the Mean time what has been hitherto discours'd concerning Reason and Faith may serve as a good Preparation in order to an Account of the Great Question Concerning the Belief of things above Reason But before we enter upon any thing of that Nature 't is fit the Distinction of Above Reason and Contrary to Reason be Consider'd and rightly Stated which is the task allotted for the next Chapter CHAP. III. The Distinction of things Contrary to Reason and above Reason Consider'd 1. THere are some Distinctions in the World that are without a Difference though Difference be the Ground of all Distinction and this by some is pretended to be of that Number who will have the Parts of it to be Coincident and that Contrary to Reason and above Reason signifie in reality alike and are but different Expressions for one and the same thing And though they may be reasonably suspected to do this to serve the interest of a Cause for whose advantage it would be to have this Distinction taken away yet they have the Confidence to Charge the same upon those that hold it pretending that it is only a dextrous Shift and Evasion invented by Subtile Men as an Expedient to relieve the Distress of
Perception More intire for here again we have the prospect lying altogether before us in its full and whole extent whereas in the other it opens gradually and successively the Light stealing in upon us more and more as we go further and further as it does upon Men that travel toward the East To which may be further added that Intuitive Knowledge supposes and proceeds from perfection of the Understanding whose Perceptive Faculty is hereby argued to be very bright and clear For it must be a very clear Perception to perceive the Relations of Ideas by the very Ideas themselves Whereas Demonstrative Knowledge and the necesslty of Reasoning in order to it is founded upon the narrowness of our Intellectual Capacities which not being able to perceive the Truth or Falshood of a Proposition by the single collation of the two Ideas that compose it are fain to make use of a third as a common measure between them and so from the consideration of something more clear and better known to proceed in the search of what is more obscure and less known Accordingly we attribute the way of Intuition to the most Perfect Beings God and Angels Though as to Angels I make no great doubt but that in the Consideration of very compounded Questions and such as include a multiplicity of Relations they are fain to use Reasoning as well as we as in the more simple ones we use Intuition as well as they though perhaps after a much more perfect manner and by such compendious and facilitating Rules as we know nothing of And as they may be supposed when they do reason to reason better and more expeditely than we so with equal probability it may be presumed considering the great disproportion of Natures and States between us that they use Intuition in very many things wherein we are forc'd to have recourse to Reasoning 21. Hereafter indeed when as the Scripture tells us all that is imperfect about us shall be done away and we shall be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not only like but equal to the Angels we shall be able to see 't is to be hoped by Intuition too and that many things which we here not only were ignorant of but thought impossible things that were not only above our Reason but as we thought contrary to it We shall not only be able to reason better than we do now but shall in most things not stand in need of any Reasoning at all but shall with one simple View glance over and through the Relations of Ideas and so have an intire prospect of the fair Field of Truth But at present we must travel it over and that with many a weary step there being but very few things that we know by Intuition no more than just to give us a taste of the great Priviledge of Heaven and to incourage both our Desires and our Hopes of that perfect State when we shall be so far from needing any Logic to direct us in our reasoning that we shall have in comparison but little need or use even of Reason it self But in this present state of our Nonage and Infirmity our Necessity of it is very great For our Intuition is so short-sighted and reaches so very little a way that as if we knew no more than what we can by this Means attain to the Compass of our Knowledge would be so very Scanty that we should not have near light enough to direct us in our journey through the World So if we would Know more and see to a further distance from us we must assist our Feeble Eye by the Advantage of a Glass Now Reason is this Glass Naturally indeed a very good Prospective but which Logic and especially Algebra has improved into a Telescope But yet still 't is but an Artificial way of seeing and all Art supposes and argues a Defect in Nature And though it be a great help yet we know 't is no very great Commendation to a man's eye-sight to see with Spectacles 22. And why then are we Proud And why proud of that which should rather deject us and make us Humble of our Imperfections and our Defects Our Natural Reason is a Mark of our Limitation as Creatures and our Artificial one of our Infirmity as Men and both together give us but little Light and help us to see but a very little way off and that after the most imperfect and defective Manner such as upbraids our Ignorance at the very same time that it increases our Knowledge our Reason not so much inlightning as betraying the Darkness of our Understandings Some few things indeed we know as Angels do by Intuition or else we could not so much as reason like Men but still the main Fund of our Knowledge lies in the Rational and Demonstrative kind and we are fain to use Clues and Chains to Conduct our Thoughts through the infinite Mazes and Labyrinths of Truth to proceed in a Train from one thing to another to walk step by step and feel out our way with wariness and Caution like Men that go in the Dark And such indeed is our state in this Body and in this World 'T is now a kind of Night with us as having for the Most part only the Lesser Light Reason for our Difection As for the Greater Intâ—ition we have little more of that than of the refracted Beams of the Sun a little before its rising and after its setting enough to make a Twilight a Mixture of Light and Darkness but such a Mixture as is very unequal Darkness making the far greater part of the Composition And is not this Consideration sufficient if there were nothing else to take down our Pride and inspire us with a Sentiment of the profoundest Humility and Self-dejection If not let us Consider that even this Lesser Light that is to govern our present Night and Darkness does oftentimes fail us and suffer an Eclipse Let us Consider that we have a darker side yet and are subject to a Much lower Dispensation There being many things and those of the highest Nature and greatest importance wherein our Reason is utterly at a loss and cannot help us out and with respect to which being destitute of Sight we must be Content to walk altogether by Faith Concerning which in the following Chapter CHAP. II. Of Faith 1. FAith is a Term of great Ambiguity as well as Reason but not to insist upon the several Acceptations of it as it is used either in Divine or in Humane Writings I shall only define in what sense I here take it and then proceed to such Considerations upon it as may serve to lay open its Nature so far as is requisite to the Present Design 2. I do not take Faith here for the Object of Faith but for the Act or Habit of Faith and that not Ethically consider'd as it denotes the Moral Vertues of Veracity Fidelity Honesty and the like but Logically as it signifies a certain Assent Judgement or
not to be comprehended or accounted for by it But this will cross my way again in another place and therefore I shall not anticipate here what further Considerations I may have occasion to bestow upon it there 16. To return therefore I say that this Obscurity and inevidence that is in Faith and upon whose account it is commonly said to be an inevident Assent does not belong to its formal Reason which you see may be clear enough as clear as any Principle of Natural Science but only to the Matter or Object of it That is in other words the inevidence does not lie in the Reason of Believing but in the Nature of the thing Believ'd Not that the matter of Faith again is wholy and all over without Evidence for then there would be no reason to believe it but only that it has no evidence from within and from the Nature of the thing it self as was remarqu'd before Not that this again is so to be understood neither as if the Proposition to be believ'd were not so much as simply intelligible as to the very litteral sense and direct signification of its Terms No we are no more to believe we Know not what than to believe we Know not why and whatever Darkness there may be in Faith it is still so much a Luminous Assent and an Act of Reason as to require that we understand the simple Meaning of the Proposition we are to believe as well as the Grounds of Credibility upon which it Challenges our Assent For the general Object of Faith is Truth and Truth is the relation of Connexion between Ideas I say Ideas for Truth does not lie in Sounds or Words but in Things Therefore to believe such a Thing to be True is the same as to believe that there is a Connexion between such Ideas But then a Man must know what those Ideas are or else how can he believe they are connected Therefore he must understand something more than the Terms themselves he must also have the Ideas of those Terms which is the same as to under stand the Meaning and Signification of them And indeed he that has no Idea or Conception of what he believes believes he knows not what and he that believes he knows not what cannot be properly said to believe any thing In all Faith therefore the Proposition Must be simply intelligible and though the Truth of it be to be Believ'd yet the Meaning of it must be understood 17. For we are again Carefully to distinguish between the Meaning of a Proposition and the Truth of a Proposition The meaning of a Proposition is only the Determination of the Ideas that are signified by such Terms the Truth of it is the Union or Connexion that is between those Ideas Now though a Man does not see the Connexion that is between the Ideas of that Proposition he is said to Believe yet he must in some measure perceive the Ideas themselves because in believing the Proposition he is supposed to believe that such Ideas are so related and Connected together When therefore 't is said that the Matter of Faith is inevident as to the intrinsic Nature of the thing the inevidence must not be thought to lie in the Ideas whereof the Proposition to be Believ'd Consists but in the Connexion of those Ideas that is not in the Meaning of the Proposition but in the Truth of it which is properly the Object of Faith as the Ideas themselves are of Perception Which again by the way may serve to discover another Instance of Impertinency in the Reasoning of those who when they are Maintaining that there can be no Article of Faith above Reason divert into pompous Flourishes and Declamations about the Intelligibility of the Objects of Faith and the utter impossibility of Believing what is not intelligible As if we denied the simple intelligibility of the Proposition or would have Men believe they know not what which certainly would be a strange degree of Implicit Faith and more Nonsensical than that of the Collier or as if that Proposition which is clear enough as to its simple Meaning might not be inevident and so above Reason as to its Truth or in other words as if Clearness of Ideas might not consist with Obscurity of their Connexion 18. But then it must be observ'd again that when we say that the Inevidence that is in the Matter of Faith respects the Truth of the Proposition not the Meaning of it or the Connexion of the Ideas and not the very Ideas themselves this is not so to be understood neither as if the Matter of Faith even thus consider'd were Absolutely and in its self necessarily inevident and such as could not possibly be known without altering its Nature and ceasing to be any longer the Object of Faith I know the contrary Supposition has prevail'd in some Schools where it passes almost for Principle and Maxim that Knowledge and Faith are mutually Exclusive of each other that the same thing cannot be at once the Object of both and that therefore if a thing be believ'd it cannot be known and if known that it cannot be believ'd St. Austin was of this Opinion and has in many places declared his mind to this purpose particularly in his XL Treatise of his Exposition upon St. Iohn's Gospel And his Authority has recommended it as it did most other things to several of the Schoolmen particularly Aquinas whence it has been transmitted down among many Modern Writers of the Systematical way both Philosophers and Divines But we must follow Reason before Authority and whoever can be prevail'd with to lay the latter quite aside and to use the other as he ought will I believe clearly perceive that nothing hinders but that the same Proposition may be at once the Object of both Faith and Science or that the Same thing may be at the same time both Known and Believ'd provided it be by different Mediums according to the diversity of the respective Acts. 19. For not to enter into the wrangle and Dust of the Schools upon this Occasion it may be sufficient to consider that there is no manner of Opposition between Faith and Knowledge or the Most evident Assent as to the Essence of the Proposition that being not supposed to be denied in the one which is Affirm'd in the other or the contrary but only as to the Medium of the Act. And that 't is not the Absolute Nature of the thing Believ'd but the Quality of the Motive that specifies Faith and distinguishes it from other Assents So that 't is no matter what the Absolute Nature of the thing be in it self whether it be evident or not evident Knowable or not Knowable provided it be assented to upon the proper Medium and Motive of Faith that is upon Authority without any respect had to the Natural evidence of the thing though otherwise never so evident in its own Absolute Nature so as to be the Object of Science
being no reason from the Nature of Faith that requires it should which may consist with Evidence though it proceeds not upon it and has no regard to it as a Motive So then the formal Reason of Faith is always Clear the Matter of it Absolutely consider'd may be clear or not clear as it happens according as the Nature of the thing is but as Believ'd or as Consider'd under the formality of being the Object of Faith so it is always inevident and Obscure as being not supposed to be assented to for the sake of its Evidence even when it has any but wholy upon another Account already sufficiently represented 23. And thus having struck some Light into the Darkness of Faith by stating and explaining with what exactness I could in what Sense it is an inevident Assent I cannot forbear Observing by the way though a little of the soonest of what Service this Account may be towards the grand Question of Believing things above Reason For if Faith be an inevident Assent so far at least as not to respect the Evidence of its Object why may not a thing be believ'd though it be above Reason For what though it be above Reason is it therefore above Faith Has Faith any regard to Evidence Or is it determin'd by any Rational Motive I mean that is taken from the Nature of the Object Even when a thing is evident Faith is not supposed to assent to it because of its Evidence and why then may not a thing be believ'd though it be not evident Some Contend that Faith and Evidence cannot possibly consist together and according to them Not only what is inevident may be believ'd but whatever is believ'd must be inevident But this I look upon and have already shewn to be a Mistake And 't is a Mistake in the Extremity too For I take it to be every whit as much an Extreme to say that the Object of Faith is always inevident as to say that it is always evident However it is always inevident so far as Believ'd which is the Middle Point between the two extremes The Nature of Faith requires at least this Relative inevidence of the Object whatever it be in its own Nature and we need no More For if the Object of Faith be alwayes inevident so far as Believ'd then will it not follow that it May be believ'd though inevident For my part I see nothing that should hinder this Consequence if the Principle it proceeds upon be right The Principle is and a very moderate one sure the generality of Writers straining the Matter a great deal higher that the Object of Faith is inevident as far as Believ'd The Consequence is that therefore a thing may be believ'd though inevident 'T is true indeed one of these is an Absolute and the other only a Relative inevidence But this signifies Nothing to the Argument For why may not a thing really and in it self inevident be believ'd when even that which is Evident is Consider'd by Faith as inevident Why then 't is all one as to Faith as if it were so indeed For what does the Evidence signify or what real alteration does it make if Faith has no regard to it nor Consideration of it And what should hinder then but that a thing really inevident may be believ'd especially if reveal'd by God himself and concerning himself The short is Faith as Faith has no regard to Evidence I mean that of the thing and Faith as Divine has no need of it and therefore why an inevident thing may not be believ'd is what I do not understand and would be glad to Learn 24. But to return for I look upon this as too much a digression from the present and too much a Prevention of what is to follow to be further pursued after having thus discours'd of the Nature of Faith in General and the double Distribution of it into Humane and Divine with proper Considerations upon each of them it remains that it be now further consider'd that each of these may be either Explicit or Implicit Then we are said to believe Explicitly when we believe determinately such or such a thing in particular distinctly knowing what that Particular thing is And then Implicitly when we believe indeterminately and at large whatever is proposed to us by such an Authority not knowing what in particular is proposed or what it is we Believe Which though it seems to carry the Appearance of an Assent too blind and hood-winkt to be the act of a Reasonable Creature may yet in its proper place become him as much as the other and indeed is every whit as rational an Assent in its Ground and Principle For all Explicit Faith is founded upon Implicit and has Implicit Faith in it 25. To understand both this and the Nature of Implicit Faith the better we are to Consider what has been already intimated that Faith proceeds upon Premisses as well as Science and is the Conclusion of a Syllogism And I further Note what perhaps may not be unworthy the Observation of the Curious that the Major Proposition in Faith Explicit is the Conclusion in Faith Implicit as may be seen in the Syllogism before set down Whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is Reveal'd by God Therefore this is true The Major Proposition here whatever is reveal'd by God is true is the Conclusion of Implicit Faith whose act is as much to believe to be true whatever God reveals as the act of Explicit Faith is to believe that this or that in particular is so So that Explicit Faith proceeds upon Implicit borrows from it its Conclusion for its Principle and begins where the other leaves off Just as in the Subalternation of Sciences that which is a Conclusion in one is a Principle in the other so 't is here in the Subalternation of these two Faiths whereof that which is Explicit may be said to be Subalternated to that which is Implicit Let not any therefore vilify or disparage Implicit Faith as a blind and irrational Assent since it lays a ground for Explicit which serves it self of it using its Conclusion as a Principle even as what is a Conclusion in Geometry is a Principle in Perspective And as Geometry is therefore accounted the Superiour Science so ought implicit Faith to be reckon'd as the Superiour Faith upon whose Conclusion the other proceeds and which it self proceeds thus Whatever is reveal'd by him that is Infallible is true God is Infallible Therefore whatever is reveal'd by God is true Here besides that 't is plain to be seen that the Conclusion of this last Syllogism is the Principle of the precedent One and that Explicit Faith supposes what is proved in Implicit it may be further noted that Implicit Faith as being the highest degree of Faith is due only to the highest that is to an Infallible Authority the reason why whatever is reveal'd by God is here Concluded to be true being
of Reason we must Assent to nothing but what has an internal Evidence and what in its self and by its own Lights is Comprehensible by us as they seem to mean or else their distinction of the Case of Reason and the Case of Revelation is here impertinent then I conceive that they set too narrow limits to our Assent in Matters of Reason when they allow it to be given only to things which in this sense are Evident to us For 't is plain that there are many things in Nature which we fee are True and must be True and so not only may but cannot help Assenting to them though at the same time we are not able to Comprehend how they are or can possibly be 7. Not that our Assent is then Blind and wholly without Evidence for then we might as well Assent to the contrary as to what we do and would do better not to Assent at all but only that it has none from within and from the intrinsic Nature of the Object but only from some External Consideration much after the same manner as it is in â—atch In both which there may be a Clear Reason why we should Assent to an Obscure thing But then as the internal Obscurity does not destroy the External Evidence so neither does the External Evidence strike any Light into the internal Obscurity or in other words as the Reason for Assenting is never the less Clear because the Matter assented to is Obscure so neither is the Matter assented to ever the less Obscure because the Reason for assenâ—ing to it is Clear And yet notwithstanding this internal Obscurity of the Matter we assent to it because of the prevailing Light of the External Evidence And this we do not only in Matters of Faith according to the Restriction of some but in the things of Nature and Reason too where we are oftentimes forced by the pressing urgency of certain External and Collateral Considerations to assent to things internally obscure and whose very possibility we cannot Comprehend as is plain in the great Question of the Divisibility of Quantity and other Instances whereof every Thinking Man's Obseâ—â—ation cannot but have already furnish'd him with variety The Incomprehensibility then of a thing is non just Objection against our Assent to it even in Matters of a Rational Nature much less then is it in Matters of Faith For if not in Matters that belong to the Court of Reason and where she sits as Judge then much less in things that are not of her proper Jurisdiction and if notwithstanding the internal inevidence of an Object we think fit to assent to it upon Rational Considerations much more may we and ought we upon the Authority of the Infallible God 8. Indeed if whatsoever is Above our Reason were also as some pretend as Contrary to it and there were nothing true but what was also Comprehensible and so the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true then I conâ—ess we could not as Rational Creatures assent to an incomprehensible Proposition upon any Consideration whatsoever No not even that of Divine Authority 'T is true indeed there could then be no such Authority for Incomprehensible things But if there were 't is impossible we should regard it because we could not have greater assurance either of the Existence or of the Truth of it than we have already upon this Supposition that the things reveal'd are not true But now if this Supposition be no more than a Supposition if to be above Reason does not involve any Contrariety to it if there are incomprehensible Truths and Consequently the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument oâ— it s not being true all which has been already proved then 't is plain that what is an incomprehensible may yet be a Believable Object because within the Possibility of Truth and then to render it actually believ'd there needs only some External Evidence either from Reason or Authority For what should hinder our Assent to an Incomprehensible thing when we have plain Evidence from without for it and its own internal Obscurity is no Argument against it 'T is plain therefore that we ought to give our Assent And since we do so oftentimes upon a Ground of Reason much more ought we upon that more Firm and Immoveable ground of Revelation The short is whatever is no Objection against the Truth of a thing is none against the Credibility of it since Truth is the General Object of Faith unless you will say that a thing is unfit to be believ'd upon any other account besides want of Truth and therefore since we have already shewn that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Truth of it it visibly follows that it is no Argument against the Belief of it neither Therefore an Incomprehensible thing may be believ'd and accordingly he that refuses to believe any thing is bound to give a better Reason for it than because it is Incomprehensible 9. If it be said that this is reason enough because Faith is a Rational Act and therefore what is above the Comprehension of Reason is as much above a Rational Belief to this besides what I have already remarqu'd upon this Occasion in the Chapter of Faith I here further reply that it is true indeed and on both sides agreed that Faith is a Rational Act but in what Sense is the Question There are two very different Senses according to which it may be said to be so either in regard of the Clearness of its Formal Reason or in regard of the Clearness of its Object Either because it is founded upon an External Evidence or Argument for believing or because it proceeds upon an Internal Evidence that appears in the very Nature of the thing Believ'd Iâ— Faith be said to be a Rational Act in the latter Sense the Assertion is then False for so that â—s in respect of the Object we have shâ—wn it to be an inevident Assent But i◠〈◊〉 be said to be a Rational Act in the former Sense then indeed it is true but nothing to the purpose since nothing hinders but that this External Evidence may well consist with an Internal Inevidence or in other words that the Clearness of the Reason for Believing may stand with the Obscurity of the Object Believ'd And therefore though Faith be a Rational Act yet it does not hence â—ollow that what is Above Reason is also above Faith and cannot rationally be believ'd because the Act of Faith is said to be Rational Not in respect of the Evidence of the Object but only that of its Formal Reason or Motive And therefore though there be no Evidence in the Object yet it is not thereby render'd uncapable of being the Matter of Faith because the Evidence which Faith as a Rational Act supposes is wholly of another kind There seems indeed a kind of opposition as to the Sound between Faith's being an Act of Reason
and the believing what is Above Reason And this it may be is that which imposes upon the Minds or the Ears shall I say of them that urge it as an Objection I cannot imagine what else should for I 'm sure there is no Contradiction in the Sense 'T is true indeed Evidence in the Act and not Evidence in the Act are Contradictories because ad Idem and so are Not Evidence in the Object and Evidence in the Object for the same reason But there is no Contradiction between Evidence in the Act and No Evidence in the Object and therefore these may stand together though the other cannot 10. But to lay open the Fallacy of this great and very popular Objection yet a little more to the Eye though it must be a very blind one that does not see it already I will put it into Form and give it a Formal Answer If Faith be a Rational Act then what is Above Reason cannot rationally be Believ'd But Faith is a Rational Act Ergo. For Answer to this I distinguish If by Rational Act be meant an Act founded upon Internal Evidence or the Evidence of the Object then I deny the Minor Faith is not so a Rational Act. But if by Rational Act be meant an Act founded upon External Evidence or the Evidence of its Formal Reason or Motive then indeed I grant the Minor but deny the Consequence which is none at all for it does not at all follow because Faith is a Rational Act meaning by it that it proceeds upon External Evidence and that there is a clear Reason for Believing that therefore the thing Believâ—d may not from within and in its own Nature be altogether inevident and so above the Comprehension of Reason For though Evidence be Contradictory to Not Evidence in the â—ame yet Evidence in the Act is no way Contradictory to inevidence in the Object and Consequently does not at all exclude it They may therefore both stand together and Consequently what is above Reason may be believ'd for any thing that this Celebrated Objection from Faith's being a Rational Act makes to the Contrary which truly is so gross and palpable a Sophism that I cannot but wonder how it could ever impose upon so many Learned Men as it has done and some of them very acute and nice Considerers of things But I hope the Fallaciousness of it is by this so plainly and fully detected that I shall not think those Heads worth much informing that shall be further imposed on by it 11. But what then shall we say to that Great and Fundamental Maxim so pressingly inculcated by Des Castes and his Followers and not disallow'd of by others that we are to assent to notâ—ing but what is Clear and Evident If to nothing but what is Clear and Evident how then to what is Obscure and Inevident Or if to what is Obscure and Inevident how then to nothing but what is Clear and Evident Do not these seem flat Contradictions one to the other and how then shall we adjust the Matter between them It must be either by denying that Cartesian Maxim to be true or by shewing that though it be true it does not Contradict the Assertion here maintain'd but is Consistent with it The First way I shall not take I allow the Maxim to be true and not only so but to be withal of the greatest importance of any that can be given for the direction of the Mind of Man in order to the avoiding of Errour The only Remedy and Caution against which is never to let our Judgments prevent our Conceptions or to Assent to any thing that we have only a Confuse Notion of and where we see only by halves and with an imperfect Light or perhaps do not see at all but to have a Clear Understanding of the Matter before we adventure to judge of it and to Maintain an Evidence in all our Reasonings Which accordingly is made by M. Malebranche the First of those Rules which in his Treatise of Method he lays down to be observ'd in the inquiry after Truth And indeed to do otherwise is to make a wrong use of our Intellectual Powers particularly of that Liberty we have to suspend Judgment till the fulness of Evidence requires it and the want of Observing this Rule is also the Occasion of most of our Errours and Wrong Assents as the same Excellent Person shews it to have been in particular to the Authors of the Scholastic Philosophy 12. I shall not therefore go about to salve my own Assertion by denying Des Cartes's Maxim but rather by shewing that according to the true Sense and intendment of it it does not Contradict it But first we must see what the true Sense of it is or rather in what Sense it is true though this may be without much difficulty Collected by any attentive Reader from what has been already said in several places of this Chapter wherein I have in great Measure prevented this Objection But to Consider it more directly To verifie this Maxim that we are to Assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident the usual way has been to distinguish between Matters of Faith and Matters of Reason In Matters of Faith say they we are to believe many things which we cannot Comprehend And here then it seems this Rule must be laid aside But in Matters of Reason we must Assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident And here then it seems it holds Accordingly when 't is Objected against certain Articles of Faith that they are not to be comprehended by Reason 't is usual to reply that these things do not belong to Reason c. implying that if they did then indeed the Objection would be good and the incomprehensibility of such things would be an Argument against assenting to them which implies again that in Matters of Reason we must not Assent to any thing but what is Clear and Evident though in Matters of Faith we may But we have remarqu'd already that even in Matters of Pure Reason we are forc'd to Assent to many things which we cannot comprehend and that even in Matters of Faith we do in a Certain Sense Assent upon Clear Evidence This Distinction therefore will not do 13. In stead therefore of distinguishing between Matters of Faith and Matters of Reason I think it will be better to distinguish of Evidence We are to Assent to Nothing save what is Clear and Evident says our Maxim Very Good Now if by Evidence here be meant internal Evidence and the Sense be that are to assent to nothing but what in its own Nature and by a Light intrinsic to it is Evident then the Maxim is False and that not only in Matters of Faith but also in Matters of Reason too wherein we find our selves often Constrain'd to assent to things that have not this internal Evidence but are as to what respects the Nature of the things themselves altogether Obscure and
that of the Subject or to word it more Intelligibly though perhaps not altogether so Scholastically into that of the Thing and that of the Understanding Reason objective or of the Thing is again very various Sometimes it is taken for Truth and that both for Truth of the Thing namely the Essential relations that are between Ideas and for Truth of the Proposition which is its conformity to those Ideal Relations Thus it is taken the first way for the Ideal Relations themselves when we inquire whether the Reasons of Good and Evil are ab Eterno meaning by Reasons the Essential Relations or Differences Thus again it is taken the second way for the agreement or conformity of a Proposition with those Essential Relations as when we say This is Sense and Reason meaning that the Proposition is true and conformable to the Nature of things Sometimes again it is taken for the Medium Argument or Principle whereby as Truth is proved as when we say Do you prove this by Reason or by Authority Sometimes again for the Rules and Measures of Reasoning as suppose I should say That Reason is the â—ittest Study for a Rational Creature I should be supposed to mean those Rules and Measures whereby we ought to reason and so to intend a commendation of Logick Sometimes again it is taken for Moderation as when we say There is Reason in all things Sometimes for Right Equity or Justice the observation of which is commonly call'd Doing a Man Reason It is also taken for the End or Motive of an Action as when we say For what Reason do you this or that in which sense it is used by the Poet stat pro Ratione voluntas 4. Come we now to the Consideration of Reason as 't is taken subjectively the other general part of its distinction in which also there is some variety of Acceptation For it is sometimes taken for the Act sometimes for the Habit and sometimes for the Natural Power or Faculty of Reasoning For the Act as when we say of a Man asleep that he is deprived of his Reason For the Habit as when we say of a Man that he has lost his Reason when his Intellectuals are mightily disorder'd and impair'd by a Disease For the Natural Power or Faculty of Reasoning as when we say That Man is a Creature indued with Reason Which being a Proposition of Universal Truth and that proceeds of Man as Man must necessarily be verified of every Man and consequently must not be meant of the Act or Habit of Reason for these are not at all times in every Man but of the Natural Power or Faculty of it which is not lyable to be suspended as the Act nor lost as the Habit but is Essential to the Nature of Man that which constitutes him what he is and distinguishes him from other Creatures and consequently is inseparable from him whether asleep or awake whether sick or well 5. Reason thus consider'd as it stands for a Power or Faculty in Human Nature may be taken again either largely or strictly Largely for the Power of Thinking or Perception in general whereby a Man is capable of knowing or understanding any Truth let it be by what means or in what order or method soever Strictly for the same Power proceeding after a certain special manner and according to a peculiar order and method namely from the knowledge of one thing to that of another or to the knowledge of what is as yet obscure and unknown by the knowledge of what is more clear and better known concerning which a fuller account by and by 6. After having thus distinguisht with what exactness of order I could the several Acceptations of the word Reason I shall in the next place define in which of these Senses I now use it By Reason then in this place I intend not Reason of the Object but that of the Subject and that not as to the Act or Habit but as to the Natural Power or Faculty of Reasoning And that again not as it is taken strictly as it uses a certain particular process in its operation but as it is taken more at large for the power of perceiving or knowing in general According to which Sense Reason is here the same with Vnderstanding And so it is often used as when we say The Reason of a Man teaches him this or that meaning his Understanding at large or the general Power whereby he understands For if Science which strictly taken is that particular kind of Knowledge which is acquired by Demonstration be yet often used more largely for Knowledge in general why may not Reason the great Principle and Faculty of Science which strictly taken signifies a Power of Knowing by such a certain way and in such a certain manner of proceeding be taken as well in a greater latitude for the Power of Knowing or Understanding in general 7. And the Nature of the Subject and Question now under Consideration requires that it should be thus used here For when 't is inquired whether there be any thing in Religion above Reason the meaning certainly can be no other than whether there be any thing which surpasses the Power and Capacity of a Mans Understanding to comprehend or account for And he that says there is nothing in Religion above Reason is supposed to mean that there is nothing in it beyond the comprehension of a Mans Natural Understanding nothing but what he can profound and fathom And so also he that says that there are Mysteries in Christianity or things above our Reason must be presumed to mean that there are Reveal'd Truths that so far exceed the measure of our Intellectual Faculties and are of a size so disproportionate to our Minds that with all the force and penetration of Spirit and the utmost application of Thought we cannot possibly comprehend them be our method of proceeding what it will I do not intend by this to state the Question which shall be done more fully in its due place but only to give an account of one of its Terms and to shew that by Reason I both do and should here mean A Mans Natural Power of Knowing or Understanding in general In which use of the word 't is no 〈◊〉 Authority to me that the Excellent and most Accurate Author of L' Art de Penser defines Logâ—ck to be an Art of well conducting ones Reason in the knowledge of things Where by Reason 't is plain he must mean the same as Vnderstanding 8. What this Power or Principle of Understanding is in its self or in its own Nature and Essence I do not pretend to know as not having any clear Idea of my own Soul and indeed as not knowing my self at all by Idea but only by a confuse Sentiment of internal Consciousness And therefore I shall not go about to examine what it is For the same reason also I shall not set my self to consider whether the Understanding be any Power or Faculty really
much Heathenized Religion of some Christians may also very deservedly retire behind the Curtain and decline coming to the Light for fear the Absurdities and Monstrous Inconsistencies of it should be laid open But certainly there is not any thing neither Doctrine nor Precept in that true Religion that is reveal'd by God in Evangelical Christianity that need fly the Light of Reason or refuse to be tried by it Christian Religion is all over a Reasonable Service and the Author of it is too reasonable a Master to impose any other or to require as his Vicar does that Men should follow him blindfold and pull out their eyes to become his Disciples No he that Miraculously gave Sight to so many has no need of nor pleasure in the Blind nor has his Divine Religion any occasion for such Judges or Professors For it is the Religion of the Eternal and uncreated Wisdom the Divine Word the true Light of the World and the Universal Reason of all Spirits and 't is impossible that he should reveal any thing that Contradicts the Measures of sound Discourse or the immutable Laws of Truth as indeed it is that any Divine Revelation should be truly Opposite to Right Reason hower it may sometimes be Above it or that any thing should be Theologically true which is Philosophically False as some with great profoundness are pleas'd to distinguish For the Light of Reason is as truly from God as the Light of Revelation is and therefore though the latter of these Lights may exceed and out-shine the former it can never be Contrary to it God as the Soveraign Truth cannot reveal any thing against Reason and as the Soveraign Goodness he cannot require us to believe any such thing Nay to descend some degrees below this he cannot require us to believe not only what is against Reason but even what is without it For to believe any thing without Reason is an unreasonable Act and 't is impossible that God should ever require an unreasonable act especially from a Reasonable Creature 5. We therefore not only acknowledge the use of Reason in Religion but also that 't is in Religion that 't is chiefly to be used so far are we from denying the Use of it there And it is a little unfairly done of our Adversaries so much to insinuate the Contrary as they do For I cannot take it for less than such an Insinuation when they are arguing with us against the Belief of the Christian Mysteries to run out as they usually do into Harangues and Flourishes whereof by the way I know none more guilty than the Author of Christianity not Mysterious about the Reasonableness of the Christian Religion and the Rational Nature of Faith what a Reasonable Act the One is and what a Reasonable Service the Other is c. as if we were against the Use of Reason in Religion or were for a Blind Groundless and Unaccountable Faith or if because we hold the Belief of things above Reason therefore we are for having no Reason for our Belief This I say is an unfair Insinuation and such as argues some want either of Judgment or Sincerity I don't know which in those that suggest it For they seem plainly by running so much upon this Vein to imply as if it were part of the Question between us whether there be any Use of Reason in Religion or whether Faith is to be Founded upon Reason or No. But Now this is no part of the Controversie that lies between us we acknowledge the Use of Reason in Religion as well as they and are as little for a Senseless and Irrational Faith as they can be This therefore being Common to us both is no part of the Question and they do ill to insinuate that it is by so many Popular Declamatory Strains upon the Reasonableness of Religion and in particular of Faith whereas they do or should know that the thing in Question between us is not whether there be any Use of Reason to be made in Believing but only what it is or wherein the true Use of it does Consist 6. Now this we may determine in a few words having already laid the grounds of it For since the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Concluding Argument against the Truth of it nor Consequently against the Belief of it as is shewn in the three foregoing Chapters it is plain that the proper Office and Business of a Believers Reason is to Examin and Inquire Not whether the thing proposed be Comprehensible or not but only whether it be Reveal'd by God or No since if it be the Incomprehensibleness of it will be no Objection against it That therefore ought to be no part of its Questistion or Deliberation because indeed it is not to the purpose to Consider whether such a thing be when if it were it would be no just Objection The only Considerable thing then here is whether such a Proposition be indeed from God and has him for its Author or no. And here Reason is to clear her Eyes put the Matter in the best Light call in all the Assistance that may be had both from the Heart and the Head and determine of the thing with all the Judgement and all the Sincerity that she can But as to the Comprehensibility or Incomprehensibility of the Article this is quite besides the Question and ought therefore to be no part of her scruting or debate since if it were never so much above her Comprehension it would be never the less proper Object for her Belief 7. The Sum is the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Belief of it therefore in the believing of a thing the proper work of my Reason is not to Consider whether it be incomprehensible But when a thing is proposed to me as from God all that my Reason has to do in this Case is Seriously Soberly Diligently Impartially and I add Humbly to Examine whether it comes with the true Credentials of his Authority and has him for its real Author or no. This is all that Reason has to do in this Matter and when she has done this she is to rise from the Seat of Judgement and resign it to Faith which either gives or refuses her Assent Not as the thing proposed is Comprehensible or not Comprehensible but as 't is either Revealâ—d or not Reveal'd CHAP. IX An Application of the foregoing Considerations to the Mysteries of Christianity 1. HAving thus raised the Shell of our Building to its due â—itch we have now only to Roof it by making a Short Application of the Principles laid down and setâ—led in the Former Chapters to the Mysteries of the Christian Religion against the Truth and Belief of which it plainly appears from the Preceding Considerations that there lies now no Reasonable Objection For if Human Reason be not the Measure of Truth and if therefore the Incomprehensibility of a â—hing to Human Reason be no Argument of its 〈◊〉 being True